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ABSTRACT 
 
Oren M. Abeles: The Agricultural Climax and Darwin’s Evolutionary Rhetoric 
(Under the direction of Jordynn Jack) 
 
This dissertation explores Charles Darwin’s encounter with an increasingly modern style 
of English agricultural rhetoric that emerged in the late 1700’s, analyzing how figurative 
language in those texts helped Darwin articulate his theory of natural selection. It argues that 
agricultural depictions of cultural change and biological power were essential to Darwin’s logical 
argument in The Origin of Species, and specifically that two stylistic tropes used by agricultural 
writers and artists, incrementum and metonymy, also enabled Darwin to reconceive the causal 
relationship between environments and organisms. While bringing attention to these agricultural 
dimensions of Darwin’s rhetoric, this dissertation simultaneously participates in recent 
conversations about the performativity of stylistic rhetoric, challenging the conception of style as 
extraneous to scientific discovery and invention. 
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CHAPTER 1: ARTICULATING AGRICULTURE AND DARWIN TOGETHER 
Introduction 
This dissertation traces the historical articulation of two rhetorical figures essential to 
Charles Darwin’s evolutionary rhetoric. It argues specifically that these figures, the well-known 
trope of metonymy and the lesser-known classical figure of incrementum, were adopted by 
Darwin after his encounter with specific agricultural texts on the breeding and cultivation of 
domesticated livestock. These agricultural works were part of a broader genre of agricultural 
writing and art that emerged in the early 1760’s and made the case that forward-thinking farmers 
and landowners could pioneer agricultural improvements vital to a national project of progress 
and prosperity. Such texts used similar figurative arrangements to describe the progressive 
achievements of innovative agriculturalists, suggesting that Darwin owes as great a debt to this 
rhetoric of modern English agriculture as he does to the other rhetorics with which his work has 
been frequently associated (the demographic logic of Thomas Malthus, for example, or the 
uniformitarian geological accounts of Charles Lyell). To that end, this dissertation will add to the 
understanding of Darwinian articulations, arguing that not only were his evolutionary theories 
influenced by modern agricultural techniques, but that rhetorical strategies essential to his 
arguments were likewise indebted to agricultural arguments.  
In making this case, this dissertation builds upon three different scholarly approaches to 
studying scientific culture. In its organization, specifically the way it traces Darwin’s 
engagement with broader intellectual and social trends, it builds upon earlier cultural histories of 
Darwin’s science, principally those by Michael Ruse. In its methodology, particularly with 
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regard to way it simultaneously considers the logical and figurative construction of Darwin’s 
arguments, this dissertation is most indebted to previous studies of scientific rhetoric. Here a host 
of writers are important, but John Angus Campbell, Alan Gross and Jeanne Fahnestock are 
amongst the most prominent. And lastly, in its philosophical commitments, it draws from 
scholarship in a variety of fields, but is most directly inspired Bruno Latour’s recent attempts to 
construct a post-human ontology of the social, along with Nathan Stormer’s similar effort to 
theorize articulation as the simultaneous social construction of bodies and languages.  
While there are some similar commitments that cut across those three fields, the specific 
way that this dissertation attempts to profit upon and integrate their earlier findings requires 
further explanation. Those three different strains are not often closely associated, and so the 
reason why this dissertation brings them into conversation requires an explanation that this 
chapter will provide. It will also outline how this dissertation attempts to make an empirical case 
for the kind of constructivist study that Latour advocates. For while Latour has done remarkable 
work exploring the logical and empirical gaps of standard positivist-inspired philosophies of 
science, and offers convincing critiques of how such epistemologies misunderstand science’s 
practical contributions, little of his work considers how Darwin’s rhetorical constructions may 
have contributed to the types of causal analyses that Latour himself critiques. Indeed, one of the 
exigencies for this dissertation is my belief that some of the rhetorical choices Darwin made 
largely account for biology’s inclusion within and support for that rhetoric, and that a proper 
revaluation of its contributions can not be made without a clear understanding of how Darwin’s 
rhetorical choices are inseparable from the ideological consequences that Darwinism has had in 
our broader culture. That, however, is an extended argument, which must wait till after the 
empirical work of this dissertation concludes. Before that can happen, it is important to better 
   
3 
understand how historians, cultural critics and rhetoricians have tended to study Darwin. As I 
argue below, their methods and results have been productive, but they also reveal important 
theoretical problems which this dissertation will work to address.  
Darwin and the Logic of Influence 
Perhaps more than any other scientific advance, Charles Darwin’s evolutionary theory 
has been the subject of cultural and rhetorical studies that attempt to discern the way a novel 
scientific discovery integrates the broader cultural norms amidst which it emerges. Gertrude 
Himmelfarb, for example, highlighted the reciprocal and mutually beneficial sources of 
alignment created between laissez-faire capitalism and Darwinian theory, with both modern 
biology and free-market economics succeeding more in tandem than either could have done 
individually (418-420). Milton Millhauser pointed to the role John Henry Newman’s 
developmental theology played in setting the stage for Darwin’s evolutionary schema, as well as 
a similar conception of developmental growth espoused by Jean Jacques Rousseau's romantic 
psychology (28). These, aided by a host of other religious and scientific ideas, created what 
Millhauser called a “concatenation of influences” in which Darwin’s ideas, while appearing 
surprising and revolutionary, drew from existing Victorian cultural currents that had always been 
“in the air” (29-31). Robert Young’s study of Darwin’s evolutionary argument functions 
similarly, tracing a number of extra-scientific “streams” whose intellectual currents flowed into 
and out of his scientific thought (23-24, 69). Young particularly points to the influence of 
Malthusian economics (40-44), associationist psychology (72), Victorian philosophy, and 
theology (80, 97-98).  
Rhetorical research on Darwin and the Origin has also followed this pattern, most 
prominently in scholarship by John Angus Campbell. In Campbell’s analysis, what made Darwin 
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so successful was his ability to reinterpret existing cultural norms in the service of otherwise 
radically divergent scientific ideas (“Scientific Revolution” 369). Campbell’s Darwin not only 
demonstrates a deep understanding of how the prevailing “cultural grammar” worked, but also 
how existing instabilities within that “cultural grammar” created rhetorical opportunities to 
appropriate it anew (352). Crucial to that process of appropriation was Darwin’s ability to use 
language metaphorically so as to simultaneously reference traditional religious principles while 
also pointing the way to novel and potentially heterodox biological concepts (363-364). David 
Depew offers a similar analysis, likewise arguing that Darwin’s reliance upon metaphorical 
rhetoric allowed him to leverage a number of dominant Victorian discourses (materialist, 
Romantic, and even theistic) to advance his science (“Rhetoric of the Origin” 351). In Depew’s 
view, metaphor’s inherent polysemy gave Darwin the ability to borrow from broader cultural 
rhetorics that might otherwise, if they were used less metaphorically and rhetorically, conflict 
with the biology he advanced (252, 254). Alan Gross’s study of Darwin’s rhetoric takes a 
slightly different tack, focusing more on Darwin’s intra-subjective compositional process than 
his engagement with dominant culture-wide discourses (Rhetoric of Science 144-159). Yet to the 
degree that Gross considers Darwin’s wider public audience, he too suggests the Origin is a text 
more interested in broad-based cultural integration rather than revolutionary disruption (111).  
Likely there is a great deal of validity to all of these studies and their findings. Yet in 
attributing Darwin’s rhetorical prowess to a unique facility for cultural or rhetorical borrowing, I 
think these scholars avoid one of the more interesting and research-worthy quandaries to which 
science studies and the rhetoric of science can direct us: how a new conceptual paradigm, be it 
religious, political, scientific, or otherwise, emerges (Kuhn 89-90). For even if we grant that a 
scientific breakthrough like Darwin’s Origin owes its rhetorical success to the re-appropriation 
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of an existing cultural discourse, this just begs the question as to how that existing cultural 
discourse itself achieved its earlier rhetorical invention. At some point, this “wherefrom” 
question of rhetorical invention needs to be faced, particularly for the rhetoric of science. If not, 
we are left with a rhetoric of science evacuated of all its profoundly confusing and intriguing 
problems, distributed out to the supposedly more social and acceptably rhetorical (but less 
epistemologically provocative) realms of economics, religion and psychology. It leaves science 
as an area that might then be influenced by such rhetorical, extra-scientific cultural elements, but 
that in turn only suggests that, in an ideal, non-social, uninfluenced science, we might actually 
arrive at natural facts alone, pure, and uncontaminated by social influence and rhetorical 
discourse.  
In Darwin studies, no work more clearly exemplifies the consequences of this approach 
than Michael Ruse’s admittedly invaluable research on Darwin’s compositional development. 
Ruse’s work takes a course very similar to Campbell’s rhetorical scholarship, and expands it to 
include a greater diversity of cultural and personal influences on Darwin’s thinking and style of 
argumentation. He offers an intricate historical account in which neither Darwin nor any of his 
scientific colleagues is ever arguing in just one cultural discourse community alone. Naturalists 
like John Herschel and William Whewell are shown to simultaneously write disquisitions on 
philosophy and religion, just as a clergyman like William Paley is always expounding upon both 
religion and biological adaptation. As Ruse puts it, those separate cultural “strands” were always 
“intertwined” (Darwinian xiii, 323).  
That conclusion, however, suggests a contradiction against which Ruse’s own analysis 
struggles: “strands,” for all their tangling, can still be imagined as having a separate existence. 
For though Ruse is firmly committed to the notion that science emerges out of a “network” of 
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reciprocal influences with extra-scientific culture (Darwinian 67, 73, 94, 138), he also is firmly 
committed to the Popperian notion that, contra Thomas Kuhn, science makes the decisive 
contribution of untangling the good cultural strands from the bad, the right ideas from the false 
ones (Mystery 246, 249). This suggests that science is ultimately a different kind of “strand” than 
the more contingent cultural ones that happen to intertwine with it. And here is where Ruse’s 
work becomes particularly interesting, as it exemplifies that kind of “logic of influence” account 
described above that has not only been a powerful mode for analyzing Darwin’s engagement 
with culture, but also (and as we already saw in Depew’s and Campbell’s work) appears more 
generally as a guiding method in the rhetorical study of scientific invention. He suggests that the 
degree to which extra-scientific culture contributes to the production of science, it is by offering 
to science new conceptual and heuristic metaphors, novel paradigmatic interpretations which 
science can then put to the test (249). As Ruse puts it,  
My point is that that there is something deeply cultural about evolutionary biology, even at its most mature 
or professional or praiseworthy level. Through the language, the ideas, the picture, the models, above all 
the metaphors that evolutionary biology uses, culture comes rushing right back in…. I am simply claiming 
that when evolutionary scientists turn to language to express their findings, the words they choose are often 
laden with metaphors taken from the surrounding culture. (my emphasis; 239)  
 
If culture is, “above all” about metaphors, this might, at first glance, seem perfectly 
disposed for affording a rhetorical notion of scientific invention. Yet here again we see problems 
with this approach similar to other “logic of influence” analyses. First, despite all of Ruse’s 
stated willingness to accept the mutual imbrication of science and culture, confining metaphor to 
non-scientific cultural production--one which, as a philosopher and historian of science, Ruse is 
under no obligation to thoroughly investigate--allows him to let culture solve theoretical 
problems for the philosophy of science without studying the creative cultural differences upon 
which his philosophy of science depends. Indeed, it seems a strategy particularly well-designed 
for allowing the philosophy of science to continue on its traditional course without having to 
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think deeply about the reality of tropological construction and invention. A scholar like Ruse can 
just say that, as a historian and philosopher of science, it is simply not his job to learn about the 
internal inventional dynamics of trope and turn back to a project of describing reality using non-
tropological, non-cultural, terms. Indeed, this is precisely how Ruse concludes his work on the 
topic, saying that he will now likely return to purely philosophical inquiries and leave the study 
of socially constructed metaphors to others (Mystery 253). Treating metaphor as a cultural, extra-
scientific production allows us avert our eyes right at the point when science studies is on the 
verge of showing us the reality of tropological invention. This strategy then leaves open the 
possibility that, at least theoretically, we might imagine reality as uncontaminated by the 
complications of rhetorical invention (253). In the end, Ruse seems to think it possible that we 
might one day describe a kind of scientific knowledge absent the messiness of culturally-
inflected, metaphorical human observation. Tropological invention, in this mode, is a temporary 
solution for scientific thought, as Ruse looks forward to a day when philosophy no longer needs 
such rhetorical productions (253). 
Yet it is not enough for me or any other scholar of science studies to simply critique the 
ways Ruse’s scholarship might duplicate the very epistemological divisions (between nature and 
culture, reality and metaphor) that he initially claims to bridge. One needs to offer an alternative 
approach that not only critiques his sequestration of trope to culture but also, and simultaneously, 
demonstrates the ways that cultural and tropological production is part of science’s internal 
process of paradigmatic innovation and coherence. As we shall see shortly, this is precisely what 
some scholars in the rhetoric of science have been doing. For the moment, however, it serves our 
purposes best to remain in the broader field of science studies, for while scientific tropes like 
metaphor have long been a mainstay of the rhetoric of science, there is line of scholarship within 
   
8 
science studies that still attends to invention without limiting such construction to the logic of 
influential, extra-scientific metaphors.  
Moving From Metaphor to Articulation 
There is an interesting moment in Ruse’s work that reveals the exact point at which his 
method hesitates to confront the novel articulations which science invents. For our purposes, the 
specificity of this hesitation is quite useful, as it also indicates the precise point where we can 
decide not to hesitate and, consequently, not replicate the dichotomies (science/culture, 
metaphor/reality) which Ruse’s work, despite his best efforts, inevitably reproduces.  
This point of hesitation occurs at the beginning of Ruse’s book Mystery of Mysteries: Is 
Evolution a Social Construction?, which, as its title suggests, aims to explore the philosophical 
issues generated by the so-called “science wars” of the 1980’s and 90’s. Not surprisingly, the 
critical question for Ruse is whether or not the facts science produces can bear any kind of 
corresponding, referential relationship to the reality they represent. For Ruse, as we have seen, 
the answer to this question is ultimately and ideally yes. This puts him, he argues, in direct 
opposition with Bruno Latour, arguably the most important theorist of social constructivist 
sociology of science. The grounds for his disagreement with Latour are highlighted, he argues, in 
Latour’s utter “nonrealism,” which he proves by quoting two passages from Latour’s 
foundational work (co-written with Steven Woolgar) Laboratory Life. Here is how Ruse excerpts 
those passages, along with his framing sentences critiquing the quotations. Ruse’s presentation is 
significant enough to quote at length:  
One who took this path [social constructivism] was the French sociologist Bruno Latour, who was 
explicit and forceful in his historicism, his nonrealism, his social constructivism. With a colleague he wrote 
as follows (Latour and Woolgar 1979, 128): 
“One important feature of our discussion so far is worth noting at this point. We have attempted to 
avoid using terms which would change the nature of the issues under discussion. Thus, in 
emphasizing the process whereby substances are constructed, we have tried to avoid descriptions 
of the bioassays which take as unproblematic relationships between signs and things signified. 
Despite the fact that our scientists held the belief that the inscriptions could be representations or 
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indicators of some entity with an independent existence “out there,” we have argued that such 
entities were constituted solely through the use of these inscriptions. It is not simply that 
differences between curves indicate the presence of a substance; rather the substance is identical 
with perceived differences between curves.” 
So much for Popperian reality: “Our point is that ‘out-there-ness’ is the consequence of scientific 
work rather than its cause” (180-182). (Ruse 27) 
 
What I find interesting here is the way Ruse’s summary shows an avoidance of the genuine and 
novel philosophical quandaries to which constructivist science studies can direct our attention. If 
we consult the original text of the two passages Ruse’s quotations stitch together, we find that 
the second quotation is excerpted in just such a way that Ruse can study Latour’s 
“constructivism” and accuse it of “nonrealism” without being genuinely perplexed by the fact 
that Latour and Woolgar specifically deny the charge of nonrealism in the very sentence before 
that which Ruse quotes as his evidence to the contrary. Here is how the second Latour and 
Woolgar quotation appears in the original text along with the initial two framing sentences which 
Ruse omits: “We do not wish to say that facts do not exist nor that there is no such thing as 
reality. In this simple sense our position is not relativist. Our point is that “out-there-ness” is the 
consequence of scientific work rather than its cause” (Latour and Woolgar 182). Ruse may well 
be right in suggesting that this shows Latour and Woolgar do not subscribe to a specifically 
“Popperian reality,” but that, at least in their understanding, does not make them the 
thoroughgoing “nonrealists” Ruse wants to make them out to be. What we see in the more 
complete Latour and Woolgar quotation is that they preemptively reject the charge of anti-
realism and argue instead that their empirical study of scientific practice has simply offered them 
new insight into what the “real” really is. Now, Latour and Woolgar may be wrong about those 
insights, but then the least Ruse might do is offer to address where they go wrong, instead of 
selectively quoting and thereby prematurely dismissing what is, arguably, a founding text of 
constructivist science studies. He may dislike Latour and Woolgar’s conclusions, but he certainly 
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owes them more than this hasty and incomplete portrayal.  
 Instead of avoiding the kinds of perplexing statements such constructivist philosophies of 
science pose to our understanding--instead of avoiding such uncertainties--what if we follow 
them? This is precisely the method which Latour has outlined as the basic methodology of 
constructivist science studies (Reassembling 21-22). What it requires, however, is a more 
ontological approach to social constructivism, as opposed to the more epistemological approach 
delineated by Ruse (as well as Young, Himmelfarb, and Millhauser). Here, in plain terms, is 
what that means: instead of treating science as a series of ideas about reality which, because they 
are ideas, might be influenced by other non-scientific, more “social” ideas, beliefs, and norms 
(Ruse’s and Merton’s method), Latourian sociology of science treats science as sets of hybrid 
material-semiotic practices and argues that science works because it allows new such practices to 
emerge in the midst of the real indeterminacy and openness to novelty which scientific spaces 
and times afford. For Latour, to simply confine one’s study of science to the level of ideas is to 
miss the real novel differences that scientific practice actually constructs. Particularly important 
to Latour are the technological tools and material mediators without which science could not 
make the innovative differences for which we prize it. Indeed, if we look back on the long Latour 
and Woolgar passage Ruse cited, we might notice that the authors are not talking about scientific 
ideas at all. Rather they talk about scientific materials--“substances,” “bioassays,” “entities,” and 
“inscriptions”--and the ways these are processed by analytical equipment to produce new and 
very real “differences.” 
 Here we might also begin to see the reasons why Ruse misunderstands Latour’s 
constructivism. He thinks Latour argues that scientists have influential ideas about reality that are 
more reflective of their personal biases, extra-scientific cultural beliefs, and ideological 
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predilections than they are of the facts themselves, and that these influential ideas then construct 
the scientists’ understanding of nature. This is not at all what Latour argues--indeed, it 
misunderstands Latour’s project on two fronts. Firstly, and as was just mentioned, Latour does 
not think science is ultimately about producing new ideas--its main business is the production of 
different material-semiotic arrangements and practices. So when Latour says science 
“constructs,” he does not argue that scientists import false notions about reality into their 
scientific ideas. Rather, he argues that the laboratory affords a uniquely constructive space and 
time for the emergence of significantly novel differences.  
 The slightly asymmetrical phrasing of those last two sentences (juxtaposing “scientists” 
with “laboratories”) hints at the second important distinction that Latour wants to make and that 
Ruse seems to miss. In Latour’s work, it is never just the scientist alone who invents the science. 
Rather, it is always a broader assemblage (often a laboratory or research protocol consisting of 
people, non-human lifeforms, and technologies) that affords science’s constructive novelty. This, 
of course, requires us to rethink modern notions that posit the individual agency of a Cartesian 
human cogito as the apex of real differential causal action (Reassembling 85), but that, to my 
mind, seems a particularly appropriate task for science studies and the rhetoric of science. 
 The particular challenge for the rhetoric of science, however, is to determine how to take 
Latour’s constructivist, hybrid (material-semiotic) ontology of embodied practices and translate 
it back into a rhetorical discipline that, since Aristotle, has been more oriented towards the 
productive coalescence of linguistically constructed ideas, concepts and arguments. Fortunately, 
Latour seems to have anticipated that need and offers an ontological vocabulary that allows 
words and things, language and materiality to be thought alongside one another. He does that 
through three key terms: propositions, articulations and differences. We need to deal with 
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propositions first, as it is the most philosophically complicated term and one that is not actually 
original to Latour’s corpus. Instead, he borrows it from the earlier “process philosophy” of 
Alfred North Whitehead, who used it as a way of complicating the normal referential 
relationship between words and things that we typically imagine is expressed by propositions. 
Whitehead points out that this imagined view of propositions fundamentally mistakes the way 
they accomplish their most vital work. For example, when we state a specific proposition like, 
“The grass is green,” we typically judge that proposition by whether it accords with a specific 
green-grass state of affairs, along the representational axis of truth and falsity. Whitehead points 
out, however, that from the point view of metaphysics the proposition’s most important 
commitment is not to its representational description of that specific state of affairs but the most 
metaphysically general state of affairs which that proposition simultaneously “proposes:” that 
reality can be divided up accurately into subjects (eg. grass) and predicates (eg. green) 
(Whitehead 13). All propositions perform this incessant double duty, “proposing” a general 
metaphysics while describing specific cases in which that metaphysics obtains. In evaluating the 
general metaphysics that a proposition proposes, referential truth or falsity does not quite 
accomplish the task, as the referential truth or falsity of the universe’s metaphysical subject-and-
predicate-ness is not so much proven by the truth of a single specific subject predicate statement 
(eg. “The grass is green.”) as its is by the potential total coherence of all the true subject-and-
predicate-ish statements we can make about the universe (12, 197). That total metaphysical 
coherence is not experienced as a representational truth or falsity, at least not until we have 
experienced the universal coherence of all possible representational propositions which, 
Whitehead argued, is something philosophy had not accomplished (12, 197).  
And yet something still inheres in the proposition that, though not experienced in the way 
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that we experience the truth or falsity of ideas or the presence or absence of things, is neither 
entirely beyond the proposition nor entirely within it. Whitehead calls this inherent something of 
the proposition a “prehension” or “a lure for feeling” (185-186). The “prehension” is exactly 
what it sounds like: it is the sense that, in the etymological meaning of “prehension,” is biased 
towards reaching out, that lures us and the objects we identify to become coherent. Prehension is 
the primitive (primitive in the sense of temporal and spatial priority as opposed to “less 
cultured”) sense of propositional coherence. It is a universal bias reaching out towards, 
prehending coherences--not a substance but a subsistence that, to paraphrase Deleuze and 
Guattari’s Whiteheadian inflected phrase, snaps us up (238). Whitehead’s point is that, before we 
establish the referential truth or falsity of what a proposition expresses, or the ontological 
coherence that such expressions provide for our sense of unified being, prehension provides the 
something more that lures us to feel how new beings and different expressions might cohere. In 
Latour’s parlance, the prehension “proposes” (Pandora’s 143).  
It is important to point out that in both Whitehead’s and Latour’s discussion of 
propositions, they speak of them as neither referentially conceptual nor materially substantial. 
They subsist prior to both the materially physical and the linguistically conceptual and, rather 
than taking a stable position in either realm, instead “pave the way along which the world 
advances into novelty” (Whitehead 187). Propositions are, as Latour emphasizes, “pro-
positions,” meaning they tend towards the occurrence of stable positions (Pandora’s 141). Thus 
Latour is able to find in Whitehead’s notion of the proposition a way of theorizing a concept of 
novel different occasions, events that tend towards the coherence of the bodies and ideas that a 
material-linguistic practice like science proposes. We should not be misled by the fact that 
“proposition” typically has a more linguistic meaning; both Whitehead and Latour insist that 
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propositions propose prehensions that exist prior to material bodies and linguistically mediated 
ideas, and which then allow bodies and ideas to increasingly cohere. The theoretical leverage that 
accrues from using a linguistically inflected phrase like propositions is that we are generally 
more willing to grant a certain novel inventiveness to language that we typically deny to the 
world of things. But for Whitehead, as for Latour, all novelty, material and semiotic, occurs 
through this prehensional sense of propositions. Since it is prior to both bodies and meanings, it 
is not something either Latour or Whitehead can identify, as it is no more a substance capable of 
being delimited as it is an ideational term capable of being defined. In a very real sense, it is only 
something they can propose in the hope that it may lure us to articulate something new.  
Following Whitehead, Latour develops a theory of propositions by building upon the 
inventiveness we typically grant to language and extending that novel differential creativity to 
hybrid material-semiotic arrangements. It is likely for this reason that he replaces the more 
conceptual and cognitive term “prehension” with a term better suited to the simultaneously 
material and linguistic dimensions that such a propositional lure can make us feel. The term 
Latour proposes is “articulation.” For Latour, articulation is a similarly prehensive metaphysical 
bias, a basic “ontological property of the universe,” a general tendency towards concrescence 
(Pandora’s 303). So, following Latour, one could say that a proposition succeeds by it 
articulating itself far and wide. Latour makes this point by distinguishing successfully articulated 
propositions from the more standard epistemological account of scientific practice that 
emphasizes its ability to produce representationally accurate statements, using his own research 
on Louis Pasteur’s propositional articulation of microbial fermentation as a running example: 
Going beyond the facts and taking a stand are bad things for statements, since every trace of work and 
human agency obscures the world out there. But they are excellent things if the aim is to articulate ever 
more precisely the two propositions of the lactic acid ferment and of Pasteur’s laboratory. Whereas 
statements aim at a correspondence they can never achieve, propositions rely on the articulation of 
differences that make new phenomenon visible in the cracks that distinguish them. Whereas statements can 
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hope at best for sterile repetition (A is A), articulation relies on predication with other entities (A is B, C 
and so on). To say that “lactic acid fermentation,” the sentence, is like lactic acid fermentation, the thing, 
does not go very far. But saying that lactic acid fermentation can be treated like a living organism as 
specific as brewer’s yeast, opens up an entirely new era in the relation of science, industry, ferments, and 
society in the nineteenth century. (Pandora’s 143) 
 
For Latour, what makes Pasteur’s scientific propositions successful is not that they accord 
accurately with some fixed state of natural affairs. Rather, those propositions succeed because 
they articulate widely, realigning relations well beyond the laboratory in which those 
propositions were first proposed.  
Lastly, the above quotation introduces us to a final Latourian term which we will need to 
successfully compose a rhetorical vocabulary for scientific practices: difference. When Latour 
writes about the way science propositionally articulates itself throughout society, he says that 
such “propositions rely on the articulation of differences that make new phenomenon visible in 
the cracks that distinguish them” (my emphasis). Exactly what Latour means by “differences” (or 
“the cracks that distinguish them”) is, to be honest, a bit unclear in his texts. Yet I think Latour 
provides us with some telling indications upon which we can build an affirmative definition of 
rhetorical difference that then allows us to the better theorize scientific articulation. We can 
begin with the definitions of difference which Latour does supply, though even here we may find 
ourselves in a bit of confusion as Latour sometimes talks about “difference” but only specifically 
defines a much broader process which he calls “differentiation.” The nature of that distinction, 
between difference and differentiation, should, I think, become clear when delve a bit deeper into 
the topic. So, first we will look at how Latour describes “differentiation” and then us what we 
learn from that description to provide a more detailed definition of scientific “difference.”  
In defining “differentiation,” Latour juxtaposes it with the more standard philosophical 
concept of scientific “demarcation.” Under demarcation, science defines for itself a real natural 
world disconnected from all the historical, social and cultural beliefs that might misconstrue that 
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definition. Demarcation operates by creating a vast unbridgeable distinction between nature and 
culture, allowing nature an ahistorical, eternal presence and confining culture to a temporary, 
shifting travail. What Latour shows, however, is that, in practice, what science does is not so 
much demarcate a vast distinction between nature and culture but, rather, create a tight network 
of “associations” between the two (Pandora’s 157-164). However, in the process of creating 
these associations, neither nature nor culture stays exactly as it once was. Rather they 
“differentiate” (157). Indeed, the more science “associates” the two spheres (nature and culture), 
the more those spheres are simultaneously changed by their new associations. According to 
Latour, what we get, therefore, is more than just new associations, in which two previously 
separate institutions retain their old identities even after they are more tightly joined together. 
Such associations require the possibility that each enity may need to change to afford the 
association’s durability, a potential which Latour calls “substitution.”  
Differentiation, therefore, is the increasing reality of a joint nature-culture through the 
simultaneous compromise of associations and substitutions (Pandora’s 162). Interestingly for 
rhetoricians, Latour develops this terminology of association and substitution from the 
structuralist linguistic concepts of syntagm and paradigm, with association standing in for 
syntagm and substitution standing in for paradigm (303-304). In structuralist linguistics, the 
syntagmatic dimension of meaning marks the way different parts of a text comprise its sense 
through their interaction with one another within the boundaries of the text itself (Chandler 81-
82, 84). For example, we might consider how within both Shakespearean comedies and 
tragedies, the two different genres often each contain a prominent wedding and a prominent 
death. In comedies, however, the death comes at the beginning of the play and the wedding at the 
end, whereas in tragedies the arrangement is reverse. Though their component parts are the same, 
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their different syntagmatic arrangement within the narrative comprises an entirely different 
meaning.   
Of course, the syntagmatic arrangement of words, stanzas, or scenes is not enough alone 
to create a text’s meaning. So, for instance, the fact that a Shakespearean comedy ends with a 
wedding only produces a syntagmatic comedic structure because, paradigmatically, weddings are 
generally conceived as emblematic of happy unification. Thus texts also always rely upon the 
external axis of paradigmatic meanings that exist beyond their internal structure. Considering 
another example, we might say that the novel Moby-Dick obtains particularly important 
paradigmatic meanings by its frequent allusions to biblical characters and events that obviously 
occur beyond the space and time of a nineteenth century whaling voyage. Yet we would also 
have to say that Melville is also always articulating these external biblical paradigms 
syntagmatically as well. To begin the narrative with a phrase like “Call me Ishmael,” is both a 
way of drawing upon biblical meaning from beyond the narrative and to arrange that meaning at 
a crucial starting point within the narrative’s internal structure.  
As Roman Jakobson pointed out, meaning generally occurs at the combinatorial 
intersection of these two linguistic axis and neither the syntagmatic nor the paradigmatic alone is 
enough to create a coherent text (72-76). Additionally, Jakobson thought that these two axis 
could be more broadly identified through the tropological terminology of rhetoric. He labeled the 
syntagmatic axis the “metonymic pole” because it registered the meanings produced through the 
contiguous arrangement of associated entities. He labeled the paradigmatic axis the “metaphoric 
pole” because it registered the meaning produced by parts of the text through their general 
similarity with different things, ideas and entities that exist beyond it (90-96).  
Thus, a more rhetorical inflection of Latourian differentiation might define it as the 
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production of new material-semiotic networks through the simultaneous production of novel 
metaphoric substitutions and metonymic contiguities. This, I think, may also help us understand 
why Latour is able to provide a clear definition of differentiation, but not one for difference. 
Differentiation is clearly a process with two definable and simultaneous modes of operation. 
Along each axis, the metaphoric and the metonymic, one can trace a clear movement of both 
associational contiguity or substitutional similarity. Yet, when we turn to the singular concept of 
difference in it itself--bearing in mind that this difference can never only be isolated along either 
one of the two poles along which meaning articulates--this forces us to consider that, if 
difference is a real production, it has a level of reality both irreducible to those separate modes 
by which it can be described (metonymy and metaphor) and qualitatively different from the 
operation of any one of those modes individually. Thus, though we can define the different 
modes of the broader process of differentiation (the combination of metonymy and metaphor), 
when considered as a process in and of itself, difference is an irreducible. So, when Latour writes 
that “propositions rely on the articulation of differences” (Pandora’s 143) and that such 
“articulation is an ontological property of the universe” (303), he is making just this kind of case 
for the irreducible nature of difference. The movement of articulation is a production of such 
irreducible difference and it is through such differential articulation that propositions propose to 
go beyond themselves. 
Fortunately for the purposes of this dissertation, a number of scholars have already done 
helpful work tracing the way Darwin’s science emerges as just such a differential production of 
natural-cultural articulation. Before we turn our attention to those previous studies however, it 
bears mentioning that the above analysis of differential articulation (as simultaneously always 
metonymic and metaphoric) may afford us some theoretical clarification of the gaps that were 
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evident in some of the other accounts by which philosophers of science tried to describe what 
they conceived of as a primarily metaphorical process of invention. So, for instance, it may be 
that Michael Ruse ultimately retains the distinction between nature and culture because he 
overlooks metonymic contiguity as a genuine mode of inventive articulation, focusing instead 
only on the metaphoric pole by which culture can only imagine a nature that is not contiguous 
with it. Such a tropological imbalance would unsurprisingly lead to a concept of culture that 
constructs the meanings we try to attach to nature, while leaving nature wholly separate from that 
process of cultural construction. Yet, as Christian Lundberg has well argued, the very tendency 
of extrinsic entities to metonymically associate amongst each other serves, when such 
associations “become particularly significant points of investment,” to undergird the production 
of metaphor (78). By missing metonymy’s importance in associating the otherwise seemingly 
discontiguous entities of nature and culture, Ruse may be lead to view construction as a 
unilaterally metaphorical cultural process that ultimately bears no contiguous metonymic 
connection to the nature with which it articulates. Paying more attention to metonymy’s role in 
scientific rhetoric can therefore help us understand science’s rhetorical accomplishments as 
stemming from the kind of articulate associations to which Latour draws our attention.  
Defining Metonymy 
If this dissertation hopes to solve problems for the rhetoric of science by calling attention 
to the way science depends upon metonymy’s syntagmatic contiguities, it makes sense to begin 
with a clear definition of what we actually mean by metonymy. That is particularly necessary 
because metonymy has historically been subject to a variety of often ambiguous and occasionally 
contradictory definitions. As Hugh Bredin points out, it is often conflated with synecdoche and 
occasionally even incorporated along with synecdoche as a subspecies of metaphor (46). Bredin 
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goes on to make a convincing case for a much clearer taxonomy that distinguishes not only 
metaphor and metonymy, but synecdoche as well. He does so in ways that bear some important 
similarities with Kenneth Burke’s consideration of metonymy, which will also be discussed 
further down. As we will see, I ultimately find both Bredin’s and Burke’s description of 
metonymy slightly off the mark, but both of their clear and systematic accounts provide an 
excellent beginning upon which we can further improve.  
As Bredin points out, all three figures (synecdoche, metonymy, metaphor) afford 
linguistic representations of one entity by another, but their key difference lies in the type of 
relation that affords each figurative substitution. For Bredin, the key distinction is whether the 
relation is either “structural” or “extrinsic.” By “structural” Bredin means “relations within 
things” and by “extrinsic” he means “relations among things” (53). Synecdoche is a figure of this 
first type of “structural,” “within things” relation, as the substitution it affords allows one part of 
a thing to substitute for the whole it. For example, calling a penny “a copper,” requires this kind 
of internal, structural relation, taking what a thing is made of and using that partial aspect to 
stand for the whole. Synecdochic substitutions can also operate in the other direction, allowing a 
whole to stand for a part. Referring to the University of North Carolina’s men’s basketball team 
as “UNC” or “The Tarheels” would be an example of such a whole for part synecdoche. 
We can quickly see that this is very different from metaphor, which represents one whole 
entity in terms of another wholly different other entity. Bredin therefore describes metaphor as a 
substitution based on an “extrinsic relation.” Yet noting an extrinsic relation between two 
different entities is not enough to produce a cogent metaphor, as literally all different entities are 
extrinsic to one another. For example, I can not just say that “My dog is a horse” and be assured 
that you will metaphorically understand what I mean. Since “dog” and “horse” are just as 
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extrinsic to one another as, say, “cat” and “horse,” an effective metaphor between “dog” and 
“horse” requires their extrinsic relation be made more specific than mere extrincicity. If, 
however, I say, “Look how big my dog is! She’s a horse,” the metaphorical quality of that 
statement becomes clear. To work as a metaphor, the substitution requires a more specific 
extrinsicism, what Bredin calls a “dependent extrinsic relation,” that brings the otherwise merely 
extrinsic entities into a more focused relation (54). In the example I used above, the substitution 
of a horse for my dog “depends” upon them both possessing a similar property (in this example, 
bigness). As Bredin puts it, “In dependent relations, the identity of the relation depends upon 
some property possessed by both of the relata” (my emphasis; 54). 
Thus metaphors depend upon a specific property to establish a relation between two 
otherwise utterly extrinsic entities. However, as Bredin points out, there are a few pairings of 
extrinsic entities that are so contiguously associated with one another that, even absent a 
specified dependent property, one extrinsic entity can still clearly stand for the other. These 
extrinsic relations do not “depend” on any specified shared property. Instead they are, as Bredin 
calls them, “simple extrinsic relations” and they are the basis for metonymic substitutions. The 
metonymic relation between cause and effect is a classic example. Bredin argues that cause and 
effect are extrinsic to one another, but we so conventionally identify the presence of one with the 
presence of the other that their contiguous relation is taken for granted and does not depend upon 
a specified property to clarify the substitution (57). Invention and inventor is another classic 
metonymic relation. We find it difficult to imagine one absent the other, and so a speaker who 
metonymically says that they are “reading Shakespeare” does not need to clarify that they 
metonymically mean that they are reading a work invented by Shakespeare (as opposed to 
metaphorically “reading” the expression on Shakespeare’s face, or literally reading the word 
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“Shakespeare”). 
 In Bredin’s analysis, therefore, metaphor and metonymy can be distinguished by either 
the simplicity or dependency of their relation. Both substitute one extrinsic whole for another, 
but, Bredin argues, in the case of metonymy the relation between its extrinsic wholes are so 
“habitually and conventional known and accepted,” that they require no third dependent property 
to clarify the substitution (57). Metonymic extrinsics are so closely associated that they accrue a 
kind of figurative contiguity. Thus, if metaphor creates new associations between extrinsic 
entities, metonymy depends on associations that are already well established and is therefore 
“subject to limitations and changes imposed upon it by inherited knowledge and culture” (57). 
Whereas metaphor can develop innovative and creative associations, “Metonymy is irresistibly 
and necessarily conventional” (57).  
 These last assertions are critical for my project for two reasons, as they mark a point of 
departure where my own analysis of metonymy starts to differ slightly from Bredin’s and, as we 
will see just below, Kenneth Burke’s as well. This is not to say that I disagree with Bredin’s 
description of metonymy as a substitutional figure of conventional cultural contiguities. Instead 
my disagreement with him is that he prematurely limits his study of how those cultural 
contiguities are produced. To attribute them merely to inherited knowledge and culture is just to 
beg the question of how such inherited knowledge and culture might itself be tropologically 
articulated. Science, it seems to me, would be a logical arena for such cultural knowledge 
production, particularly for modern cultures. My point is not that Bredin is wrong but that he 
does not go far enough, and that his more limited scope of metonymic production can be 
justifiably extended to include not just traditional cultural contiguities (which he thoroughly 
considers) but scientifically constructed ones as well (which he does not explore).  
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In neglecting to consider metonymic contiguity as produced through a scientific 
articulation of nature and culture, Bredin follows very closely in a path made a bit clearer by 
Kenneth Burke, whose best description of metonymy comes in his classic essay “Four Master 
Tropes.” Interestingly, Burke does suggest that metonymy may often play a decisive role in 
scientific discourse, though not, he wants to argue, a pure or proper one (423-424). Instead Burke 
believes that scientific metonymies reflect the importation of extra-scientific cultural values into 
science, a kind of figurative contamination. Burke identifies them as particularly critical to 
scientific attempts to reduce correlative phenomena to causal impetuses (which is, as we will see 
in Chapter 4, precisely the way metonymic arguments function in Darwin’s science). We can see 
how metonymy performs this function by returning to the “Shakespeare” example described 
above. When one metonymically says that they are “reading Shakespeare,” they reduce the 
invention to the inventor who is, the metonymic figure suggests, its cause. This might seem 
utterly proper, except that it forecloses the possibility of considering whether the very process of 
invention might itself be a more complex process not always attributable to a single agency. 
Recent research suggests that the metonymic statement “I am reading Shakespeare” would not 
apply so well to the act of reading Henry VI (Parts I, II and III), which is just to say that creative 
invention can sometimes be more complicated than metonymy alone allows (Shakespeare 333). 
In some ways, then, Burke’s emphasis on metonymy as a figure of representational and causal 
reduction is perfectly attuned to the kind of critical work I want to pursue in this dissertation. The 
only issue I take with it is that Burke seems to imagine a science that might exist absent 
humanity’s continued search for causal relations, which would then suggest metonymy is not a 
proper part of science but more an extra-scientific rhetorical contaminant (423). Whether a 
different kind of science--one free of metonymic causal arguments--is imaginable might well be 
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worth entertaining as a kind of thought experiment (although as humans, Burke might argue, we 
would probably want to know the causal motivation for that very thought experiment). However, 
Burke himself asserts that such a purely speculative science of correlation without metonymic 
causal explanation has never existed (423). This makes it hard to see why we should not treat the 
metonymic reductions produced in the course of scientific research as just as much a product of 
normal scientific practice as any other kind of scientific activity. This seems a particularly valid 
approach in the wake of Bruno Latour’s convincing scholarship showing that the supposed 
separation between science and culture is itself a product of a peculiarly modern scientific 
culture (Never Been Modern 27).    
It is curious, then, that so much rhetoric of science research chooses to highlight science’s 
metaphorical meanings instead of tracing its metonymic contiguities and causal reductions. As I 
explain in this next section, I believe some of that disproportionate emphasis on metaphor can be 
attributed to the neo-Aristotelian focus on persuasion that has largely framed the rhetoric of 
science since its burgeoning development in the late 1990’s.   
Science and Rhetoric: The Dominance of Persuasion and Metaphor 
This section will largely explore how late 20th and early 21st century rhetorical 
scholarship argues for understanding science as a thoroughly rhetorical activity. It will make the 
case, however, that in constructing science as a rhetorical phenomenon, many scholars (Alan 
Gross, most prominently) have operated with a constrained notion of rhetorical analysis as only a 
study of persuasive means, as opposed to a philosophical inquiry into, say, articulation, trope, 
invention, arrangement, delivery, or memory. As I will argue below, this constrained notion of 
rhetoric as largely about persuasion is often (though not always) connected to the same 
misapprehension of constructivism that hampered Michael Ruse’s overly metaphorical analysis 
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of the relationship of culture and nature.  
Indeed, throughout the field’s history, the rhetoric of science has largely understood its 
remit as a broad investigation into the way scientists have been either more or less successful at 
the work of persuasion. As such, the debate has generally not been over the degree to which 
persuasion accurately delimits rhetoric but, rather, the degree to which rhetorical persuasion 
defines the entirety of the scientific enterprise. On one side of this debate are studies that grant 
rhetoric a firm place in scientific practice while still leaving room for other, extra-rhetorical 
activities. Lawrence Prelli’s neo-Aristotelian A Rhetoric of Science (1989) is emblematic of this 
vein, showing scientists making active use of persuasive means to advance contested arguments. 
According to Prelli, successful scientists understand rhetoric’s usefulness, but he makes no 
argument that other significant stages of scientific practice (theoretical innovation, bench work, 
construction of laboratory equipment, field research, data computation, etc.) require rhetoric. 
Something similar is argued in Xiaosui Xiao’s essay on the persuasive means used by 20th 
century Chinese scientists to gain acceptance for their work in a culture hostile to Western 
traditions (470-472). Michael Halloran’s study of James Watson and Francis Crick’s initial paper 
on the structure of DNA takes a parallel approach, focusing on the effective deployment of ethos 
by which the two biologists distinguished their argument from competing theories (39-41). John 
Angus Campbell’s series of articles on Charles Darwin’s writing made a similar case, pointing to 
the ways his publications depended upon an effective and suasive rhetorical “accommodation” of 
his public audience, while still leaving a great deal of Darwin’s science beyond the realm of 
rhetorical investigation (Harris “Introduction” xxx-xxi; “Charles Darwin” 3). Greg Myer’s work 
offered an equally detailed description of a similar kind of accommodation that occurs through 
the review processes practiced by contemporary refereed science journals (“Knowledge Claims” 
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185, 213). All these efforts made the case that the successes of effective scientists depended 
upon their persuasive skills, but none suggested the whole scientific enterprise could be 
encompassed under that rubric of persuasion. In large part, this was a tacit admission, rather than 
one that was directly asserted or contested. Many of these studies, particularly the earlier ones 
like Prelli’s and Campbell’s limited themselves to charting what one might imagine as the final 
stage of the scientific process, publication. This left as open the question of what role persuasion 
had in earlier stages of the scientific process.  
Myers, for one, saw this as the next logical question the rhetoric of science needed to 
answer (“Knowledge Claims” 214) and made a concerted effort to show rhetorical persuasion’s 
vital role in one of the earliest stages of scientific investigation, acquiring grant funding and 
developing new research programs (Writing Biology 41-44, 62). James Wynn’s study of 
mathematical arguments in the development of evolutionary science made a similar point about 
the origin of a whole scientific discipline. In Wynn’s account, the entirety of evolutionary 
science owes a degree of its persuasive success to the ethos and logos afforded by mathematical 
arguments. More pointedly, the legitimacy of that mathematically inflected biology was itself a 
development for which pioneering nineteenth and twentieth century biologists initially needed to 
argue persuasively (13-17).  
If Myers’s and Wynn’s work extend the reach of rhetoric to the initial stages of a research 
agenda, Charles Bazerman’s study of Thomas Edison’s rhetorical abilities makes the case that 
persuasive means are a necessity at every stage of a scientific innovation. In Bazerman’s 
account, what made Edison uniquely successful was not so much his skills as a metallurgist, 
chemist or electrician, for Edison had plenty of less successful competitors with many of those 
same talents. Rather what set Edison apart were his uniquely rhetorical skills: an ability to accrue 
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allies, cultivate media, popularize concepts, market products, defend theories and critique 
opponents (2). Science, in Bazerman’s account, is rhetorical way before any discovery has even 
been made or can be proved, and continues to be so during the sequence of fits and starts that 
allow for an initially speculative concept to develop into a successfully marketable technology 
(10-13, 337-339). Accounts like Bazerman’s, Myers’s and Wynn’s were, as Randy Harris noted, 
supported by a wide variety of contemporaneous scholarship by scholars working outside 
rhetorical theory who nonetheless found convincing evidence of scientists’ complete dependence 
upon argumentation, negotiation and persuasion (“Introduction” xviii-xxv).  
This evidence of science’s ubiquitous rhetoricity led a number of scholars to argue that, 
as Alan Gross phrased it, science was rhetorical “without remainder.” “A complete rhetoric of 
science,” Gross explained, “must avoid this accusation: after analysis something unrhetorical 
remains, a hard ‘scientific’ core” (Rhetoric of Science 33). This radical approach marked a 
significant extension of rhetorical analysis: whereas early researchers like John Angus Campbell 
and Lawrence Prelli endeavored to highlight rhetorical traces in the seemingly detached 
workings of objective science, now scholars fought over whether any purely materialist traces 
could be separated out from the entirely rhetorical, socially constructed substrate of scientific 
disputation. Gross was perhaps most vociferous in this regard, arguing that, though a material 
substratum certainly existed, it had no practical relevance to what we think of as science. As he 
put it, “The rhetorical view of science does not deny ‘the brute fact of nature’; it merely affirms 
that these ‘facts,’ whatever they are, are not science itself, knowledge itself” (my emphasis; 4).  
The problem with statements like these appears in the rather unconvincing use of the 
comma to conjoin “science itself” with “knowledge itself,” as though the two were such self-
evidently coordinate nouns that the equative commatic punctuation required no further argument. 
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Indeed, the very next sentence elides the need to align the parallel by transitioning from “science 
itself” to an adjective, subspecies category, “scientific knowledge.” “Scientific knowledge,” 
Gross continues, “consists of the current answers to three questions that are the product of 
professional conversation; What range of “brute facts” is worth investigating? How is this range 
to be investigated? What do the results of these investigations mean?” (4; my emphasis). So, in 
the space of two sentences, a comma, and a tenuous transposition from noun to adjective, Gross 
turns “science itself” into “scientific knowledge.” It is this epistemological turn which allows 
Gross, in the sentences following that quotation, to acknowledge the existence of material facts, 
but only so he can make them irrelevant to the philosophical study of scientific practice. The full 
paragraph reads as follows:  
The rhetorical view of science does not deny “the brute fact of nature”; it merely affirms that these 
“facts,” whatever they are, are not science itself, knowledge itself. Scientific knowledge consists 
of the current answers to three questions, answers that are the product of professional 
conversation; What range of “brute facts” is worth investigating? How is this range to be 
investigated? What do the results of these investigations mean? Whatever they are, the “brute 
facts” themselves mean nothing; only statements have meaning, and of the truth of statements we 
must be persuaded. These processes, by which problems are chosen and results interpreted, are 
essentially rhetorical: only through persuasion are importance and meaning established. As 
rhetoricians, we study the world as meant by science. (Rhetoric of Science 4; my emphasis) 
 
To be fair, the phrase “brute facts” is not Gross’s (it originates in Henri Poincaré’s 
philosophy of science (Gutting 32)), but the dismissive tone in “these ‘facts,’ whatever they 
are,” and “Whatever they are, the “brute facts” themselves mean nothing” show Gross 
repurposing the philosophical term with his own polemical edge. A “brute” as Gross seems to 
understand it, has one distinguishing quality: it does not speak, making its worldly impact 
mutely material and uncommunicative. Gross grudgingly recognizes the reality of material 
facts, but their inability to make statements renders them, literally, meaningless, and, at least for 
the philosophical study of science, insubstantial. Matter is there, but its silent insignificance 
means that persuasive rhetoric alone can entirely determine what meaning is most successfully 
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appended to it.  
There are two subsequent and related problems that accrue from Gross’s conflation of 
scientific practice with scientific knowledge. The first is that such a conflation is simply 
empirically inaccurate. As Bruno Latour has shown time and again, what makes scientists such 
peculiarly successful rhetors is that they do not just speak conceptually amongst themselves 
about objects on the other side of an epistemological divide. Rather, they articulate hybrid 
material-semiotic contiguities that bridge what would otherwise be a vast Cartesian chasm 
between subject and object, and then learn to compose their linguistic knowledge with the 
articulated objects of their study (Pandora’s 24-80). Gross’s view of science leaves out all the 
essential intermediary material-semiotic hybrids that allow science to recompose new scientific 
objects alongside new scientific knowledge. Of course scientists need to speak and write 
persuasively about their ideas and theories, but they also need to learn how to build 
microscopes, finely distill solutions, solder circuit boards, tare balances, and arrange soil 
samples. An astronomer doesn’t just talk persuasively about a new and more articulate theory of 
astronomy; she also constructs a new satellite-based telescope that articulates her vision beyond 
what her eyes could otherwise see. Of course scientists’ ideas must be persuasive, but that does 
not mean all of their technes can be reduced to those means of composing persuasive 
knowledge. There is simply a whole range of technes (plumbing, wiring, grinding, sampling, 
welding, riveting, etc) that can not be folded into the narrow concept of rhetoric which Gross 
espouses.   
 It is, I think, this narrow conception of rhetoric as entirely subsumed by the techne of 
persuasion that ultimately accounts for the second and related problem in Gross’s argument: a 
unilateral dependence upon metaphor to theorize scientific invention. We can understand the 
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relationship between this dependence on metaphor and his limited notion of rhetoric as 
persuasion by first reiterating that what Gross describes is a real but unspeaking world about 
which scientists make more or less persuasive but not more or less materially factual statements 
(Rhetoric of Science 4). This account then begs a subsequent question that Gross must answer: 
if the statements by which scientists speak for the brute facts have no material connection to 
those facts, how do they arise in the first place? To put the question more in Gross’s terms, if 
our ideas about nature’s brute facts can not come from the brute facts themselves (remember, 
the brute facts do not speak to us) and, consequently, those ideas have no metaphysically real 
relationship to those facts, what is the rhetorical relationship upon which science invents the 
initial concepts for which it then argues (80)? Gross’s answer to this question--one that, as we 
will see, became extremely popular with other rhetoricians of science--is that such initial 
conceptions must always be metaphorical in their relationship to reality. As he puts it:  
Although the style of science encourages us to infer that a family of disciplines has privileged 
access to the causal structure of the world, problems with metaphor and reference effectively block that 
inference. Style in science is not a window on reality, but the vehicle of an ideology that systematically 
misdescribes experimental and observational events. It is their ideological stance that makes contemporary 
scientists the legitimate heirs of medieval theologians; theirs is not a dispassionate search for truth, but a 
passionate conviction that truth is their quotidian business. 
In science, understandably, metaphor is this ideology’s chief tool; at the scientific verge, words 
routinely fail to refer. In discovery, metaphor is prominent; in verification, it remains so; scientists have 
no better resource for expressing what they do not see, the universal mechanisms whose audible and 
visible traces they purport to track. (my emphasis, 84).  
 
There are a number of critiques one could offer of this entirely metaphorical account of 
scientific invention. For one, Gross seems to be following in a long retinue of rhetorical and 
linguistic theorists who, with little justification, reduce all of tropological and figurative 
productivity to the inventiveness of metaphor (Genette 114-121, Lakoff and Johnson 3-4, 139-
146), a move curiously ignorant of both the contemporary theoretical literature noting 
metaphor’s and metonymy’s mutual imbrication and the wider panoply of rhetorical figuration 
with which the rhetorical tradition has, since Aristotle, been concerned.  
   
31 
For another, Gross’s own account in the quote above seems to contradict the very 
unilaterally metaphorical explanation of scientific invention which it claims to support. Note 
how, in the final sentence, Gross supports this view by arguing that “scientists have no better 
resource for expressing what they do not see….” Such a portrayal of scientific practice, while 
empirically inaccurate (as I argued above, there are a variety of articulating scientific technes 
that allow scientists to see what they could not with there eyes alone), would accord well with 
the notion of disconnected and uncommunicative brute material facts which we saw Gross 
espouse earlier. Yet in the very next sentence, Gross seems to grant that there would have to 
also be some base level of communication coming from the facts themselves, some “audible 
and visible traces” of the “universal mechanisms” which scientists “purport to track.” The brute 
facts, at least in Gross’s final sentence on metaphor, do seem to emit some minimal audible and 
visible signals to which the scientists must attend. And while Gross may be skeptical that such 
“tracings” can ever produce accurate “trackings,” he nonetheless hesitates to suggest that all 
science is the persuasive competition of more or less effective metaphors. Indeed, in his most 
recent work, Gross seems to have backed away from his earlier claim that science was rhetorical 
“all the way down,” now arguing instead that beyond the persuasive contestation of 
metaphorical paradigms, there are material objects which can, through scientific investigation, 
eventually become contiguous with definitive, indisputable factual meanings (“Limits” 1-3). 
Even for Gross, and despite his earlier claims to the contrary, something more articulates in 
scientific practice, beyond the scope of the persuasive scientist’s paradigmatic metaphors.  
Indeed, it is in the midst of this problem which Gross leaves untheorized that we can, I 
think, tie together a number of the critiques which I have offered along the course of this review 
of rhetoric of science research. If one begins with a conception of rhetoric as entirely a study of 
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persuasive means and is also committed to a strong concept of that rhetoric’s role in scientific 
practice, one frequently finds oneself reducing all of science to the study of those persuasive 
techniques. To grant that something else is going on in science besides persuasion (say, 
laboratory technes that reveal the presence of natural facts) would, perforce, weaken the notion 
that rhetoric is either the critical or even a particularly significant scientific practice, since that 
something else would most likely point to the ways by which scientists receive access to a 
material reality that, since it is not human and does not speak, is not engaged in persuasion but 
instead unequivocally and irrefutably presents the real object’s mere nature. Such a literal 
presentation takes us beyond the realm of disputation and persuasion, a boundary within which 
Aristotelian rhetorical theory (to which Gross avowedly adheres) has long delimited the 
discipline (Rhetoric of Science 3). Once a rhetorical theorist grants the possibility of such 
indisputable, factual presentations, it is a short and steep slippery slope to sidelining rhetoric as 
a secondary and obfuscatory element that occurs alongside a more trustworthy and ultimately 
unrhetorical scientific practice which would probably be better off if it just spoke in plain 
language, philosophical syllogisms, or mathematical proofs. Unsurprisingly, most rhetorical 
theorists of science do not make such admissions. 
So instead most scholars conceive of scientific rhetoric through a strong notion of 
persuasion’s constructive efficacy. This still leaves as untheorized, however, the nature of the 
relationship between the persuasive scientists and the uncommunicative objects about which 
and for which they speak but with which they have no literal connection. An Aristotelian-
Grossian rhetoric of science has to identify some relationship between the scientific rhetor and 
his or her natural object which still allows for those objects to remain ultimately disputable and 
equivocal objects of persuasion, lest rhetoric lose its possession of science to the methods of 
   
33 
dialectic or logic. Metaphor emerges as an effective solution to this problem; it affords a 
rhetorical bridge between the scientist and nature that simultaneously allows him or her to speak 
about that nature without forcing the rhetoric of science to claim that such speech also 
represents a literal, direct and therefore unrhetorical account of that nature. As Quintilian said of 
metaphor, it allows language to describe a topic by attributing to it something it does not 
“naturally possess” (bk. 8, ch. 6). Metaphor thereby allows for science to articulate nature 
without the rhetoric of science ever having to claim science also has the direct access to nature’s 
attributes which would lend itself to the kind of indisputable proofs that would downgrade 
persuasive rhetoric’s importance to scientific practice. Thus, one can have a somewhat robust 
(though, I think, ultimately incomplete) rhetoric of science that 1) defines rhetoric entirely as a 
study of persuasion and 2) subscribes to an epistemology that defines all knowledge as 
ultimately metaphorical. Persuasion and metaphor are two interdependent sides of this kind of 
neo-Aristotelian, Grossian rhetoric of science 
And indeed, this has been precisely the terms upon which a wide array of important 
contemporary rhetoric of science researchers have also chosen to proceed. Elizabeth Parthenia 
Shea’s research, for instance, studied the ways metaphorical depictions help give science greater 
persuasive legitimacy as well as provide convincing public portrayals of otherwise abstruse 
biological processes (94-98, 124). Celeste Condit’s study of genetic science offers a similar 
analysis of the way metaphors allow scientific research a wider and more persuasive public 
ethos (14).  Leah Ceccarelli’s work argues that scientists rely upon metaphors when making 
persuasive arguments for cross-disciplinary alliances (5). Matt Ratto’s research offers a 
concurring analysis that also highlights the beneficial flexibility that metaphorical depictions 
afford coalition building between scientists and non-scientific stakeholders, particularly during 
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the development of large-scale publicly-funded research agendas (32). Scientific metaphors 
have also been shown to have a persuasive effect on governmental responses to ecological and 
health emergencies (Larson, et. al 254-257) as well as less imminent public health issues 
(Gronnvoll and Landau 48-49) and environmental concerns (Valiverronen and Hellsten 241-
242).  
Interestingly, most of this research has looked at the ways metaphors persuasively 
bridge the divide between a particular scientific discipline and either a different discipline or the 
broader, non-expert public. Only a few studies have attempted to see whether metaphors act as 
an inventional resource within a single discipline, particularly for those engaged in the kind of 
vanguard research that might develop revolutionary, paradigm-shifting science. Ken Baake and 
Michael Bradie have each argued this case, yet it is interesting that in both their works the very 
scientists they studied rejected the notion that their discoveries were ultimately metaphorical in 
nature (Baake 53-55, 72-73, 76; Bradie 162-163). Whether a different trope or some 
combination of tropes could better discern the dynamics of scientific invention has largely been 
left unstudied, particularly because rhetoric has too often imagined that the metaphorical is the 
only figurative alternative to the literal and unrhetorical (Genette 114-121).  
There have, however, been a few scholars who have highlighted the importance of 
rhetorical figures besides metaphor, including their vital role in the productivity of scientific 
invention. We have already seen this done, albeit not in explicitly rhetorical terms, by Bruno 
Latour, but similar efforts have also been made within rhetorical theory. In this next section, I 
want to turn our attention to these scholars, whose work provided the inspiration for a great deal 
of the analysis in this dissertation and who begin to offer an account of tropological articulation 
based in a more complex and diverse conception of figuration.   
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Science as Rhetoric: The Alternative of Tropological Invention and Articulation 
A number of rhetoric of science scholars have succeeded in thinking beyond the schema 
of persuasion and metaphor through which Gross and others have largely defined the discipline. 
Foremost amongst them has to be Jeanne Fahnestock, whose work on the topic of figurative 
language and scientific invention is an abiding inspiration for this dissertation’s analysis. There 
are two principal reasons why her work has been so important. Firstly, whereas previous studies 
typically considered rhetoric’s importance to the intersubjective realm of scientific persuasion, 
Fahnestock shifted the focus to the way individual rhetors invented their arguments through the 
use of figurative epitomes. To some degree, that shift was made possible by the scholarship that 
preceded it; once scholars like Campbell and Gross had shown the degree to which successful 
scientists required rhetorical competence when arguing and negotiating with other scientists, 
Fahnestock’s work could look more closely at the ways individual scientists engaged in 
figurative invention. Of course (and as we have seen) scholars like Gross had also attended to 
this question of invention, but those accounts, wedded to a strong notion of metaphor as the sole 
constitutive relationship between the rhetor and the object of her study, made the topic relatively 
uninteresting for further investigation; if all scientific invention was just a question of 
metaphorical paradigms, that left little room or reason for other rhetorical scholars to study the 
question more closely. What Fahnestock showed, however, was that the problem of figurative 
scientific invention was far from being satisfactorily surveyed and that, instead of a one 
dimensional process of metaphorical substitution, a wide variety of rhetorical figures articulated 
the conception of scientific arguments. In Fahnestock’s work, these more complex and obscure 
tropes, which might seem to be mere stylistic flourishes, show themselves instead as the 
structuring relations of important scientific theories, epitomes by which scientists organized their 
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nascent ideas and developed more complete arguments (24).   
 Nowhere is that more evident than in Fahnestock’s treatment of Charles Darwin’s 
arguments in the Origin of Species, which Fahnestock shows to be shot through with repeated 
instances of a particular figurative device called incrementum. Incrementum is one member of a 
wider class of serial figures (others being partitio, congeries, and gradatio), which specifically 
allow a rhetor to move gradually between seemingly different subjects that, absent the serial 
connection the figure offers, might otherwise remain disconnected. Fahnestock highlights a few 
critical instances of this in Darwin’s writing, yet what makes these examples so convincing is the 
way they not only define the particular coherence of specific sentences or paragraphs but, more 
holistically, Darwin’s idiosyncratic style of composition. In Fahnestock’s account, Darwin’s 
incrementums are not just micro-level stylistic flourishes; they epitomize a whole rhetorical 
strategy. In fact, the instances of formal sentence-level incrementums are somewhat rare in 
Darwin’s text but when they do appear they serve to punctuate ongoing and diffuse efforts to use 
series reasoning to collapse distinctions and antithesis which previous natural historians 
depended upon to argue against evolution (114-121).  
Fahnestock’s Rhetorical Figures in Science is filled with similarly insightful analyses of 
a host of equally significant scientists epitomizing their arguments through other stylistic 
constructions. That thoroughness is, I think, aided by what Fahnestock strategically chooses to 
leave out; there is no deep analysis of any scientist’s use of metaphorical figuration. To some 
degree, this may simply be because there was already an over-abundance of such studies and 
adding to them would not offer anything new. Yet avoiding any consideration of scientific 
metaphor also allows Fahnestock to provide a slight but importantly different emphasis. As 
Christian Lundberg has well summarized, when a rhetorical analysis centers on the specific 
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metaphorical substitution that a rhetor makes, the role that such a trope plays does not 
necessarily provide evidence that such rhetoric exemplifies a thoroughly tropological process of 
invention (75-78). Rather, such arguments that the “trope of X” plays a dominant role in a 
particular discourse lend themselves to a model of rhetoric that is fundamentally about 
persuasion (as opposed to tropological articulation), with rhetors using metaphorical 
substitutions instead of literal descriptions so as to take advantage of an alternative and more 
persuasive discourse (76). Take, for example, a metaphorical substitution that has been a subject 
of Celeste Condit’s study of genetic rhetoric: the idea that genes can be understood as a kind of 
“blueprint” (160-169). Such an analysis, while certainly valuable, does not usually show the 
work of a genetics laboratory becoming a more fundamentally metaphorical endeavor. Rather, 
the prevalence of blueprint metaphors show genetics becoming more architectural than 
metaphorical, proving the persuasiveness of an architectural logic rather than the thoroughgoing 
inventiveness of a tropological rhetorical one. Metaphor, in this instance, is not inventing 
anything new; it is simply allowing a preexistent and persuasive logic, architecture’s, to 
permeate further, from architectural drawings into biology.  
The question for a tropological rhetoric of science would be quite different: not how a 
non-scientific, non-rhetorical logic metaphorically extends itself into scientific discourse, but 
rather how science is able to propose itself tropologically. As we saw in this chapter’s earlier 
discussion of Bruno Latour’s constructivist philosophy of science, such a rhetorical logic can be 
well theorized through the concept of articulation. While recent rhetoric of science scholarship 
has only occasionally offered a similarly thorough theoretical account of tropological articulation 
(Nathan Stormer’s excellent work on this topic will be discussed below), Fahnestock’s 
discussion of figures of series reasoning (incrementum, partitio, congeries, gradatio, etc.) 
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suggests a potential beginning. She notes that the most basic construction of such serial figures is 
called an articulus, a figure that extends through a number of similar items (three or more) 
serially without specifying a particular emphasis or direction guiding the series’s iteration (91). 
One critically important element of the articulus is that it does not require specified conjunctions 
to join the different items or membra of the series (Burton). Rather the membra’s immediate 
temporal and spatial contiguity, their close syntagmatic association, proves enough for each of 
the items to extend beyond itself and cohere with the others as a relatively stable assemblage. 
This assertion requires further argument, and the chapters that follow will show how such 
articulating figures demonstrate a peculiar tendency of language to associate itself in the 
Latourian sense of syntagmatic association--to conjoin metonymically without the need for an 
explicit dependent relation. An implicit contiguity appears to hold the articulus together, an 
emergent coherence in the serial figuration of the language itself. On the basis of that coherence, 
more complex serial figures can gain the momentum to extend themselves in more determined 
and novel directions. As we shall see in the following chapters, incrementums depend upon the 
articulus’s baseline coherence to justify the extension of the figure beyond its initial starting 
point. If an articulus is a general coherence inherent in an iterated series of words, an 
incrementum is the rhetorical leveraging of that coherence to extend the series inventionally, 
articulating the series (and with it, both the rhetor and the audience) beyond the figure’s 
beginning into novel areas of understanding. As Fahnestock points out, an incrementum is 
simply an articulus that also develops just such an additional “tendency, direction, or trajectory” 
(91).   
Recently, a few other rhetorical theorists have joined Fahnestock in charting the ways 
such figurative articulations advance novel lines of scientific argument. Jordynn Jack has 
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explored the ways hegemonic incrementums articulating gender differences extended themselves 
into the construction of autism, creating an equally hierarchical scale of cognitive characteristics. 
In this case, what articulates is not simply gender difference, but a particular tropological 
figuration of that difference. Randy Harris has done similar work on a different area of scientific 
rhetoric, studying the ways figurative reasoning epitomized Gregor Mendel’s revolutionary 
discoveries in genetics. In the process, Harris makes a convincing argument that such figuration 
is so effective, not because it is ornamental or catchy, but because it fundamentally articulates a 
particular logic into a visual and material form, “compressing the reasoning into a distinctive 
harmony of patterns” (585). 
If Jack’s and Harris’s work all show the wider viability of Fahnestock’s figural logic as a 
method for rhetorical analysis of scientific prose, Nathan Stormer’s provides the wholesale 
theoretical description of articulation which, though implicit in some of Fahnestock’s work, is 
not fully specified. Stormer argues that articulation draws attention to the ways both material 
bodies and symbolic languages emerge simultaneously through rhetorical performances (260-
261). Following Latour, Stormer argues that it is this mutual constitution of materiality and 
meaning that produces a specific culture: 
Articulation is about how radically different rhetorics emerge historically in the ever-churning segregation 
and hybridization of things and discourses…. Put differently, for me articulation is not about collapsing the 
distinction between materiality and meaning to advance a specific critical project; it is about historicizing 
different configurations of materiality and meaning (collapsed, segregated, overlapping) as conditions for 
the coming into being of a given form of rhetoric. (260-261) 
 
We need to be careful here because what Stormer proposes here is how culture emerges after 
discourses and bodies have been fully delimited. There persist, however, material dimensions of 
language just as there are symbolic or communicative aspects of bodies. As Stormer emphasizes:  
to articulate is to spatialize culture and nature by arranging diverse material-semiotic elements into 
recognizable bodies and languages. Bodies necessarily are composed of material-semiotic elements, as are 
languages. Within different performative regimes, bodies and languages are configured into orders of 
things and of discourses. Because of the powerful tendency to read these terms as chains, opposed term by 
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term (materiality-bodies-things vs. meaning-language-discourse), bodies and languages are both material 
and semiotic. In addition, language can be a thing and a discourse and so can bodies, but not because both 
are material and meaningful. The emergence of distinctions between things and discourses, in which some 
bodies are seen as things and others as discourses (likewise, where some languages become things and 
some discourses) is a function of articulate performativities. (my emphasis; 261) 
 
What rhetoric can attend to, then, is the way different articulating arrangements emerge out of 
the hybrid material-semiotic performances that produce both those things we typically imagine 
as purely material and those discourses we typically imagine as purely semiotic. This dissertation 
will largely focus on those things we typically imagine as meaningful discourses, but will study 
the way they produce a particular historical and scientific arrangement between nature and 
culture through an articulating movement that is simultaneously a physical and meaningful 
arrangement. In analyzing such taxis, Stormer argues that we need to particularly pay attention to 
the contiguous structure of a particular articulation. The way a performance organizes “the 
linkage of elements within a text to create certain effects in the audience” becomes critical (my 
emphasis; 260). Here too, Stormer points our attention to the metonymic/syntagmatic pole of 
structural relations. 
Additionally, we should also note Stormer’s suggestion in the quotation above that 
attending to the spatial dimension of bodies and languages can also help us redirect our attention 
to metonymic contiguities. This requires some further explanation, which will be developed in 
this dissertation’s third chapter on the visual rhetoric of breeding. Briefly, however, we can say 
that studying how a figure structures itself spatially can often shift our attention to the way it 
creates associations within itself. That is not to say such articulate associations cannot emerge in 
the more temporally enacted rhetorics of oral or written performances--they absolutely can. But 
because the nature of oral and written performances often tends to emphasize the individual 
word, phrase or sentence which we are in the midst of hearing or reading, that gives us less time 
to consciously consider how the taxis of other words, phrases or sentences before or after the one 
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we are reading or hearing create significant effects. There are, of course, clear exceptions to this; 
we could think about how E.E. Cummings’s forthrightly spatialized poetry produces structural 
associations that have everything to do with the way printed words are arranged relative to one 
another--their syntagmatic taxis--as opposed to highlighting the metaphoric meanings such 
words establish with concepts beyond the text. Generally speaking, however, we are often too 
quick to neglect this spatial and material component. This dissertation will make a decided effort 
to focus on this spatial component of figuration. In doing so, it will continually emphasize that an 
element of a text’s articulating success is not alone attributable to the referential and 
metaphorical substitutions it has with concepts beyond the text.  
Thus, the focus of this dissertation’s analysis will be on how figures and combinations of 
figures provide particular kinds of taxis, articulating both the meaning and material arrangement 
of Darwinian and agricultural rhetorics. While, as will be discussed shortly, much of this 
dissertation studies genres of agricultural rhetoric that were certainly influential to Darwin’s 
thinking, my analysis will attempt to avoid arguing that agricultural rhetoric supplied a 
metaphorical framework which helped shape Darwin’s process of invention. Rather, the analysis 
will be that Darwin’s science is a contiguous articulating development of a rhetorical style that 
we can first see emerging in earlier agricultural texts. The figurative taxis of these earlier 
agricultural works, as we shall see, articulates bodies and discourses in both agricultural breeding 
and the biological science that emerges out of it.   
Outline of the Following Chapters 
While agricultural texts have a long history in English letters, it was only beginning in the 
1760’s that such works started to deploy the type of scientific logic and rigor that would later 
make them useful to naturalists like Darwin. This dissertation’s analysis begins in Chapter 2 with 
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a discussion of the originator of that genre, Arthur Young, author of numerous agricultural 
travelogues and publisher of the period’s most successful agricultural journal. Of specific interest 
to Young was the innovative class of livestock breeders who were beginning to apply scientific 
methods to the incremental development of new livestock varieties. Breeders like Robert 
Bakewell, George Culley, and Thomas Coke received repeated and glowing attention in Young’s 
prose. They became minor celebrities through his publicity and often coordinated with him to 
better establish their breeds and methods. Young’s writing lionized these breeders, depicting 
them as the main agents of a broader process of modernization and improvement. Such 
panegyrics used extensive figurative language, offering idealized tributes that turned leading 
breeders into the metonymic substitutes of the cultural developments they advanced. Critically, 
Young justified that metonymic substitution by integrating it with the other rhetorical figure that 
defined his rhetoric, incrementum. As we will see in chapter 2, Young’s career as a rhetorician is 
marked by the increasing integration of these two figures (a kind of incrementum all its own) in 
which each figure progressively requires the fuller articulation of the other. In their most 
productive combination, these two figures produce a rhetorical climax, a species of incrementum 
in which the final step in the incremental series (in Young’s case, that final step is the metonym) 
seems to rise above the very series from which it emerges (Fahnestock 92). Metonymy, in this 
way, serves simultaneously as a kind of driving goal towards which incrementum iterates while 
incrementum simultaneously underwrites the metonymy as an outcome that can be reasonably 
derived as the iterative series’ culmination. Young’s agricultural rhetoric increasingly moves 
towards the production of this kind of climax, a narrative, progressive account of agricultural 
change that both accounts for and is indebted to the eminent agricultural farmers who thereby 
become metonyms for modern English agriculture. 
   
43 
That Young uses figuration in this way is all the more remarkable because, as we will 
also see in Chapter 2, depicting eminent agriculturalists as the metonymic embodiment for all of 
modern agriculture was not necessarily common sense. Indeed, the very farmer who became the 
greatest focus for Young’s climactic rhetoric, Robert Bakewell, figured agricultural progress in 
terms distinctly opposed to those which Young used to metonymize him. For while Young’s 
metonymies often used Bakewell as a metonymic substitution for all of modern agriculture, 
Bakewell’s rhetoric tended to distribute agriculture’s causality more widely and deemphasize his 
personal agency over the process. Taken together, these two streams of figurative rhetoric were 
actually more effective in concert than either would have been separately, for Young’s 
metonymic rhetoric gave Bakewell an enlarged persona in popular media while Bakewell 
himself was still able to insure professional allies that they were as important to his success as he 
was to there.   
Yet because it was Young’s metonymic rhetoric of eminent agriculturalists that defined 
the popular perception of modernizing agriculture, his vision proved more broadly enduring and 
defining. Indeed Young’s new rhetorical style so thoroughly redefined agricultural thinking that 
it was adopted by later rhetoricians working in much different genres and mediums. This 
dissertation's third chapter considers how Young’s innovative style had an influence far beyond 
his particular genre of agricultural travelogues and essays and came to reshape the way a host of 
agricultural visual artists imagined the relationship between farmers, their lands, and their 
animals. Whereas earlier visual arts often showed humans and nature in amicable equality, 
agriculture art of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century focused instead on the power 
and control the new class of breeders had achieved over their animal charges. Harmonious 
Georgic scenes of shepherds and flocks were replaced by hierarchical arrangements in which 
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breeders rose above their livestock. A degree of harmony remained in these works, but that 
harmony was repurposed to naturalize the power and control modern breeding had achieved over 
animal development. Importantly, artists articulated this new order with visual equivalents of the 
figurative language Arthur Young first employed. Breeders were depicted as statuesque 
metonyms of agriculture’s new-found power, yet their otherwise outsized presence was fluidly 
integrated into their natural surroundings using incremental arrangements of figures and 
landscapes. 
The result is that these later paintings advance a visual rhetoric very similar in style to 
that which Arthur Young first pioneered in the 1770’s. That such rhetorical devices appear to 
have stylistic equivalents in the period’s visual art tells us not only that Young’s vision of 
agriculture was accepted and widely circulated, but that the particular rhetorical devices he used 
operated at both a syntactic and conceptual level. That his linguistic constructions could be so 
thoroughly and effectively translated into different forms suggests that these rhetorical devices 
articulate more than just clever turns of phrase or persuasive prose. They demonstrate a broader 
practical orientation and a cultural logic that permeates a variety of communicative mediums.  
As the fourth chapter likewise shows, later treatises on livestock husbandry similarly 
built upon Arthur Young’s figurative language, showing the natural powers of modern English 
breeders as a logical culmination of agricultural improvement. Yet while Young had limited his 
earlier travelogues to the contemporary innovations of individual farmers, later agricultural 
writers greatly expanded the temporal scope of their analysis and turned animal husbandry into 
broader indicator of civilization’s epochal progress. Writers like Sir John Saunders Sebright, 
John Wilkinson, and William Youatt offered readers extended histories of livestock breeding that 
began with the earliest domestication of animals in primitive pastoral societies. Such narratives 
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made breeding the measure of human culture’s gradual progress, with farmers incrementally 
gaining greater control over the wild animals and landscapes around them. These accounts 
concluded with the same modern breeders Arthur Young had first introduced to the reading 
public, but now these leaders of contemporary husbandry were made to stand for much more 
than England’s recent achievements. Modern breeders became the telos of a grander story of 
development that stretched all the way back to prehistory, making those agriculturalists the 
metonymic embodiment of a greater cultural and scientific accomplishment. 
It was this tradition of agricultural rhetoric that Darwin encountered when he began his 
research for the Origin. As a biologist interested in the ways species gradually changed over long 
periods of time, Darwin believed accounts of livestock breeding held a key to revealing the 
similar mechanisms of natural evolution. Darwin was particularly taken by the idea that breeders 
had obtained a kind of refined and mechanistic causal agency over nature, gaining control of the 
very evolutionary process he wanted to identify. Such is the evidence from Darwin’s research 
notebooks and his personal copies of breeding treatises. A close analysis of Darwin’s encounter 
with these texts, particularly his revealing marginalia in his personal copies of works by 
Sebright, Wilkinson and Youatt, show that these writers not only contributed significantly to his 
thinking, but their figurative use of incrementalism and metonymy struck Darwin as particularly 
compelling and potentially vital for the conception of his new science. 
It should not be surprising then that Darwin adopted these same figurative depictions of 
breeding as a rhetorical foundation for his argument in the Origin, yet this is an aspect of 
Darwin’s writing that has little critical attention. No previous scholarship has considered the long 
history that such depictions of incremental development and metonymic control had in the 
vibrant tradition of agricultural rhetoric Darwin consulted during his early research. Indeed, what 
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little research has been done on Darwin’s use of agricultural language tends to mistakenly 
construe his adoption of that rhetoric as part of a metaphorical strategy, arguing that Darwin uses 
selective breeding as an explanatory metaphor to elucidate his novel theory. Yet close analysis of 
Darwin’s studies of breeding, both in the Origin and his later work The Variation of Plants and 
Animals, shows that Darwin did not consider the relationship between breeding and evolution to 
be either comparative or metaphorical. Rather Darwin thought breeding offered a condensed and 
simplified model of the seemingly more complicated but actually identical mechanisms of 
evolution. Indeed, Darwin believed (wrongly it turns out) that breeders were not only creating 
better varieties of existing species, but were gradually evolving new species in precisely the 
same way as occurred in natural selection. For Darwin, the breeder was not a metaphor of 
evolution; he was a metonym of it, causing the identical changes that produced evolutionary 
effects. If evolution was an effect for science to represent, Darwin’s breeders were the cause that 
could so substitute.  
As I conclude in the dissertation’s final chapter, that Darwin came to perceive breeders as 
the metonymic agents of an otherwise more complex and diffuse natural effects is particularly 
attributable to the agricultural writing he encountered in his early research. Greater attention to 
his engagement with that rhetoric offers a better understanding of the conceptual significance 
that such metonymic and incrementalist logics play in evolutionary theory. Far from merely 
packaging his ideas in more illustrative prose, this dissertation reveals the way Darwin’s 
figurative language articulates his basic logical argument for natural selection.  
 We must start, however, some years before Darwin’s research, with an account of how 
incrementum and metonymy epitomized the genre of popular agricultural writing which, decades 
later, would help Darwin articulate his science.
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CHAPTER 2: TWO CAUSES, ONE BREEDER 
Introduction 
Charles Darwin was supposed to take a break in the summer of 1842. He had just sent the 
manuscript of his book The Structure and Distribution of Coral Reefs off to his publisher and 
had planned to have a restful vacation at his wife’s family’s home in Staffordshire. While on 
holiday, however, he decided the time was finally ripe to write a sketch of the ideas he had been 
developing on evolution. The result was a 35 folio-page, handwritten document that would serve 
as a first draft for the Origin of Species (Browne 436-437). The ideas poured out of him, but they 
did not emerge from nowhere. Darwin had been researching the problem of evolution since at 
least 1837 and had already filled a whole series of notebooks on the topic. He had read widely 
and deeply on the topic, including texts on the breeding of domesticated livestock. As we will 
see in Chapter 4, it wasn’t simply the principles of agricultural breeding that Darwin found 
interesting. Particularly compelling was the way texts on breeding figured individual breeders’ 
causal efficacy in the process of evolving new varieties. And in those texts, there were a few 
specific breeders who came to epitomize both the agency of evolution and the broader progress 
of modern scientific agriculture. Darwin clearly noticed that emphasis, because, in the 1842 
sketch, he also described both evolutionary causality and modern agriculture by referencing the 
power of specific individual breeders. He wrote the following notes very early in that sketch, 
comparing the evolutionary pressures between hypothetical prey and predators with the selective 
efficacy exercised by particular breeders:  
Let hares increase very slowly from change of climate affecting peculiar plants, and some other 
[illegible] rabbit decrease in same proportion [let this unsettle organisation of], a canine animal, who 
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formerly derived its chief sustenance by springing on rabbits or running them by scent, must decrease too 
and might thus readily become exterminated. But if its form varied very slightly, the long legged fleet ones, 
during a thousand years being selected, and the less fleet rigidly destroyed must, if no law of nature be 
opposed to it, alter forms. 
Remember how soon Bakewell on the same principle altered cattle and Western1, sheep…. 
(Foundations 8-9)  
 
The “Bakewell” Darwin mentions is Robert Bakewell. He lived from 1725 to 1795, and 
though contemporary readers of this dissertation are unlikely to have heard of him, the fact that 
Darwin wrote about him some fifty years after his death is, as this chapter will show, not so 
surprising. For, more than any other English agriculturalist, Robert Bakewell came to represent 
the practices of modern livestock breeding which took root in England during the late eighteenth 
century. He occupies this central place in agricultural history despite the fact that he wrote very 
little publicly about his methods and that contemporary agricultural historians have frequently 
questioned whether the techniques he developed were in fact that different from the practices of 
earlier breeders, or if the breeds he popularized were genuinely the more productive, healthy and 
profitable commodities he and others claimed them to be (Fussel lxxi). But even if Bakewell’s 
accomplishments were less innovative and significant than the notice he received, the degree to 
which he expertly cultivated that acclaim has yet to be fully recognized. This chapter explores 
this early period of modern livestock breeding from that rhetorical standpoint, looking at the 
ways Bakewell worked with others to articulate a public persona both for himself and for the 
agricultural practices he came to represent.  
Accordingly, Bakewell’s success story includes some essential allies, the principal of 
whom is Arthur Young (1741-1820), Fellow of the Royal Society, first Secretary of the then 
nascent national Board of Agriculture, editor of The Annals of Agriculture (the period’s most 
                                                
1 The “Western” Darwin mentions is another prominent breeder, though not of equal renown as Robert Bakewell. 
As we will see in later chapters, Darwin frequently mentions a number of specific breeders by name, but Bakewell 
most often of all. Hence the reason why I focus on him in this chapter and throughout this dissertation.  
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significant agricultural journal) and prolific author of numerous books and articles on 
agricultural policy, politics, and reform. Bakewell and Young often worked in tandem, providing 
advice and support to each other that simultaneously advanced each man’s career and the broader 
cause of agricultural improvement. 
Yet despite the fact that they worked doggedly to support a very unified vision of 
agricultural policy and practice, the rhetorical figures they used to articulate that vision were 
significantly different, if fascinatingly complimentary. Both depended heavily upon metonymies, 
but Young’s figurative language subsumed the broader effects of selective breeding and 
improved agriculture (enclosure, market demand, new farming implements, urbanization, road 
improvements, export laws, finance, irrigation, etc.) under the causal genius of individual 
breeders and farmers, with Bakewell one of the most prominent. In short, Young’s metonymies 
substituted an efficient cause for a multiplicity of agricultural effects, using a single human 
agency to stand for all the associated extrinsic entities of modernized agriculture. Bakewell used 
metonymy as well, but his figure substitutes a more ideological final cause for the same effects 
Young’s metonym highlights. This represented a variety of modern breeding’s effects through a 
broader “Cause” that could compel the other agriculturalists with whom Bakewell cooperated 
and, occasionally, colluded. The result was that each rhetor’s metonym fills in logical gaps 
created by the other’s rhetoric; Bakewell’s teleological “Cause” supplied him and his private 
network of allied breeders with a way to see beyond their individual influence so as to serve a 
purpose, whereas Young’s metonymic farmers became the singular public agencies who could 
stand for that same broad array of agricultural improvements. Each rhetoric supplies the element 
that the other’s figuration requires for logical closure, while simultaneously creating the logical 
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aporia that the other’s can enclose. This figurative closure makes both Bakewell and Young 
more broadly persuasive than either individually could become.     
Implicit here is a kind of distributed rhetorical assemblage, constructed simultaneously by 
multiple rhetors without a single figure providing the “essential” element. Such a network, 
attributable to no single, ultimate agency, troubles reductionist accounts that would to attempt to 
describe either Bakewell’s or Young’s rhetorical success as an inevitably linear creation, a work 
of sequential logos that required nothing but an understanding of the facts of agriculture, spiced 
with a clever appreciation for the emotional proclivities of their audience. As we will see, the 
success of the agricultural improvements for which they argued required each rhetor to do more 
than just provide a careful or expert exposition of the facts. Both rhetors needed to figuratively 
articulate the improvement of agriculture and to do so in ways that supported the more 
immediate goals they wanted to achieve, even if their broader rhetorical work showed them 
arguing for similar ends. 
How, we might ask, do they acquire these figurative articulations? Are there earlier 
traditions of writing that supply them with the kinds of stylistic arrangements that helped them 
argue for improved agriculture? In Bakewell’s case this is difficult to ascertain, as what we have 
of his writings are rather limited in variety and quantity. We know little of his early reading, 
writing and schooling, making it hard to discern how other rhetorical traditions may have 
influenced his style. In Young’s case, however, we are blessed with a surfeit of texts, with as 
much from his youthful visionary period as from his later career when his work more focused. It 
is that early period that will prove essential to understanding how Young was later able to argue 
the case for improvement so effectively, imagining a future England that was, certainly without 
the benefit of hindsight, anything but a foregone logical conclusion. This will require us to 
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examine, rhetorically, a type of work that the rhetoric of science might see as somewhat beyond 
its scope of analysis. For if any text foreshadows the visionary imagination that Young would 
later join with his comprehensive logos, it is the novels that he published anonymously early in 
his career, particularly a quasi-utopian, sentimental narrative titled The Adventures of Emmera, 
or the Fair American (1767). Emmera shows Young working to develop figurative techniques 
that would later become vital in the full articulation of his scientific and political conclusions. 
His early fiction allows him to postulate the rhetorical tools upon which the later science 
depended. 
To state things provocatively, Young’s accomplishments were a fabrication (in the 
Latourian sense of the word), a work of partial fiction that, we should be quick to add, is not at 
all to say they were “just made up.” Rather, understanding the full sweep of Young’s corpus, and 
the essential alliance he had with Bakewell, allows us to see that his accomplishments were born 
out of no single logically deductive train of thought or gradual empirical accrual, but rather a 
much more multifarious, emergent and, in both senses, “novel” network. The degree to which 
this rhetorical assemblage is partly a fictional creation only threatens to undermine its scientific 
validity if one believes, wrongly as I will later argue, that a figurative vision has nothing 
materially substantive to add to a scientific career. This chapter attempts to prove the opposite, 
showing Young’s fictional writing as part and parcel of a broader figurative, scientific 
imagination.  
All this may seem a bit far afield from Charles Darwin and the work he accomplishes in 
the Origin of Species, yet (and as Darwin’s “Essay” of 1842 suggests) we need to keep in mind 
that Darwin’s project depends heavily upon the agricultural achievements made by Bakewell and 
his colleagues. It depends just as much on the rhetorical accomplishments achieved by Young, 
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principally the valorization of breeders as a metonymic “cause” that was worthy of Darwin’s 
figurative theorization. That will become particularly clear in Chapter 4 of this dissertation, in 
which we will see that Darwin’s argument depends on an ability to condense the varied effects of 
breeding down to a singular metonymic agency in the person of the breeder, a linear “true cause” 
who is entirely and independently responsible for the evolution of a breed. There too, we will 
also see that when Darwin composes the metonym of the agentic breeder, it is not an abstract 
imagined character that he has in mind. Instead, he makes clear that he is thinking of specific 
individuals, the eminent breeders of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century that Young 
helped to make famous. Most often and with the greatest emphasis, Darwin thinks of Bakewell. 
If the opening of the Origin’s narrative can be said to have heroic protagonists, it would be these 
“eminent breeders” (Darwin’s words), whose practical knowledge of selective reproduction 
allows them to command the evolution of bred species. This chapter then, can be thought of as 
discerning how breeders became capable of such rhetorical plaudits. All professions have their 
best practitioners, but we do not automatically attribute them eminence. That eighteenth century 
agriculturists like Bakewell became worthy of that lauding, particularly in a kingdom where 
many farmers were, by definition, “commoners,” is a remarkable rhetorical and cultural shift. 
We find, then, Young establishing a new figurative arrangement that would become essential to 
Darwin’s arguments and his theorization of breeders as metonymic agents of change. To 
appreciate how significant of a rhetorical accomplishment that was, we will first need to see (in 
the next section of this chapter) how diametrically opposed to Young’s vision of the breeder’s 
agency was Bakewell’s own rhetoric. We will then return (in the latter half of this chapter) to the 
way Young used figurative rhetoric to naturalize his much grander vision of the breeder’s power. 
The chapter will then conclude with a consideration of how Young first developed that style. As 
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I suggested before, I find reason to conclude he articulated it first to consummate a utopian 
vision of modern agriculture.  
Bakewell Articulates “the Cause” 
Robert Bakewell was born in Leicestershire, an agricultural county in the British 
Midlands. His was an old family with aristocratic forebears (his earliest recorded ancestor was a 
member of Henry II’s court) but by his generation the Bakewells had become only locally 
renowned, a prominent family of the county, who cultivated a 500 acre leased farm called 
Dishley Grange. Bakewell received his earliest education in agriculture from his father (also 
Robert) who had himself developed a reputation as a forward thinking land manager, particularly 
with regard to irrigation. The elder Bakewell allowed his son to travel widely throughout Great 
Britain, observing different agricultural practices and innovative farming implements, so that by 
the age of 35, when the younger Bakewell inherited the farm’s lease, he was well poised to begin 
the broader program of reform and improvement for which he would become famous (Pawson 
13-18). 
Though there is some suggestion that Bakewell’s agricultural efforts went beyond 
livestock (apparently he grew good cabbage), his primary occupation was as a grazier and 
breeder, growing feed crops and maintaining the rest of the land as pasturage for his herds of 
sheep, cattle, pigs, and horses. Bakewell also continued many of the infrastructural 
improvements begun by his father, particularly irrigation and roadways, this despite the fact that 
neither owned the land to which these renovations were made (Pawson 23). This fact may well 
be indicative of broader and burgeoning economic trends; Bakewell and his father were part of 
an era in which investments in land holdings were beginning to recoup profits much faster than 
they had previously, incentivizing farm managers (even if they did not have an ownership stake) 
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to develop those assets in novel, quickly productive directions (Malden 233). The rewards that 
more market oriented practices yielded encouraged incipient agricultural entrepreneurs to think 
of land as more than leveraging mortgages or anchoring inheritable family power. Increasingly, 
well managed land development and agriculture could become distinct profit centers in their own 
right.  
This expanding economic potential reshaped traditional agricultural communities’ social 
relationships. Firstly, breeders like Bakewell became notoriously secretive about their practices 
(Pitt 335). Previously, livestock breeds had belonged, quite literally, to whole communities, as 
farmers tended to buy, sell, and share the animals within easy proximity to their property, leading 
breeds to acquire local characteristics understood and acknowledged by everyone in the parish 
(Neeson 131-133). Breeding practices under such circumstances could hardly remain secret. 
Additionally, prior to Bakewell’s era, there was little economic need for breeding to remain 
secretive, as the profits it generated were simply not that significant. Earlier graziers generally 
kept smaller herds, often using cattle principally as draft and dairy animals and sheep as wool 
producers. An animal’s ability to yield beef or mutton was often a secondary concern, as animals 
were far too valuable for less capitalized farmers to kill or sell until they had outlived their 
usefulness otherwise (Pawson 52). This favored hardy breeds that lived long: draft cattle with 
large, strong bones and sheep with fine wool that could be sheared productively year after year 
(Amery 8). Such herds could sustain a grazier from one year to the next, but would not likely 
generate large, fast profits. The result was that both cattle and sheep were particularly well 
adapted to local climates, conditions, and practices, bred for longevity in those environments so 
that farmers could recoup modest and steady returns (Cooper 89). Breeding certainly occurred 
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prior to Bakewell’s period, but it was not so financially remunerative or as nationally relevant as 
to require the confidentiality of trade secrets.  
In contrast, breeders in Bakewell’s era were increasingly producing livestock for a 
burgeoning national meat market, and their emphasis shifted from ensuring longevity to 
developing animals that could quickly mature and yield profitable amounts of beef and mutton 
(Culley 27, Malden 231-234, Pawson 50, 61-62). This was especially important when it came to 
sheep, an animal for which Bakewell’s breeding was particularly well-known. Great Britain had, 
during that period, a strict ban on wool exportation, which meant sheep graziers were forced to 
sell their wool rather cheaply to domestic manufacturers. Part of Bakewell’s genius was seeing 
mutton production as a viable secondary income stream for sheep graziers, particularly if he 
could develop a breed that would yield meat as efficiently as it would produce wool. Such a 
sheep might allow shepherds to better ride out swings in commodities markets; if wool prices 
dipped too low, they could sell their stock to butchers. If meat prices dropped they could hold 
back and keep their stock to shear again. Of course these were choices that shepherds made prior 
to Bakewell’s breed, but developing an animal that yielded mutton as profitably as Bakewell’s 
meant the decision to sell sheep to the meat market was no longer a choice of last resort for the 
farmer who needed quick income no matter what the long-term financial repercussions. Instead, 
mutton production could become a viable strategic investment and a way to respond to 
fluctuating market demands, giving graziers a degree of economic independence unknown in 
previous generations. These were advances that, at them time, drew an enormous amount of 
public attention, and breeders like Bakewell became distinctly aware that managing such 
attention required both some secrecy and a carefully managed public persona. 
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 At the same time, however, Bakewell was not just responding to the changing national 
marketplace, but also advocating for political and agricultural changes upon which the success of 
that new marketplace depended. It would be a mistake to imagine that Bakewell was able to rely 
upon the inevitability of the socio-economic developments of which his innovative stock was 
well positioned to take advantage. Certainly he could see his breed’s potential in a national meat 
market that, with increases in middle-class, urban populations, appeared to be enlarging in scope 
and demand. That social evolution, however, if rapid and perhaps inevitable in broad historical 
terms, would well have seemed slow and by no means assured to breeders like Bakewell who 
were risking a great deal of financial capital on what amounted to a wholesale, long-term bet on 
beef and mutton futures (Pawson 49-50). So while he had to keep some of his techniques secret, 
it was simultaneously in Bakewell’s economic interest to popularize the broader principles of 
intensive breeding and land improvement so as to shift the broader marketplace (both the supply 
and demand sides) towards the types of commodities he wanted to produce. The more quickly 
England shifted from local, domestically consumed livestock to broader, national markets for 
meat, the more likely Bakewell’s own investments were to pay off.  
As we will see, one of the most important innovations Bakewell used to manage this 
difficult balancing act of secrecy and public advocacy was the Dishley Ram Society, a cartel of 
sheep breeders who met regularly to coordinate the breeding and marketing of Bakewell’s New 
Leicestershire breed. The society had a complex set of rules, many of which were designed to 
prevent the possibility that breeding rams (those who exemplified the best characteristics of the 
New Leicestershire variety) might be sold to breeders outside the Society’s control. Rams were 
leased to outsiders for a breeding season, but had to be returned to the society member once the 
lease term was up. With some minor exceptions, only Society members could sell rams outright 
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to one another (Pawson 73). In sum, Bakewell franchised the New Leicestershire breed, allowing 
the capital of individual entrepreneurs to support his cause while simultaneously ensuring those 
individuals (and their capital) were as invested in the breed’s proprietary secrets as they were in 
its successful distribution. Bakewell, quite literally, turned his personal interests into a society’s 
cause, balancing the otherwise contradictory demands of secrecy and dissemination. 
The situation was not unlike that which Charles Bazerman describes facing Thomas 
Edison, who had to safeguard his trade secrets but simultaneously publicize those very 
innovations to help assure their broader acceptance and success. As Bazerman describes it: 
When available products and market niches are stable and are understood by all actors, the value that 
people attribute to products, and thus their desire as expressed through the demand curve, can seem like a 
natural fact, as economics does not question why people value or desire the products and services for which 
they bid. But when tastes or values are changing, desire is being created and channeled in new directions, 
and producers may have some persuasive role in the social construction of demand. Demand is no longer 
an essential given of a rational quantitative calculus. Desire must be rhetorically elicited and directed, 
perceptions must be influenced, and meanings must be attributed. (142)  
 
In this section I want to argue that Bakewell, like Edison, was as good at developing his 
proprietary breeding practices as he was at rhetorically figuring their articulation, and that a key 
to his success was an ability to do both simultaneously. This required a careful balancing act 
between, on the one hand, personal promotion and, on the other, rhetorical techniques that 
positioned himself much more humbly, as one of many people serving a greater national project 
of improving effects. The figure that emerged from this balancing act was “the Cause,” with 
Bakewell identifying his personal interventions, not so much as individual actions taken in self-
interest, but rather as an effect of his service to a broader causal movement. 
Unfortunately, we have a much less complete written record of Bakewell’s efforts than 
we would of, say, an Edison. There are biographical and cultural reasons for this: Bakewell lived 
in a period that lacked the extensive journalistic infrastructure later innovators were more able to 
access (though he was finely attuned to what journalism there was, as we will see in bit). 
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Thankfully, in addition to reports on Bakewell from the period’s agricultural press, there is also a 
series of detailed letters sent by Bakewell to his friend and fellow stockman George Culley. The 
late agricultural historian H. Cecil Pawson discovered these in the 1950’s amongst a collection of 
family papers in the possession of a Culley descendant and “The Culley Collection,” as they 
have come to be known, are the main primary source documents we have of Bakewell’s personal 
writing. Though limited in number, they offer insight into the ways Bakewell articulated his 
broader agricultural program without compromising his proprietary techniques.2  
Indeed, Bakewell spends comparatively little space in this correspondence discussing the 
specific criteria of his selective breeding practices, and nowhere does one find a detailed 
discussion of how he developed a breed’s particularly marketable morphological traits. Rather 
these letters are more about networking than farm working; Bakewell’s primary objective is to 
enlist allies in his broader goal of improving British agriculture, which he articulates with the 
metonymy of “the Cause.” Sometimes, as we will see, Culley was his direct target, and Bakewell 
makes repeated requests for his friend to take a leading role in the efforts to modernize 
agriculture and help improve the breeds Bakewell developed at Dishley. In other moments, 
Bakewell confines himself to a general recounting of his own efforts in that direction, describing 
meetings with other prominent farmers, landowners, politicians and aristocrats. Throughout the 
variety of these descriptions, the trope of a compelling “Cause” emerges again and again. 
Whereas popular agricultural writers (Arthur Young most prominently) figured Bakewell as the 
cause of this historic evolution, he himself found it more accurate to direct their attention to the 
“Cause” that was creating a whole class of associated farmers. 
                                                
2 Pawson reprints the entire Culley Collection in the appendix of his biography Robert Bakewell: Pioneer Livestock 
Breeder, which is where they will be cited here. The originals are in the possession of King’s College, Newcastle. 
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We see this kind of humble deflection in the very first letter of the collection, dated April 
11, 1786. Here Bakewell argues that it makes little sense to position him as the figurehead of this 
movement, referring specifically to the unwanted celebrity status he received from Arthur 
Young’s writing as being bad for “the Cause:” 
I have not yet wrote to Mr. Young for which I think myself much to blame but I cannot say I wish to be 
taken notice of in the way he does it which I think has made him many Enemies and rather hurt the Cause 
he means to serve, notwithstanding this I have a very high opinion of his Abilities and of his Desire to 
throw all the Light he can on this Subject.3 (102) 
 
Bakewell was likely not exaggerating when he spoke of Young making “many Enemies,” for as 
we will see a little later, breeders could be incredibly competitive, particularly if they thought a 
rival like Bakewell was getting undue credit. 
Rival breeders might also accuse Bakewell of self-promotion, which indeed is what 
happened when Culley’s own book, Observations on Live Stock (1786) was published, 
containing no less than 17 laudatory descriptions of Bakewell’s work and describing him as the 
leading light among the era’s stockmen (180-181). In a letter that follows the one cited above, 
Bakewell offered Culley a humorous but firm critique of these plaudits, asking his friend to keep 
his focus on the greater, principled cause of breeding and not turn Bakewell into the cause of its 
success. He writes: 
Your pamphlet has made many Converts among the Sensible and Intelligent part of Mankind but some old 
Breeders in Lincolnshire Warwickshire and other Counties are much disgusted and I believe not more at 
you than me for the many Compliments you are pleased to pay a certain Person you allude to which they 
think is me leads them to think I was concerned and am sounding my own praises  I am much obliged by 
the very kind manner in which you mention this Stock but should you publish another edition I wish you to 
say less and only mention general Principles (8 Dec 1786). 
 
Bakewell is being a bit coy referring to himself as the “certain Person” to which Culley’s 
compliments “allude,” since the book makes absolutely clear he thinks Bakewell is the main 
                                                
3 Bakewell and Culley were close friends and their correspondence omitted formalities, with Bakewell frequently 
foregoing punctuation and taking liberties with spelling. Pawson’s transcriptions include these, as I also do here. 
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innovator of the nation’s best breeds. What that coyness achieves, however, is the very tone 
Bakewell wishes his friend strike in the future, turning the breeder into a kind of elusive, 
insubstantial figure, one hardly noticed when attention is paid to breeding or the “general 
Principles” that underlie it. Here Bakewell argues that the greater “Cause” of agriculture requires 
writers like Culley and Young to turn its more immediate cause (the breeder) into an effect. 
There is, likely, a degree to which Bakewell’s efforts to remove himself from the 
limelight are a kind of diplomatic sleight of hand, convenient misdirections that allowed him to 
advance his personal interests without drawing a celebrity’s critical notice. Yet to see Bakewell 
as the stereotype of a cunning, behind-the-scenes politician is, firstly, to miss his rhetoric’s 
complexity, and, secondly, simply inaccurate. There is little doubt that he profited personally 
from the growing popularity of his breeds and agricultural innovations, but the Culley 
correspondence shows that his call for a greater movement was not simply lip service. Rather, 
Bakewell realized very early that he and his practices needed to enroll and benefit multiple allies 
if they were to succeed, and that he himself depended as much upon the broader success of the 
“Cause” as upon his own genius and initiative.  
This meant, first and foremost, enlisting other farmers and thinkers to take leading roles 
in the work and, as has been mentioned, George Culley was a primary target. If Culley could 
keep his journalistic focus on the success of the Leicestershire breed (and not its eminent 
breeder) Bakewell would enthusiastically applaud Culley’s writing. Culley seems to have struck 
that proper balance in an account he published in Arthur Young’s journal Annals of Agriculture, 
which Bakewell praised in a letter dated June 6, 1891: 
….the Public are greatly indebted to you for the very ingenious account of the Leicestershire Sheep in your 
Letter to Mr. Young the date I do not now recollect, I think it’s more likely to be of service to the cause 
than any thing I have yet seen for sometime where to much is attempted little is gained but you have not 
said more than most Breeders will credit who are not determined to abide by old established Opinions. 
(155-156) 
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Again, Bakewell himself stood to profit from such publicity, but so too would other forward-
thinking graziers who could come to understand the increased profitability of the Leicestershire 
breed. It seems very creditable that Bakewell felt the broader “Public” really did owe Young for 
this service to “the cause.” 
In another letter Bakewell asks Culley to take the lead in establishing an experimental 
farm on royal lands, not just to test breeding practices, but a host of agricultural improvements 
that he and others were already testing. Such an agricultural laboratory might benefit Bakewell’s 
own enterprise, but it was also part of a broader movement, with leading agriculturists and the 
monarchy promoting what they all imagined to be a public good. Bakewell writes: 
My stay in London was longer than I expected owing in some measure to a desire of having application 
made to some of the great Folks and by them to the King to have some of the Crown Lands (which I 
understand in some parts of the Kingdom are like to be inclosed) set apart as experimental Farms for the 
purpose of trying from what sort of Beasts or Sheep most can be made of giving quantities of land as nearly 
as may be of the same quality be the same good or bad but I would have the tryal made on different sorts of 
Lands from very bad to very good the proposal seems to meet with general approbation and if some Young 
active Persons will undertake to form a Plan and attend the execution much good may result therefrom but I 
fear that it is too much to expect unless a Mr. Culley will stand forward and take upon him and some of his 
Friends this important business to which I shall be happy to lend all the assistance in my power but at my 
time of life cannot act as a Principal however well I may wish to the cause…. (30 May 89) 
 
Here again there is something of the same coy, demurring tone that Bakewell used in the 
earlier, December 1786 letter criticizing Culley’s book. Directly asking Culley to lead the 
experimental farm effort might sound too commanding, as though even in stepping aside he was 
staying in charge, so instead Bakewell simply hopes that a certain man with the same name as 
Culley’s might step forward of his own volition. Such a volunteer could count on the support of 
his “Friends,” which would include Bakewell but, of course, many others. In both style and 
substance, Bakewell avoids being the principal agent of this effort, instead positioning himself as 
a humble servant of a greater cause.  
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Bakewell also tried, on multiple occasions and eventually with some success, to recruit 
Culley into the nascent group of associated breeders that would become the Dishley Ram 
Society. The first of these instances comes in a letter dated January 16, 1788 which, 
unfortunately, contains some illegible portions that make the full missive somewhat difficult to 
discern. It appears, though, that Bakewell bemoaned the absence of candidates to be the society’s 
Secretary, trying thereby to cajole Culley into accepting that title. He writes: 
I think such meetings are like to be of great us we had one at Milton last week and are to have another next 
Tuesday  we had a very respectable Company many of the old Graziers did us [illegible].... it was proposed 
to have an Agricultural Society and Premiums given for any improvements that should be made…. The 
subscription begun I have not the least doubt but a business of this nature would meet with encouragement 
should any Person who had Leisure enough on his hand and [illegible] sufficient to qualify as a Secretary 
undertake the matter but I fear not anyone will be found that will lend that attention and take such an active 
part as the importance of the Subject will necessarily require, on which account I fear it will miscarry or do 
but little service, I wish you would come and lend your Assistance it is a common Cause and in which you 
are not a little interested as well as many other of your Friends. 
 
Here we see just how effectively Bakewell used the “Cause” metonym to circulate his 
personal politics as widely as possible. Whereas popular agricultural writers like Culley might 
make the breeder out to be the agent of agricultural change, Bakewell’s rhetoric utterly 
depersonalizes and distributes that power. The “Cause,” in this quotation, becomes “common,” a 
movement broad in scope, way beyond Bakewell’s personal control, and too widely compelling 
to emanate from a single individual. Far from being the result of his individual action, the 
“Cause” is a force unto itself that calls individuals together out of a sense of collective 
responsibility to one another and the principals that join them. One does not agentically activate, 
originate or command it. Instead, as Bakewell puts it in multiple letters, one “serves” the cause, 
and not the other way around. 
In broadening this “Cause” of breeding to a “common,” compelling principle, Bakewell 
ran the risk of including constituencies with conflicting agendas. Whether this was frequently the 
case is difficult to say, but we do at least have some indication that he had to engage in a bit of 
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diplomacy to manage the demands put upon him by his two major publicizers, Culley and 
Young. Though both men wrote about similar trends in agricultural improvement, they wrote for 
slightly different audiences; Young’s books were generally more popular, often written as 
accounts of a gentleman’s tour through rural districts, whereas Culley wrote books more suited 
for practical farmers and breeders, especially ones engaged in entrepreneurial improvements of 
the sort that interested Bakewell.  
These different audiences required differing levels of evidence and proof. Young, who 
was more in touch with the broader scientific establishment, often wanted data produced from 
formally scientific procedures and controls. Bakewell lamented to Culley (or at least feigned 
lamentation) that, at times, this meant he had to hold back information until he had fully 
completed the procedural requirements Young and his scientific audience expected: 
I am making experiments of many kinds of Sheep which are now tied up weighed and their food weighed 
to them, but as it is not finished I must omit giving you an Account of them till my next for you see 
according to Mr. A.Y. [Arthur Young] nothing is to come before the Public but experiments  Perhaps he 
thinks every Person who writes has as much time on his hands as he has which I believe with men of much 
business is seldom the case. (“8th Feb 1787” 106) 
 
Apparently this data was as intriguing to Culley as it was to Young, for Bakewell had to make 
repeated assurances that he would supply it to Culley as soon as possible, writing two months 
later, “The account of the tyed up Sheep You shall certainly have as we now continue to weigh 
them every Week and shall do till they are killed, and then you shall have the particulars” (“28th 
April 1787” 110), and again that June, “The tied up Sheep you shall have an Account of before 
your next Edition comes out except it be published sooner than I expect, but had rather have the 
Sheep killed before you have the Acct” (“30 June 1787” 114). 
If Bakewell was gaining a larger audience beyond his close network of allied breeders, he 
was also embracing the wider range of agricultural improvements that would interest that greater 
range of allies and went well beyond the intensive breeding for which he is now best known. He 
   
64 
wrote to Culley frequently about about market reforms, veterinary medicine and, with particular 
fervency, irrigation. Culley supported that broad range of improvements, so much so that 
Bakewell would later laud Culley for his attention beyond breeding and towards, as he put it, 
other “various branches of business.” Here again, the “Cause” metonym allowed Bakewell to 
describe Culley’s efforts as compelled by a greater movement: 
I am persuaded most People will allow that free enquiry and proper investigation will throw light on 
subjects that hitherto have not been so much attended to…. but in this who has done so much as yourself or 
paid so much attention to the cause in which you have engaged with such liberality and Candour made 
known the result of so large and long experience in those various branches which have been the objects of 
your Pursuit. (“20 Nov 1787” 122) 
 
As Culley and Bakewell’s agricultural interests widened, their cause increasingly 
overlapped with broader political controversies. The foremost of these involved the Wool Bill, 
which, as mentioned before, prohibited foreign exports of raw wool, keeping domestic supply 
high and prices low. Bakewell supported that export ban, chiefly because his sheep’s 
comparative advantage was that they produced extra mutton (an unregulated income stream) 
while continuing to yield passable wool. This put him at odds with some of his sheep breeding 
contemporaries, particularly those who believed that shepherds and graziers should stick solely 
to wool production and that politicians should support wool producers by deregulating wool 
exports. 
 Foremost in this movement to deregulate wool exports was a Lincolnshire stockman 
named Charles Chaplin. He was, in many respects, as advanced and careful a breeder as 
Bakewell, but the two produced very different types of sheep, with Chaplin’s bred primarily for 
wool and Bakewell’s primarily for meat (though without sacrificing wool production too much). 
The competition between them them led to a very public battle over which breed would most 
profit farmers, while they each simultaneously lobbied politicians for the political and economic 
regulations under which their different breeds would best profit. Despite the fact that both were 
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successful breeders in a period when that profession was just beginning to garner popular 
respect, their cause was absolutely not the same. 
Those differences appear to have boiled over during an incident in the Fall of 1788. The 
exact particulars were disputed by each side, but what seems clear is that Bakewell, on a tour of 
Lincolnshire and eager to see his competitor’s product first hand, went with some colleagues to 
one of Chaplin’s pastures and asked the shepherd if he could inspect the herd. The shepherd, not 
knowing Bakewell from any other potential customer, complied, and they rounded up a small 
group of sheep for Bakewell to examine. Chaplin learned of the incident and ordered Bakewell 
banned from his property, but he also challenged him to a public competition in which their two 
breeds could be compared side by side for both wool and meat. The dispute got a great deal of 
local and national press (the London Evening Post ran heated letters by both sides), and Bakewell 
seems to have been put a bit on the back foot by Chaplin’s willingness to confront him 
publically. At stake was not just Bakewell’s personal pride, but the broader cause of the Dishley 
breed and the allied graziers who had invested in mutton production. Bakewell writes as much to 
Culley in a letter dated November 22, 1788, where he suggests that Chaplin is receiving financial 
support from a number of politicians interested in abolishing the Wool Bill and that Bakewell’s 
own lobbying efforts would be more successful if allies like Culley lent equal support to his side: 
How far we shall proceed will in a great measure depend on the reply Mr. C [Chaplin] or any other of his 
party makes to my Letter, I say his party because I believe Sir Jo. Banks, Sir Peter Burrell, and all the 
Opposers of the Wool Bill think themselves interested in this debate and will support Mr. C by every means 
in their Power, for I saw at Spalding a Subscription amounting to more than 1,500£ to support the said 
Opposition.... Now if these Gents. will support Mr. C should not every one who has made use of that sort of 
Sheep, which he so fully condemns unite in one body to support their Conduct and Opinion against all 
Opposition and both use their Pens and lend their purses on a Subject of such vast Importance and in which 
the Community at large are so much interested? May we be honoured with your Name to our List of 
Subscribers, which would add great Weight to the Cause and would ensure us your Assistance should our 
Subscription go on, but I fear its doubtful except more Friends join us than at present I expect. (132) 
 
Here again Bakewell offers his usual humble self-description, though this time it seems 
more genuine than coy. He is indeed only a single servant of a much greater “Cause,” against 
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which there is well organized opposition, requiring an equally well subsidized counter-effort. It 
is a theme he repeats in his next letter to Culley, dated December 29, 1788. This time we find 
him discussing the challenge laid down by Chaplin, and bemoaning that, individually, he lacks 
the resources to ensure a fair competition, let alone the capital to transport, feed, and prepare 
sheep capable of winning. “By whom are these Expenses with others such as Conveyance, 
Attendance, etc to be defrayed?” he writes, complaining further that if “some Company is not 
formed and Subscriptions made, can it be supposed any one Person would take the whole upon 
himself and singly stand the Butt of a whole Kingdom?” “I candidly own,” he continues, “it is 
more than I think incumbent on me at my time of Life, yet I shall be glad to serve a Cause I have 
so much at Heart by taking any part I ought to do in conjunction with such others as any regular 
formed Committee shall appoint, but allmost say not otherwise” (137-138).  
The broader political dimensions of the “Cause” continued to preoccupy Bakewell 
greatly, as is apparent in a later letter dated December 15, 1791. Here Bakewell informs Culley 
that he has sent his nephew and agent Robert Honeyborn to lobby an influential member of 
Parliament, presumably on the Wool Bill or other issues related to the Dishley breed. Honeyborn 
went armed with haunch of Dishley mutton to demonstrate the breed’s meatiness, though 
Bakewell admits the haunch’s purpose was as much tributary as evidentiary. He writes: 
Mr. Honeyborn intends being in London next Monday and shewing a Haunch of Mutton there which I sent 
this week to Mr. Alderman Curtis M.P. London who is a well wisher to the cause and probably some of his 
brother Alderman may be invited to partake of it and have a few Bottles on the occasion as it will be likely 
some conversation on the subject will be introduced which may have a great tendency to remove some 
prejudices that yet remain with regard to breeding in general and this sort of Sheep in particular however I 
do not know a more likely method than what is now pursuing for the present, in future it may be varied at 
discretion. (162-163) 
 
The end of this excerpt shows Bakewell perhaps a bit uncomfortable that his edible lobbying 
might border on bribery, though again this could also be feigned discretion and humility for the 
benefit of Culley’s sensibilities. Also interesting is the distinction he makes between “breeding in 
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general” and his “sort of Sheep in particular,” suggesting that supporting the former was not all 
their specific cause required. In both cases, we see the great lengths to which Bakewell went to 
assure the kind of political and economic environment in which his “particular” cause would 
succeed. 
As that cause increasingly required broader political commitments it became clearer to 
Bakewell and his allies that such a wider movement required the support of a more formal 
organization, the type of “regularly formed Committee” he had called for in the Winter of 1788. 
Indeed, Bakewell and some neighboring breeders had been meeting informally to discuss their 
mutual interests since at least the Fall 1787. At that time Bakewell wrote to Culley to tell him 
about the nascent organization and invite him to join their discussions: 
Your Company in this Country the sooner the better would give pleasure to your Friends, You Advice and 
Assistance do service to your Country for at this time something like a new Code of Laws is forming 
amongst the Top men in this and some other Counties for which Purpose meetings are appointed to be held 
the first Wednesday in every Mth from this time till June for taking into consideration such methods as 
shall be though most conducive to the Public good and may best promote the cause in which you together 
with many of your Friends are so deeply concerned…. what may we not expect from more mature 
deliberations and the united efforts of those who shall attend such meetings and of others that may take this 
business into consideration and be kind enough to lend their Friendly assistance by making such proposals 
as to them may appear best calculated to promote the cause… (“20 Nov. 1787” 123) 
 
This rhetoric, of a “cause” too weighty for individual breeders to take on separately, only 
increased as the association developed into the fully chartered society it eventually became. The 
next letter, already cited above, is the one in which Bakewell refers to the early association as 
advancing a “common Cause,” one of mutual interest and requiring concerted effort. Of course, 
recognizing that Cause as “common” and actually taking coordinated actions were two different 
things, and the letters following provide some indication that it was difficult for Bakewell and his 
associates to agree upon the precise rules by which their association could be governed. By the 
winter of 1789, however, a measure of consensus had developed and Bakewell was able to send 
   
68 
Culley a synopsis of the Dishley Ram Society’s new bylaws and a narrative of how the various 
members finally came to terms. “For more than 12 Months past,” he wrote, 
meetings have been held at different places and very little done for want of unanimity and some One 
Person taking the Chair which has frequently been offered to me which on account of the state in which my 
affairs have been I have heretofore declined but having been again solicited and things now taking a 
favorable turn I have accepted and shall do everything in my power to serve the cause I have engaged in on 
the other side have sent you the resolutions of the last meeting for your perusal at which happened more 
than I expected would have been done considering the great variety of Opinions that have hitherto 
prevailed and the want of confidence in each other being suspicious that each wanted to promote his private 
interest without so much regard as out to be paid to public good, but I hope this is in a great measure 
over….. (“18 Nov 1789” 147) 
 
As he had done in previous letters, Bakewell can not seem to conclude this one without 
entreating Culley to join the the effort. He writes, “I flatter myself you will give us your Name 
and if possible attend the next meeting and lend us your assistance that everything may be done 
with the mutual approbation of all concerned” (147).  
 Bakewell’s cajoling seems to have eventually succeeded, for by the late 1790’s he and 
Culley were discussing the creation of an allied association of breeders centered around Culley’s 
farm in Northumberland, some 200 miles North of Dishley. The initial idea appears to have been 
broached in an earlier letter, in which Bakewell, finally confident that the Dishley Society is 
workable enterprise, suggests the possibility of Culley organizing similarly. He writes, “Our 
Ram Company is now established upon a more solid Basis than it has been at any time before 
and I think will not now be shaken. Mr. T. [an unknown colleague] and self thinks something of 
the sort should be put in motion in your part of the Country and will consult with you on this 
subject” (“6 June 91” 155). Bakewell saw the possibility of a Culley-led Northern branch of the 
Dishley society as a chance to expand his breed’s influence well beyond the geographic area he 
could personally monitor, supervised by a colleague he could trust to forward the New 
Leicestershire brand while safeguarding its proprietary value. This becomes clear in the next 
letter, in which Bakewell uses rhetoric befitting a military campaign and calls Culley “the 
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Generalissimo of the Northern Provinces” (“6 Sept. 1791” 159). In his next letter, it is clear he 
not only wants his breed to circulate more widely, but to also spread the kind of organizational 
structure the Dishley Ram Society used to protect his investments. He writes, “There will be 
another meeting of the Tup [Ram] Society at Leicester on the 7th of December but my 
attendance is uncertain but will communicate the contents…and inform you of any regulations 
there made that may be of use to you should a society be established in your Neighbourhood 
which I am persuaded would be of great advantage to the cause” (“Sat. 22 Oct. 91” 161). 
Bakewell’s repeated suggestions seem to have had the desired effect, for by 1892 he and 
Culley were discussing specific breeders willing to join a Northumberland version of the Dishley 
Society. It also appears they intended for these two societies to coordinate actions, for at one 
point Bakewell asks Culley for a sort of black-list, a register of Northern graziers unwilling to 
join Culley’s organization so that Bakewell could ensure none of his Dishley members would 
have any trade with them (“13 April 92” 165). He later invited members of Culley’s group to 
travel to Leicester and attend meetings there. He particularly insisted that this northern branch 
hold to the organizing principle that had been key to the Dishley Society’s success: ensuring 
control over the breed by never selling the prized breeding rams (“28 Aug. 92” 167). We are 
fortunate enough to have a synopsis of Culley’s response to that request, which he summarized at 
the bottom of the final letter in the “Culley Collection.” Culley suggests a willingness to abide by 
Bakewell’s request to not sell rams, though suggests exceptions be made in distant, isolated 
markets where the breed had yet to catch on. Fascinatingly, this bit of Culley’s writing shows 
that, in addition to Bakewell’s breed, the Dishley rules, and its organizational structure, Culley 
had also adopted Bakewell’s rhetoric of service to a broader “Cause:” “Ans’d this 4th Sep 92, 
Acknowledging the propriety of discouraging going to market &c. with Tups [rams] where 
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people are established in Business, but the contrary in remote Countries where the merit of the 
Breed is not sufficiently known. There I think it benefits the Cause” (my emphasis; “28 Aug. 92” 
168). 
As we will see repeatedly throughout this and the next chapters, contemporary 
agricultural writers saw breeders as clear models of meritorious innovation, initiative and action. 
This is the distinct perception one gets from Darwin’s writing, where breeders become the 
metonymic representation of a selective agency, singlehandedly and directly molding the 
morphology of animals in whatever way they alone thought profitable. On the other side of that 
rhetoric, however, the breeders themselves had a much more complicated and humble estimation 
of their influence, and a much greater appreciation of broader market and political forces which 
impinged upon them and constrained their choices. Breeders like Bakewell and Culley were 
more likely to think of themselves as “servants” than as masters; each was more an effect of that 
greater “cause” than a cause in and of himself. We have seen that at times Bakewell used this 
rhetoric of a greater “cause” to conveniently deflect attention away from himself, or to enroll 
allies whose service would benefit him, but it is equally clear that he did really face a host of 
forces much larger than himself and genuinely required the mutually beneficial cooperation of 
allies to insure his individual success. This cooperation reached its apogee in the Dishley Ram 
Society, a social network that allowed Bakewell to articulate “common cause” with others. That 
the Dishley Society succeeded in making the “Cause” common seems supported by both 
Culley’s attempt to start a similar organization and by his own use of that same “causal” rhetoric 
in summarizing those efforts. Undoubtedly, then, Bakewell was an innovative breeder, but he 
was equally good at understanding the broader demands society put upon him and his associates, 
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and responding to those demands with successful rhetoric. That he articulated this broader cause 
so well was a great strength.  
It was not, however, the only rhetoric which the “Cause” of modern agriculture required. 
While Bakewell needed to figure his breeding society’s greater purpose, other rhetors worked to 
articulate modern agriculture for a much larger national audience. That different exigency 
required a different type of rhetoric. 
Young Figures the Farmer 
In 1784 Arthur Young published an article in the Annals of Agriculture (the farming 
journal he had begun publishing the year before) on the enterprising work of a wealthy 
landowner in Norfolk, in the East of England. Titled “A Minute of the Husbandry, at Holkham, 
of Thomas William Coke, Esq,” the piece recounted Young’s journey to the estate of Thomas 
Coke who, along with Robert Bakewell, was a rising star in the constellation of enterprising 
farmers Young’s writing was helping to make famous throughout England. (We will encounter 
Coke again in chapters 3 and 4, as he was depicted with equal grandeur in both the period’s 
agricultural art and in Darwin’s accounts of breeding.) But if Young’s publicizing was indeed 
critical to the acclaim and support that these innovative farmers obtained during the Georgian 
era, Young himself was careful to downplay his own role in that growing popularity, instead 
depicting these agriculturalists’ success to a peculiar mixture of, one, their own personal 
initiative and, two, the otherwise inevitable progress of Western culture.  
We see this peculiar duality in the introduction to the 1784 article on Coke, where he 
begins by explicitly stating that great farmers can, by dint of personal effort and creativity, attain 
the status of a “figure.” That Coke’s farm, Young says, though situated in an area of quite 
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prosperous farming, still appears as the very paragon of agricultural improvement, is a testament 
to its owner’s industry and drive to distinguish himself. He writes: 
It is not a difficult undertaking for a gentleman of very large property, to make a great figure in husbandry, 
when seated in a country generally ill cultivated; the smallest exertions make a figure in such a situation; 
and modes of culture appear as efforts of improvement, which, in a better district, would pass for nothing 
more than common management. This is a sort of advantage totally unknown in the vicinity of Holkham: 
Mr. Coke resides in the midst of the best husbandry in Norfolk, where the fields of every tenant are 
cultivated like garden; a landlord makes an ill figure who comes short of them in that race in which he has 
voluntarily engaged. (536) 
 
As Young makes goes on to make clear, Coke cuts anything but an ill figure, observing instead 
that it was to his “exertions, as are here described, that the national agriculture must owe that 
future improvement which can alone support the consequence and even the independency of this 
kingdom” (382). Yet if the exertions of individual farmers like Coke and Bakewell were so vital, 
and so worthy of the figurative status which Young attributed to them, there was also, he seems 
to suggest, something almost natural, logical and even expected about their achievements, 
something for which their personal initiative did not solely account. That sense of a natural 
evolution appears immediately following the introductory passage quoted above. Here, in 
addition to using Coke as a metonymy of innovative agriculture, Young likens Coke’s 
developments with the progress of a gradually dawning sun reaching its natural and inevitable 
zenith: 
The views which instigated Mr. Coke in the culture of his farm, were of the most liberal and public-spirited 
nature. Convenience might have been answered on a much smaller tract of land; but the experiments he 
wished to make, could convince the farmers only by being on the largest scale…. When an active mind can 
extract knowledge useful to mankind from its efforts in search of amusement, the prospect enlarges; the 
mind’s horizon, if I may use the expression, expands; and rays of brighter lustre guild the scene. What once 
seemed merely private purpose, becomes the source of general felicity; the contraction of common effort 
spreads into more diffusive views, that connect the pleasure of an individual with the happiness of the 
species: knowledge matures; every step advances towards perfection, till mechanic art takes the colour of 
sublimer science. These are the views that ought to animate the farming landlord. (354-355) 
 
Coke begins this passage as its central animating figure, but he is gradually subsumed by 
the broader, natural process of a dawning, enlightening sun, so much so that by the passage’s end 
it is not the farmer driving the action, but, first, a larger awareness dawning upon him, and then 
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the wider, sun-illuminated prospect which, finally, “animates” his efforts. This passage still 
manages to glorify the “farming landlord” as a figure unto himself, but it offers a simultaneous, 
parallel, if figuratively distinct narrative in which that farmer’s course is itself driven by an 
equally significant natural trajectory “towards perfection.”     
The challenge of Young’s rhetoric is that these two figurative tropes, the metonymic 
substitution of the farmer as cause for modern agriculture’s effects, and the climax of a 
persistently enlightened agriculture reaching its final perfection, are both simultaneously at play. 
The benefit of his corpus is that it offers us a chance to see the ways each figurative strategy 
complements and, at times, requires the other. Charting that complementarity is possible because 
(unlike with Bakewell) with Arthur Young we have access to a surfeit of this prolific author’s 
quite varied writings, a whole literary career that extends from youthful political tracts and 
anonymously published sentimental novels, through a series of extended agricultural travelogues, 
to a plethora of magazine articles he penned for The Annals of Agriculture. That great variety of 
Young’s extant work gives us a more holistic sense of his rhetoric and, therefore, a more 
complex and full understanding for the ways its different tropes work together. 
That variety granted, it makes sense to begin with the kind of metonymic techniques with 
which we left off in Bakewell’s writing, as Young also put them to good use. Unlike Bakewell, 
however, Young synthesized the agricultural innovations he championed, not by articulating 
those reforms as a broader “cause” but, rather, by figuring individual breeders as paragons of 
science, innovation, and causal action. He was specifically looking for men who could, as he 
says in the quotation above, make a “great figure.” 
Young’s tendency to single out individual farmers as metonyms for modern agriculture’s 
effects finds its literal origin in the series of travelogues he published between 1768 and 1771, as 
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well as at least three other works on farming principles published contemporaneously. The 
travelogues recounted his tours through most of Great Britain and included A Six Weeks Tour 
Through the Southern Counties of England and Wales (1768), A Six Months Tour Through the 
North of England (1770), and The Farmer’s Tour Through the East of England (1771). Though 
these tours catalogued specific and historically distinct farming regions of the kingdom, what 
strikes one about their organization is that they strive less to be compendiums of broad, 
geographically consistent farming practices, and instead catalogue the varied and uncustomary 
work of the particularly innovative farmers Young encountered. Indeed, writing in the preface to 
his first published tour, Young makes explicit that he sought out “gentleman farmers” who were 
deviating from the customary and common practices of the lower class “common” farmers 
around them. His goal, he writes, was 
To let every cultivator see all the different methods that are practised upon such land as his own; that he 
may know from them his own deficiencies, and learn at the same time to remedy them: and this not from 
the ipse dixit of an author, or, the opinion of an individual, but from the genuine practice of his brother 
farmer in another place. (vii) 
 
And as he clarifies in the next two paragraphs, 
I would not however be understood to expect too much from the common farmer's reading this, or 
indeed any book: I am sensible that not one farmer in five thousand reads at all, but the country abounds in 
gentlemen farmers, whose ideas are more enlarged, and whose practice is founded less on prejudice. Such 
cultivators may be supposed to read and act accordingly: it is by their means that the farmers vary, by slow 
degrees, the common line of management, and come into improvements unknown to their forefathers.  
They who suppose any improvement originally owing to common farmers are somewhat 
mistaken. All the well known capital strokes of husbandry are traced accurately to gentlemen….(viii-ix) 
 
This distinction, between “common” and “gentlemen” farmers, might well signify more 
than just a descriptive flourish. As I noted earlier, the term “commoner” originally described 
rural folk who farmed on the “commons,” open land possessed, managed and used by whole 
parishes and towns. Such land was farmed systematically, but governed by long established 
communal customs that made it hard to attribute the agricultural influences affecting it to a 
single agency. For an agricultural popularizer like Young, who was intentionally seeking out the 
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individual “figures” who could stand for improved agriculture, the “gentleman farmer” was a 
better agent to study. Young’s preface makes clear that he intended to find just such gentlemen 
who could metonymically represent agricultural improvement. 
In truth, the exalting tone of this passage does not similarly characterize the bulk of the 
Six Weeks Tour. Rather, instead of glorifying specific gentleman farmers, Young just mainly logs 
the minutiae (commodity prices, acreage yields, labor rates) and picturesque scenery of the 
countryside through which he travels, without too frequently homing in specific, noteworthy 
agriculturalists. On occasion, however, when he does encounter the kind of innovative 
“gentleman farmers” he highlighted in the preface, the tone of the writing shifts quickly and 
markedly, approaching the kind of metonymic substitutions we will see more frequently in his 
later works. Here, for example, is a passage where he describes meeting one John Yeldham, a 
barley farmer who exemplifies initiative and innovation: 
… at Saling the culture of barley upon the above described principles, is carried to what I believe I may 
venture to call the highest pitch of perfection, by John Yeldham, Esq; who, upon an average of seasons and 
crops, manured and not manured, has for many years reaped 7 quarters per acre; and yet it is not an 
uncommon custom with him to take a crop of oats after one of barley ; and this upon one year's fallow 
without any peculiar circumstances besides common good husbandry: his soil a strong clay, as before 
described, well drained. I mention this remarkable instance of excellent husbandry with due veneration; the 
worthy author of it well deserves being ranked among the first cultivators of his age; and to receive the 
same tribute of applause which the Duhamels, and the de Chateauvieux, have enjoyed for their attention to 
objects of a more equivocal merit.4 (81) 
 
Unlike the earlier passage in which the exalted figure of Thomas Coke had to compete, as 
it were, with the equally grand and climactic sunrise, here Young manages to weave the two 
figures together, creating a gradually rising tone that culminates with the farmer as exemplary 
figure. The climax begins with Yeldham simply as a humble “Esq” practicing “common good 
husbandry,” but almost immediately elevates him, first noting his “strong soil” and now 
                                                
4 Henri-Louis Duhamel du Monceau (1700-1782) was a French polymath who conducted significant experiments in 
botany. Michel Lullin de Châteauvieux (1695-1781) was a Swiss agricultural innovator. Both were aristocrats. 
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“excellent husbandry,” then next to the status of a “worthy author,” and rising further to “among 
the first cultivators,” till finally we arrive alongside and perhaps above two of continental 
agronomy’s aristocratic luminaries. This rhetorical climax both mirrors and finds its justification 
in Yeldham’s own increasingly successful improvements which, as Young describes them, have 
been “carried” to “the highest pitch of perfection.”   
We should note however, that though the climax shows Young’s rhetoric tending in this 
direction, the paragraph in which it comes does not conclude with that incrementum’s 
culmination, slightly weakening its impact. Young was still a young and budding writer, not yet 
thirty when he published this, and possibly not yet fully exploiting or commanding the figurative 
techniques that more clearly articulated his later rhetoric. So, instead of ending with a bang, 
Young follows up the figure with the dissonantly mundane sentence, “I should remark that the 
farmers throughout this tract of country make their hollow drains only one rod asunder” (81). 
Not exactly a rousing crescendo.  
Yet the benefit of studying these early, fitful efforts is that we can observe Young’s 
technique taking shape and trace, as it were, the incremental arc of his own progress as a stylist; 
for even if he is not in full control of the tropes that animate his earliest works, that they recur 
again and again, with greater clarity and effectiveness as time passes, suggests that the tropes 
were gradually articulating his long term project. Indeed, by the time he publishes his next tour, 
A Six Month Tour Through the North of England, these techniques, of singling out individual 
farmers for praise, mirroring their improvements with a parallel figure of climatic plaudits, and 
of including them with the broader progress of English experimental science, were to become 
almost formulaic elements, which Young used to repeatedly carry the reader from one stop to the 
next along his journey. 
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This is indeed the impression one gets on reading that northern tour. Much more 
organized and purposeful than the previous travelogue, this one is more systematically built 
around visits to individual farmers and cataloging their innovative “experiments.” To a degree, 
this was likely because Young, now a more well-known author and agriculturalist, was in better 
contact with the type of literate, upper-middle class landowners he had less successfully sought 
out in the first tour. Yet this practical affordance aside, it also seems clear that the style of the 
northern tour (and the tours that followed) had always been a regulatory ideal which was now 
more successfully articulated. 
So, consistently throughout this tour we are shown the work of individual, exemplary 
farmers, men achieving success with “experimental” crops and agricultural practices that earn 
that title chiefly for differing markedly from the regional farming culture of their neighbors. In 
Rotherham, for example, he meets Samuel Tucker, whom he describes (in what may likely be the 
first use of this phrase for this subject) as the “ne plus ultra” of cabbage farmers (125). Tucker 
has also conducted a particularly “curious experiment on wheat,” very successfully using seed 
from a non-local supplier, a practice, Young remarks, that is far from “common” (130). Later he 
encounters Dr. Hunter of York, inventor of a particularly simple and effective seed drill. “No 
one,” he writes, “can understand the principles of agriculture and vegetation better than this very 
ingenious cultivator, whose ideas are philosophical and perspicuous, and whose experiments are 
accurate and judicious” (212).  
At times Young spends an extended period describing one locale, often because it has 
fallen under the influence of a particularly improving lord or landowner. Such is the case upon 
his visit to the estate of Charles Watson-Wentworth, 2nd Marquess of Rockingham, prominent 
Whig politician and two-term Prime Minister. Young describes Lord Wentworth as a paragon of 
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experimental agriculture, a visionary reformer who, unsatisfied with the customary and 
prejudiced practices of his tenants, began setting an example of improved, experimental farming 
which they could then emulate. As Young remarks in the preface:  
If I was not fearful of breaking in upon his attention to matters of greater importance, I should beg the 
Marquis of Rockingham to accept my humble thanks for the great encouragement he gave me, and for the 
information I received from him, which any one, who views the land his Lordship keeps in his own hands, 
will soon perceive must have been very instructive. I never saw the advantages of a great fortune applied 
more nobly to the improvement of a country. Every discovery of other counties,---every successful 
experiment in agriculture,--- every new implement, (and many of his Lordships own invention) introduced 
at a great expence.---Draining, the general management of grass land, and manures, among numerous other 
articles, are, at Wentworth, carried to the utmost perfection. (xvii-xviii) 
 
We can, in this passage, again perceive Young’s penchant for climax, beginning as he 
does with his rather “humble thanks,” for Rockingham’s “instructive” guidance, a moderate tone 
that quickly heightens as Rockingham’s “nobly” applied “fortune” lays the way for the county’s 
“improvement.” Then, to conclude, we see a list of various “successful” reforms of “great 
expense” which, in the end, Wentworth carries to “utmost perfection.” 
A similar description, later in the book, shows more succinctly that Wentworth’s 
successful efforts allow Young to make him a metonymic byword for all of modern agriculture’s 
progressive effects. Young writes,  
Upon turning his attention to agriculture, his Lordship found the husbandry of the West Riding of 
Yorkshire extremely deficient in numerous particulars: It was disgusting to him to view so vast a property, 
cultivated in so slovenly a manner; eager to substitute better methods in the room of such unpleasing as 
well as unprofitable ones, he determined to exert himself with spirit in the attempt; and he executed the 
noble scheme in a manner that does honour to his penetration. A very few particulars, among many of the 
common practice, will shew how much this country wanted a Rockingham to animate its cultivation. (307) 
 
Again, we see similar, increasingly laudatory rhetoric, as Rockingham, first “disgusted” 
with the “deficient,” “slovenly” conditions, and next just “eager,” becomes “determined,” with 
“spirit,” till a “noble scheme” comes to fruition which finally “does honor” to his efforts. This 
climax of achievement allows Young to turn Lord Wentworth into a metonymic figure; the 
Rockingham becomes “a Rockingham,” a metonymic cause that stands for all the effects he has 
made as the great improving agency of the district. Such a metonymic turn articulates 
   
79 
Rockingham’s efforts as an agency that could extend beyond its original locale, a figure that 
could circulate to inspire similarly improving reforms wherever required. 
This exemplary image, of the expert gentleman farmer as the author and guide of all he 
surveys, is repeated again when Young first writes about Robert Bakewell, the agriculturalist 
with whom he is perhaps most closely tied. This comes in his 1771 The Farmer’s Tour Through 
the East of England, where he devotes the better part of a chapter to the entire management of 
Bakewell’s farm, praising everything from the particular meatiness of Bakewell’s stock to the 
stolidity of his draft animals and his successful improvements in irrigation. And while Young’s 
repeated praise does not, at least in this particular treatment, ever coalesce into a smoothly 
graduated climax, the chapter culminates with the kind of characteristic flourish we have come to 
expect from his assessment of forward thinking farmers: 
I cannot conclude these observations on this very spirited farmer's undertakings, without expressing the 
satisfaction I felt at viewing them: No where have I seen works, that do their author greater honour; they 
are not the effect of a rich landlord's determining to be a good farmer on his own land, but the honest, and 
truly meritorious endeavours of a tenant, performing great and expensive works on the property of another. 
It is true, he is fortunate in a generous and considerate landlord; and much do I wish, that such excellent 
farmers may always meet with the same encouragement. A truly good farmer cannot be too much favoured, 
a bad one cannot have his rent raised too high. Let me exhort the farmers of this kingdom in general, to take 
Mr. Bakewell as a pattern in many points of great importance; they will find their account in it, and the 
kingdom in general be benefited not a little. (134) 
 
Clearly, here again we have Young’s penchant for turning individuals into more idealized 
figures, in this case Bakewell as a symbolic “pattern” that other farmers could copy. And, while 
the paragraph’s rather varied focus produces an effect perhaps too diffuse for a clearly 
incremental climax, that we move from the scale of a humble tenant farmer to, literally, an 
exhortation on behalf of the Kingdom is indicative of Young’s tendency to gradually draw out 
majesty from the ranks of yeomanry. At the very least we can say with confidence that Young’s 
first treatment of Bakewell concludes with a rising tone and culminates with the breeder as a 
worthy figure of emulation. 
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Young’s initial encounter with Bakewell clearly impressed him, for he would go on to 
publish two more more texts devoted specifically to praising the stockman as “a breeder of the 
finest cattle and sheep in the kingdom” (“Ten Days” 453). The first of these came in 1786 when 
he published an extended article in the Annals of Agriculture titled “A Ten Day’s Tour to Mr. 
Bakewell’s.” Suggestively, the article itself seems figuratively structured as an incremental, 
climactic approach towards a metonymic summation. Though clearly this tour was intended to 
focus on Bakewell, the article spends a good 14 pages on the road approaching the farm at 
Dishley, with Young cataloguing the less impressive efforts, sights and experiences he 
encounters along the way. The journey gets off to a rough start, beginning on the 11th of March: 
The 11th breakfasted at Huntingdon after 16 miles of open, uninteresting, disagreeable, country, as can be 
met with in England… I was shewn the house in which the great wicked man [Oliver Cromwell] was born. 
We do not in this age live under a government where such a memento is wanted; but in every other country 
the portrait of Cromwell should hang [as a warning] in the antichamber of kings. (453-454) 
 
Exactly why Young so fervently despises Cromwell is not exactly clear (Young was 
neither a fervent monarchist nor a radical leveller), though one possible reason was Cromwell’s 
famous opposition to enclosure of the commons (Hill 21). This reason, among others, seems 
likely for, as the journey continues, the topic of enclosure comes up immediately and repeatedly, 
with Young frequently voicing disappointment with how much of the countryside has been left 
open and unimproved. Right in Huntingdon he meets a farmer vehemently opposed to enclosure, 
which makes Young question whether that gentleman is in full possession of the facts (454). 
Moving forward from that less-than buoyant beginning, there are occasional glimmers of 
improvement, as when in the next town, Wellingbrough, he finds some new enclosures and well 
built sheep pens. Still the overall tone remains mostly dark, with Young describing the road there 
as “33 miles, through country as uninteresting as any I have seen--joyless to the eye” (455).  
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Slowly things improve. “...the features of this hitherto disagreeable country begin to 
mend; it is more chearful,” he writes. Then next, approaching Northampton, conditions get even 
better: “chiefly new inclosures; much of the red loam which ranks among the most fertile soils in 
England” (455-456). A pleasing visit to Ecton follows where “A fine country begins,” largely 
because the land was, “inclosed and very well planted by the late Mr. Istead” (456). “Then,” he 
writes, “comes Billing, where Lord John Cavandish has built a large new house. Next Mr. 
Thoresby’s, all pretty, and ornament the country much” (456). Added to this ornament, as he 
says in very next sentence, are the landowners’ improvements and enclosures which, he notes, 
clearly increased the land’s value: “Near Northhampton the new inclosures let at 40s [shillings] 
and even to 3l [pounds] that when open were 10s [shillings] or 12s [pounds]” (456). 
Then he comes to Hazelbeach, the estate of a Mr. Ashby whom Young befriended during 
the previous tour through the northern counties. The reception is quite warm and welcoming, 
though Mr. Ashby’s attitudes on enclosure complicate the smoothly graduated, climactic 
approach towards Dishley and Bakewell. Ashby is generally against enclosure, and Young thinks 
too highly of him to dismiss his opinions out of hand. What ensues, then, is an extended 
investigation drawn out over as many pages as are devoted to the rest of the journey, examining 
the particular reasons why enclosure has not been as successful in Ashby’s area as, according to 
Young, it should naturally have been. Young concludes that historic and geographic 
idiosyncrasies make Ashby’s situation an outlier (458-462), allowing him to include it in the 
advance towards Dishley, without having its counterexample upset the otherwise smoothly 
climactic approach. It is, instead, Young seems to argue, an exception that proves the rule. 
Indeed, that Young goes to so much analytical effort disproving a potential counter-narrative 
suggests just how important he considers the climatic narrative he is trying to cultivate.  
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The next day’s journey brings that figure to its culmination, as Young arrives at 
Bakewell’s and sees that, “The fifteen years that have passed since I had seen Mr. Bakewell’s 
cattle have not elapsed without his gaining considerable experience, and carrying every part of 
his stock much nearer perfection” (466). Enclosure is not as much as a natural topic at Dishley, 
as Bakewell is a tenant farmer on property that was long ago enclosed. Yet Young still finds 
opportunity to note that Bakewell agrees with his own feelings on the topic, with Bakewell 
pointing to a nearby open forest as a “strikingly convincing” example of “the inutility of 
commons…” (497). Bakewell’s main objection seems to be that stock raised on commons can 
not be fed and monitored with the high degree of control and observation he is able to exert at 
Dishley, and would therefore be much less valuable at market.  
Indeed, what strikes one about the broad sweep of Young’s observations on Dishley’s 
benefits is that they frequently and repeatedly emphasize how far Bakewell, as a manager, has 
been able to exert his personal control over every aspect of the farm’s operation. Here, for 
example, is Young’s account of Bakewell’s improvements in irrigation, in which a new water 
mill’s access to a better supply is figured much more personally as Bakewell’s exacting and 
precise “command” over greater natural resources: 
The importance of watering is no where seen to more advantage, than on Mr. Bakewell’s farm; 80 acres he 
improved in this manner long ago, and he has lately hired a watermill, which giving him command of the 
river so much higher, has enabled him to plan out an irrigation of 40 acres more… he has made great 
progress in this work, and executes every part of it with that intelligence and precision that seem to animate 
all his exertions. (490) 
 
Similarly, Young is particularly impressed by the exacting controls with which Bakewell 
conducts his experiments in irrigation, describing a series of “proof pieces” in which a small 
parcel of land is irrigated alongside a similar piece of unirrigated soil. Bakewell, according to 
Young, has taken such experimental control to its apogee: 
More satisfactory experiments could never be made on the benefits of irrigation, than those which Mr. 
Bakewell calls his proof pieces. They are small squares in most of his meadows, over which the water is 
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prevented coming, by drains cut around them. Most of them are in low, boggy, miserable spots, where 
these drains must alone be of use; but notwithstanding that advantage, they are perfectly contemptible, on 
comparison with the immediately contiguous spots over which the water is conducted. The difference is so 
great, as to bring complete conviction to the mind of every person who views them. (491) 
 
A  comparable level of control appears in Young’s description of Bakewell’s breeding 
methods. His attentive efforts, Young argues, prove that the major determinate of a sheep’s or 
cow’s morphology is neither the feed upon which it is raised nor the condition in which it is kept 
but, rather, the bloodline from which it is bred. Notice how, as Young relates Bakewell’s 
argument, he carefully inserts that Bakewell has ensured experimental controls, procuring 
different breeds to compare alongside his own experimental variety: 
If it is contended that Mr. Bakewell’s sheep, being long woolled, must be kept as all long wooled sheep are, 
on very rich land, he denies the conclusion, and asserts that the same disposition to be fat, will, in a 
moderate sized sheep prevail, let the food be what it may. The worse formed the carcass, and the less 
tendency to fatten, the worse must the animal thrive or do on any food. This is to be seen in all sorts of 
animals. Some will be lean in spite of every attention to make them fat; and others will be fat, on no better 
keeping than those that are lean; this plainly appears by a collection of different sorts he now has in his 
possession, which he has procured for this purpose, and wishes may be carefully examined by any person 
desirous of having information on this subject. Mr. Bakewell has gradually formed his breed by selection, 
made with constant attention to this circumstance. (479-480) 
 
This image, of the consummate breeder carefully selecting the precise morphology of his stock, 
and controlling every environmental input they experience, is what makes Bakewell such an 
exemplary figure, both for Young and, as we will see in Chapter 4, for many of the later 
agricultural writers that follow in his footsteps. It is an image that allows Young to conclude this 
account of Dishley with a climactic figuration of Bakewell that mirrors, and perhaps surpasses, 
the earlier praise he heaped upon Lord Rockingham and John Yeldham. It begins, as did the 
Yeldham figure, with Bakewell depicted quite humbly, in measured language, but quickly rises 
to point where Bakewell, “the man” is rearticulated as “a public man” (just as Rockingham was 
turned into “a Rockingham,”), a metonymic figure of experimental control which (using 
precisely the same phrase he used for Yeldham’s work) “reaches the highest pitch of perfection” 
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and can, consequently, circulate far beyond its humble origins. The paragraph is worth citing at 
length: 
I cannot take my leave of this very sensible, spirited, and intelligent breeder, without expressing the 
warmest wishes for his success. The opulent who amuse themselves with husbandry in various parts of the 
kingdom, may, by rational experiments, make their pleasures contribute to the public good. Let them try 
Mr. Bakewell’s cattle in such a system of management as he connects, with the nature of their soil and 
situation: by doing ample justice to such trials, they will have the satisfaction of at least diffusing the 
knowledge of cattle, &c. and turning the attention of their neighbours, to objects closely connected with 
views of general utility. The interest of the community is greatly and intimately concerned. It is not a 
question of this or that breed of cattle, or of sheep, but that of knowledge and sagacity, that shall, in a 
manner superior to all other men, carry any particular breed to the highest pitch of perfection. The man that 
has shewn experimentally, the talents adequate to this truly national pursuit, is a public man, and ought to 
be supported by every exertion that can give animation to the efforts of individuals. (my emphasis; 498) 
 
Readers were likely not surprised to see Young ending this visit in such grand style, both 
because “A Ten Day’s Tour to Mr. Bakewell’s” so clearly tends, from beginning to end, towards 
this climax, but also because, by this time, those used to Young’s rhetoric would have expected 
to find themselves headed to where it usually ends up. Bakewell, like many of Young’s other 
model farmers, is, gradually, made a figure; the man becomes a man, a climactic metonym of all 
that is right and proper about the effects of modern, scientific agriculture, and an exemplar for 
the rest of English farming. 
Young would find at least one more chance to heap this kind of praise upon Bakewell 
when in 1811 he delivered a paper titled On the Husbandry of Three Celebrated British Farmers, 
Messrs. Bakewell, Arbuthnot, and Ducket to the Board of Agriculture in London. Unlike his 
earlier works, which have an energetic (and sometimes disorganized) youthfulness about them, 
this essay is a very polished piece. It makes an effort to tie up loose ends and strikes an almost 
valedictory tone. Young was close to seventy when he penned it, and one gets the feeling that, in 
trying to provide clearly defined biographies of the farmers with whom his work had been so 
intimately involved, he was simultaneously trying to insure that his own career attained a sense 
of closure.  
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Accounts are settled, particularly with regard to Bakewell’s work, which, as Young 
acknowledges, was sometimes controversial amongst other breeders. Yet Young deals with these 
objections methodically, allowing him to end with the kind of climax that had, by this point, had 
become his trademark. Here is the first part of the concluding paragraph:  
In his private character, Bakewell was extremely respectable; his morals unimpeached; his conversation 
never disgraced by those detestable expletives so current in many a farming mouth;--his humanity to the 
brute creation eminent and exemplary; of the economy he practiced in his house-keeping, as well as his 
numerous journeys, Mr. Culley speaks in terms of warm approbation: in his observance of religious duties, 
he was steady and consistent, nor would he deviate from his rule of not shewing stock on a Sunday; though 
urged by persons of the highest rank: in word, he was a man who thought for himself, and whatever might 
be his failings, he was so decided a benefactor to the public, that his memory ought to be dear to the whole 
Agricultural world.  (16-17) 
 
Note how Young moves progressively from the most intimate sphere and expands out, 
beginning with Bakewell’s private behavior, advancing to his treatment of animals and then on 
to the management of his local household. We then are given of an appraisal of Bakewell’s 
equally exemplary behavior while traveling away from his home. These more circumscribed  and 
secular concerns then give way to the more broadly spiritual and cultural, till what we are left 
with is a great, free thinking, independent man whose figure can belong to the entire world.  
But Young saves the best for last, taking this grand appraisal of Bakewell’s personal 
worth and extending it to a value that borders on canonical. “And some statues,” he concludes 
with next sentence, “are to be found in Westminster Abbey, erected to the memory of men, who 
merited far less of the public, than did this humble Cultivator of the earth” (17). The “private 
character” who begins the passaged has incrementally evolved into a capital “C” “Cultivator,” a 
figure who belongs to all of humanity, humble only in his own estimation and contrastingly great 
in Young’s. Bakewell becomes the metonymic Cultivator who can stand as the singular figure 
for all of modern cultivation’s improving effects.  
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Young Figures the Utopian  
Grand as that climax is, there is something in the tone of this later work that differs 
slightly from the incremental figures we find in some of Young’s earlier pieces. Particularly if 
you compare this climax to the incremental narrative approach of “A Ten Day’s Tour to Mr. 
Bakewell’s,” the incrementum above seems more contrived, as though both Young and his 
audience already know they would inevitably arrive at a metonymic conclusion and the series of 
utterances that take them there are, at this point, just for effect.  
Put simply, On the Husbandry of Three Celebrated British Farmers shows Young 
emphasizing the metonymization of Bakewell as the “great Breeder” over the gradual climaxes 
that lead up to that metonym (14). The equal, intermingled, emphasis on both climax and 
metonymy that figured his early tours now tilts in favor of the later. That may not be entirely 
apparent in the figure above, but consider another such passage that comes earlier in the piece, 
this one considering whether Bakewell can really be credited with great contributions. Here it is 
not the gradual climax which lays the ground for Bakewell’s eminence but, rather, Bakewell’s 
greatness upon which the gradual climax is founded.  
The question which we ought in justness to ask, is simply this, did the immense change, which we all know 
to have been effected, originate with Bakewell? In the many Agricultural Journeys which I have made, 
during the period of the last forty years, a variety of opportunities have offered of ascertaining this fact, in a 
manner the more remarkable, because I have met with a change both in knowledge and practice, in persons 
who were hostile to every Breed proposed by Mr. Bakewell; and while they were in conversation, eager to 
express their disapprobation of all Tup Clubs [like the Dishley Society], and the principles supposed to 
govern them, they were gradually effecting an improvement of their own distinct Breeds, upon principles of 
which they were entirely ignorant, till some importation of Bakewell’s Stock into the vicinity, with visits 
from that celebrated Breeder, occasioned an activity in the farming mind, unknown before: after ages of 
sleep, men seemed to awaken; and whatever the Breed might be, the result was sure to be beneficial. It is, 
in my opinion, unquestionable, from a multitude of facts within my personal knowledge, that the admirable 
spirit of enquiry, comparison, and experiment; which has for the last fifteen of twenty years made such a 
progress, in every part of the Empire, was excited by this extraordinary character; and that there is not at 
present Breed of any sort of Live Stock in the Island, that does not derive its improvement from the skill, 
knowledge, and principles which we owe to him, and which would not in any probability have existed if 
Bakewell had not laid the foundation. (12-13) 
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This shift of emphasis is, perhaps, not so surprising, as Bakewell had, by this time, 
attained a degree of fame independent of Young’s writing, putting less pressure on Young’s 
figuration to provide the kind of gradual context in which an individual farmer could make sense 
as a truly eminent figure. This work is, after all, about a farmer who is already “Celebrated,” and 
so the climactic rhetoric does not have to work as hard carrying us to that effect. 
Yet if this last work on Bakewell stresses that metonymic significance, other works seem 
to tilt in the opposite direction, emphasizing gradual climax as a process not requiring final 
fulfillment in an idealized figure. The clearest of these appear in a substantial article titled “On 
the Conduct of Experiments in Agriculture,” which Young published in the fifth volume of the 
Annals in 1786. This essay, perhaps more than any other piece, shows Young purposefully 
ensconcing his project in the broader tradition of English empirical science. Note, for instance, 
the way he paraphrases Bacon’s famous dictum that, through controlled experimentation, “nature 
betrays her secrets.” “Theory and hypothesis,” he writes, “which so long possessed an undue 
empire in the human mind, are at last dispossessed from their usurpation, and nature, brought by 
philosophers patiently and steadily to the test of experimentation, discloses her secrets to those 
whose industry deserves her confidence” (18). 
Befitting a work on empirical methods, this essay keeps the focus on science, not the 
scientist, such that, if anything attains metonymic standing, it is the latter. More often though, 
what Young offers us are pleasing incrementums that climax in scientific achievement, without 
exalting a single individual as the prominent agent of the process. Individuals are named, even 
lauded, but the climax glorifies science itself as the gradual attainment of higher knowledge. 
Take, for example, the two paragraphs following the passage above: 
Nothing can be more beautiful, than the graduation of that progress by which successive abilities 
and attention advance the science that employs them. Every fact ascertained becomes the foundation of 
other facts; each discovery that is made opens the path that leads to new ones…. 
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This progress of fact depends greatly on the nature of the science…. When former experiments are 
doubted, they may be repeated without any formidable waste of time or expense. In this case, the labours of 
one generation are appropriated by the next, and the successive age in possession of all preceding 
knowledge, advances with an accelerated rapidity. How amusing in the history of electricity, to trace the 
discoveries through Gilbert, Boyle, Newton, Hauksbee, Grey, &c. to Walson, Franklin, Nollet, and other 
electricians flourishing at present! Few of the sciences have advanced by a more regular gradation. And, in 
the philosophy of air, we may be satisfied that Boyle prepared the way for Hales and Stalh; and that 
without these, it is not probable Black would have made the great advance which he effected, which opened 
the way to Priestley and that host of disciples, which in every part of Europe have lighted their flambeaux 
at an English torch. (18-19) 
 
Unlike the climaxes in his earlier agricultural works, this one ends in metaphor, not metonymy, 
with the glowing torch a symbol of English science’s great achievements. Scientists, great ones, 
are mentioned, but they stand as markers of enlightenment’s greater progress.  
As the essay proceeds, Young imagines how this climax of scientific achievement might 
extend into agriculture, a difficult enterprise since, as opposed to laboratory science, agriculture 
is so much more prone to the intrusion of unwanted variables. “...experiments are in the open 
fields,” he notes, 
and consequently liable to the plundering of thieves, to accidents from birds and reptiles--to the intrusion of 
another sort of vermin, sportsmen, whose object of a partridge or a fox, will induce them to trample on 
pursuits they have no relish to enjoy, nor attention to understand. 
The same exposure in the fields is also to the heavens, and every experiment is, in a great measure 
dependent on the weather…. When all these circumstances are considered, it will clearly appear, that the 
trials in agriculture are quite another thing from those in any other science. Experiments in a laboratory, 
which a man can lock up when he turns his back, upon a substance that lies on a table, or is confined in a 
jar… in such a situation all is within command…. perfectly free from the intrusions of storms, thieves, 
crows sparrows, rabbits, hares sportsmen, or idlers. The contrast is so strong, that it accounts readily for the 
extreme backwardness of this art, and its being so little removed from its old doubt and confusion, by the 
labours of an age that has impelled every other science in most rapid course. (20-21) 
 
The old system of open field agriculture, Young argues, simply did not lend itself to scientific 
control.  
Complicated though it is, Young does go on to imagine what such controlled 
experimentation would look like in the sphere of agriculture, using another gradual climax to 
articulate these methods’ effects. Again, he does not exclude human characters from the 
incrementum, but none ever rise to the status of a figure in themselves. Instead, the concluding 
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focus is kept on science’s achievements, above and beyond the great men who might otherwise 
define it:  
When the great difficulty of making experiments in this science is well considered, it will easily be 
conceived that common farmers are very unlikely to make any considerable progress…. gentlemen who 
keep land in their hands will employ themselves only with common views of profit and convenience…. So 
multifarious are its operations, so great the range of enquiry connected with it, that a multitude of trials 
accurately made and correctly registered on all sorts of soils, are necessary for this great and urgent 
purpose. If every gentleman that occupies any land would lay it down as a rule to form and register one 
experiment every year, of such a nature as is best adapted to his soil and circumstances, it would form 
through the kingdom a most noble and accumulating mass of knowledge, which being properly combined 
and arranged in some such work as this, would do more to fix the true principle of the art, than all the 
books that have been written from Cato to Duhamel. (40-41) 
 
As in the earlier passage glorifying Thomas Yeldham, this one uses two famous agriculturalists 
as a yardstick of achievement, but in this case it is not another individual who surpasses that 
mark but, rather, “a most noble and accumulating mass of knowledge.”  
What we see, then, is that though Young could pair climax and metonymy so effectively, 
this does not mean that he had to. Each figure had an integrity unto itself and Young eventually 
had the stylistic sophistication to use them profitably either separately or combined. Comparing 
this impressive facility of his later work with the way those figures so frequently conjoined in the 
earlier Tours, Young’s figurative techniques seem to have had their own gradual narrative of 
development, a fact which begs a final question: if by the later publications Young was able to 
separate the two figures, what can we say about his earliest works, especially those that predate 
the agricultural writings where the two figures were so frequently in tandem?  
Significantly, Young began his career not with agricultural or scientific writings but with 
two strikingly different genres: geopolitical tracts and sentimental novels. His first published 
work, The Theatre of the Present War in North America (1758), concerned the strategic 
implications of the Seven Years War, and argued fervently for the economic independence of 
Great Britain and its American colonies as a kind of isolationist disentanglement from the type of 
international intrigues that brought about the war (54). The following year he published again on 
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the same topic, writing in Reflections on the Present State of Affairs at Home and Abroad (1759) 
that Britain had only itself to blame for the mess of the French and Indian Wars, negligently 
leaving the colonies unexplored and underdeveloped and, therefore, vulnerable to French 
incursion (25). Young’s hope was that the Kingdom might, with the benefit of the colonies’ 
natural wealth, develop a level of economic independence that would free it from an increasingly 
complex and entangled global system (8-9). Over the coming years Young refined this concern, 
homing in on an enlightened and improved agricultural system as the key component for the 
nation’s financial and geopolitical independence. This is a principal argument of his 1772 tract 
Political Essays Concerning the Present State of the British Empire (77), in which he goes on to 
advocate that the nation enclose waste commons and lease them to independent, entrepreneurial 
farmers who, incentivized by the possibility personal profit, would immediately turn those 
wastes to good (92). To confirm his theory, he suggests an experiment: 
With what ease might a certainty be gathered in these matters, if some gentleman who has property in poor, 
and commonly called barren soils, would try the experiment, by turning twenty acres of his poorest land 
into a little farm, and either give the property of it to some industrious labourer, with a wife and four 
children, or at least a lease of 99 years at a shilling rent. The capability of such a portion of land’s 
maintaining such a family would then be rendered clear--and the experiment would be perfect, if such farm 
was thrown into proper order, by dividing it into several fields, well fenced with the hedge shrubs most 
proper for the soil; and if any artificial grass is discovered that will really grow luxuriantly on such land, to 
lay down a field with it; by these means such poor tracts would be made to turn to the best account 
possible. (93-94) 
 
In this important passage we can begin to discern the point at which Young’s earlier, 
geopolitical concerns for England’s independence meet and merge with the later obsession for an 
improved, experimentally controlled agriculture. Yet it is not entirely clear here what type of 
figure articulates this juncture. There are hints of climax, certainly, but the paragraph summits a 
bit too soon with the vaulting phrase “the experiment would perfect” coming in the middle rather 
than at the end. There are traces of metonymy too, with the wealthy landowner and sturdy 
leaseholder, but it is not certain which Young valorizes most and neither is specifically exalted 
   
91 
by the climax. Young wrote this passage around the same time as his first tours, which showed 
similarly imperfect examples of the figurative devices which later more clearly animated his 
thinking. 
Discerning this pivotal articulation in Young’s corpus requires we look at some texts that 
might, at first blush, seem beyond the scope of this project. Yet if any works most clearly show 
Young struggling to conceive the figures that would bring his imagined, independent Kingdom 
to fruition, it is the series of at least four sentimental novels he authored5, all except one between 
the earliest tracts on the Seven Years War and his first writings about England’s need for 
agricultural improvement. The first of these clearly shows Young trying to bridge those early 
geopolitical texts with the later agricultural ones. Titled The History of Sir Charles Beaufort 
(1766), the narrative follows the humble but courageous Sir Charles who happens upon and 
saves the virtuous Ms. Minors from the clutches of a local ne’er-do-well. He is wounded in the 
rescue and taken back to the Minors’ family farm till he can recover. There he becomes fast 
friends with Minors’s father, who schools him in scientifically managed agriculture and helps 
him grow an appreciation for rural life. “I shall ever consider farming as the most rational, 
philosophical, and manly employment in the world,” Beaufort exclaims at one point, adding: 
For my own part, I have always thought it unfortunate that so few gentle men have a taste for country 
business: agriculture bestows on all its professors health and chearfulness, and, generally speaking, a 
greater share of independency than most other professions can boast. (vol. 1, 50-51) 
 
It is that last phrase, emphasizing the “greater share of independency” of a scientifically 
grounded agriculture, that is important for our purposes. It appears repeatedly throughout this 
novel and the ones he published after. His 1775 The History of Julia Benson has its heroine find 
                                                
5 I say “at least four sentimental novels” because Young frequently wrote anonymously during his early career, 
including the period when he published these novels. It is possible, then, that there are others besides the four works 
which scholarship has clearly identified as his writing. 
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temporary refuge, independence and contentment on a scientifically managed farm, complete 
with perfect enclosures and experimental crops (vol. 2, 59). And, as we will see shortly, much of 
the drama of his 1767 The Adventures of Emmera centers around the possibility that such a 
perfect, enclosed, scientifically managed agriculture might take root in England.  
Science is also lauded above and beyond its participation in an enlightened agriculture. In 
The History of Sir Charles Beaufort, Sir Charles’s sister, a heroine in her own right, is a bench 
scientist, and keeps a complete laboratory with botanical, animal, and fossil specimens, 
bookshelves full of technical manuals, a microscope, a number of telescopes, a variety of globes, 
and an air pump (130). At one point Ms. Beaufort writes her brother requesting new equipment 
(which he happily supplies) and at another point asks after a translation of Newton’s Principia 
(37).  
Just as Sir Charles Beaufort appears to valorize science in all its manifestations, it does 
an equally good job of opposing that enlightened spirit with the kind of European entanglements 
that concerned Young in his earliest works. Within only a few chapters of their first romantic 
encounter, the heroic protagonist is abducted from Ms. Minors’s house by a gang of criminals 
based in continental Europe. There he is imprisoned and, even once freed, involved in all manner 
of complicated misfortunes that prevent the reunion with his beloved. Subsumed by international 
intrigues (Catholic inquisitions in Italy, forged letters from Germany, and disguised villains in 
France) things do not end happily.  
Sir Charles Beaufort shows Young struggling to answer his concerns about the 
possibility of civil liberty in an age when international geopolitical entanglements were having 
increasingly significant domestic repercussions. That the novel ends so poorly for its heroes 
suggests he was still less than fully confident in his imagined solutions. He seems, still, worried 
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that science in general and scientific agriculture in particular were not yet up to the task of 
creating an enlightened independent kingdom, one in which domestic tranquility could be 
secured despite an increasingly complicated world without. We find this concern voiced by 
Beaufort’s sister (the bench scientist) in a letter where she bemoans that her brother’s beloved 
has fallen victim to a spurious lawsuit, perpetrated by the same international gang that abducted 
her brother. “What laws are these,” she writes, 
to involve such a family in ruin! What barbarous gothic institutions, to throw the possessions of all men of 
honour and conscience in the absolute power of perjured knaves! Is this the justice of the country that 
produced the divine Newton! Have all the philosophers of England lived and died without freeing their 
country from this slavery, the most galling the world ever knew. (121-123) 
 
In Sir Charles Beaufort, even the lawful clarity of Newtonianism gives way before the 
international malefactors and legal machinations that beset its heroes. The idealized enclosure of 
an independent, scientific agriculture is never achieved, and, even though Ms. Minors later buys 
a farm where she hopes she and her Beaufort can find happy retirement, both characters perish 
before they ever reunite in the safety of that utopia.  
If one finds that conclusion rather depressing, it is possible Young may have felt 
similarly, as the novel he published the very next year has a more optimistic and successful 
trajectory. The Adventures of Emmera; or the Fair American is a distinctly trans-Atlantic 
narrative, set in both the utopian colonial wilderness and a contrastingly violent and corrupt 
England6. It shares many characteristics with Young’s other novels (villainous suitors, noble 
heroes, deceptions, abductions), but here Young strikes a more imaginative and, quite literally, 
exploratory tone. In the first chapters of this epistolary narrative, the protagonist, a hardy 
Englishman named Chetwyn, recounts his travels with a few servants and Indian guides into the 
                                                
6 Though The Adventures of Emmera was published anonymously, scholars uniformly agree it to be Arthur Young’s 
work. Critic Jeffrey Richards has a fine essay (noted in this dissertation’s “Works Cited”) outlining the reasons for 
this attribution. 
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unsettled western regions of the American colonies. There he makes his way into a secluded 
mountain vale and, after penetrating the thickets surrounding its periphery, discovers a quaint 
farm house. Inside, an old man lies deathly ill, attended by his young and beautiful daughter, 
Emmera. With his last breaths, the old man tells Chetwyn of how he fled an England becoming 
increasingly corrupted by, as he puts it, “the vile practices of the world,” escaping to live in 
happy, agricultural independence in the American wilderness. Chetwyn promises to protect his 
daughter, and stay on to work the farm with her in the secluded fertile valley. This sequence of 
these scenes is vital, for it appears to show Young struggling to find his voice through the figures 
that would so define his later work. Note, for instance, how the first approach to the valley both 
literally and figuratively, climbs to a new vista and resolves in a climatic summation of the 
scenery: 
We were very near turning aside from the track before us on a account of a thicket of briars, brambles and 
almost impenetrable thorns; when our indians discovered an ascent up a pretty steep and rugged hill, which 
they apprehended I might scale with no little difficulty. The hill was covered with a thick wood, which we 
traversed for some time, and then began to descend, still enveloped in it.---We soon entered a small valley 
sunk in the side of the hill, which feasted our eye with a landskip truly American. From one side of it, we 
looked tho’ an irregular arch of prodigious oak and walnut-tree, on the lake, a fine and smooth expanse of 
water stretching away on each side to a great distance, but broke in front by a woody island. On the other 
side, and at a distance in our front view, ran a circular ridge of hills (mountains you wou’d call them in 
England) completely covered with vast forest trees from edge of the fine valley below us, to their very 
summits and forming the most romantic amphitheatre of wood imagination can paint. Surrounded on one 
side by this noble mound, appeared beneath us a valley (if I may so call it) of gently swelling hills, slopes 
and lawns, dales, streams and cascades, scattered with all the enchanting negligence of the most 
picturesque fancy. The moment I threw my eye over this delicious spot, all my faculties were for a moment 
suspended, I could scarce draw my breath for gazing with such statute-like attention at the amazing 
beauties of this little spot. (16) 
 
With Chetwyn’s description we are brought through briars and brambles, up a steep incline, over 
a summit and out of an enveloping wood to view a prospect of qualitatively greater beauty than 
any he has ever beheld. In truth, the climactic grandeur of the scene in front of him tends to 
overwhelm the gradual ascent that leads to the figure’s completion, but the ascending elements 
are important nonetheless. The climb allows Young to separate Chetwyn’s old world from the 
new one he encounters, with a narrow, quick ascension that still maintains (albeit somewhat 
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artificially) an element of narrative continuity. That Chetwyn just happens upon this path up the 
hill and into the valley may seem a bit too convenient, but we are of course in the world of 
sentimental adventure, and have willingly agreed to suspend most of our disbelief as long as 
some minimal articulation joins our real world with the detached utopian vale. Young relies on 
this novelistic compact as much as he can to support the imagined journey, and uses the logic of 
climax to do the rest of the narrative work.  
Young may have been pleased with the way that figurative articulation unfolded, for he 
immediately follows the passage above with another climax in which the incrementum is even 
clearer, completing the gradual journey into to the utopian settlement he has stumbled upon. 
Here Chetwyn walks into the valley below him and towards the farmhouse he spied in the 
distance: 
As we moved gently along, a thousand fresh objects struck our admiring eyes, the slight vallies which 
intersected the most verdant swelling lawns I ever beheld… Here a broken cascade tumbling down a hill 
almost over-shadowed with pendent wood. There, a fine rising slope spotted with a variety of unknown 
tree, the lake glittering tho’ them; with herds of deer and beeves grazing every part of it. As we approached 
the house, the landskip grew yet more enchanting, the lawns more elegant, the sound of falling waters 
unseen, were heard--innumerable vines trailed their branches up the trees, their tendril and ripe clusters of 
fruit hanging from every part in beautiful festoons--a few inclosures with standing corn gave a variety to 
the landskip--and the house the gilding of chearfulness and society over the whole scene. (17) 
 
We should note that in this figure and the passage that preceded it, Young’s climaxes do 
not culminate as they might in his later agricultural writings, with a gentleman farmer as the 
figure of harmonious control and mastery over the utopian scene. Certainly some of that later 
scenography’s accoutrements are present, with the cheerful farmhouse and, significantly, 
enclosed and fruitful crop lands. What we still lack, however, is a metonym of enlightened 
cultivation who can embody this new world where wilderness and agriculture seem to merge 
(like the cattle grazing side by side with the deer) into an idyllic zenith of natural order. 
Young does eventually supply such a character, though importantly is not the kind of 
gentleman farmer we find in his latter works, nor is it the hardy Chetwyn. Instead it is a female 
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character, the beautiful and angelic Emmera who, as her homophonic name suggests, 
metonymizes the utopian American landscape with which she is so closely associated. Her 
father, she tells Chetwyn, had been the victim of all manner of corruptions and misfortunes in 
England, and had left that world behind to seek out a secret redoubt where he could raise his 
daughter beyond the “wretched vanities” of Europeans (115). Growing up in that utopian 
seclusion, Emmera’s personality comes to metonymize the “native innocence and simplicity” of 
her surroundings (46). Chetwyn quickly falls equally in love with both the woman and her secret 
valley. Emmera schools him in the principled and efficient agricultural practices she devised 
with her father and as the two fall in love, Chetwyn experiences a complete sense of serenity and 
contentment. He promises to keep Emmera and the utopian farm from ever being disturbed by 
the outside world. He blocks the path by which he entered the valley and vows to “pistol the first 
European face I behold within the limits of this retirement” (58).   
Yet as the story unfolds, Chetwyn becomes increasingly convinced that he can transplant 
the perfectly controlled, isolated, independent utopia back to England. Emmera resists his 
arguments, worried that “in society, a man is surrounded by millions of temptations---by the 
practitioners of all kinds of vices” and “open to the attacks of envy, hatred, malice, hypocrisy 
and deceit and what may” (vol. 2, 19). Finally, though, she relents, agreeing to a trial stay on 
Chetwyn’s country estate, so long as their stay remains secret and they avoid all superfluous 
society. There they quickly set to work organizing a farm along the same lines as their American 
utopia, with hedged in enclosures and carefully ordered crops. Things go well, until the 
neighbors discover Chetwyn’s return and insist on visiting. Emmera, finding the society of card 
playing and derisive argument intolerable, convinces Chetwyn that the experiment has failed and 
that the only way they can find true contented isolation is to return to the utopian vale, where 
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enlightened agriculture can persist in harmonious, entwined balance with the unsullied, wild 
countryside. 
A feminine metonymy of utopian agriculture and civilization is what Young seems most 
able to articulate at this point--he had yet to discover men of equal metonymic capacity, able to 
duplicate Emmera’s perfect, independent enclosure in England. He needed characters with which 
that pure, edenic and feminine figure could be rearticulated as a gentlemanly figure--men who 
did not have to be ensconced deep in the virgin forests, but could, with a stylized stalwart 
discipline, resist the common bigotries of their neighbors and chart an independent course. He 
would find these men soon enough. As he toured the countryside over the coming years, he saw 
what he was searching for in figures like Coke, Rockingham, and especially Bakewell, men who 
had enclosed the wastes and, he could argue, had strengthened England’s natural position in a 
world of increasing complexity and entanglement. These men were modern agriculture 
metonymized, cultivators who had seemingly achieved a gentle but complete mastery over 
nature, creating little utopias where all could be within their more masculine command and 
control. “...nature,” Young had written, “brought by philosophers patiently and steadily to the 
test of experimentation, discloses her secrets to those whose industry deserves her confidence.” It 
was a climactic figure of accomplishment. 
This figurative arrangement of agriculture may have been decidedly different than the 
one which Robert Bakewell tried to articulate, yet those two styles addressed two different 
audiences and ultimately worked towards the same purpose. Bakewell tried to circulate a broader 
cause that would convene individual breeders into a better integrated breeding society. Young, 
on the other hand, wrote for a much more public, national audience and therefore wanted to 
circulate the causal agency of individual eminent breeders as a metonymic representation for the 
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improving effect scientific agriculture would have for the English nation. Both rhetors were 
successful in their different but mutually reinforcing goals, to the point where we can then say 
that the “Cause” of improved livestock husbandry simultaneously owes crucial debts to the 
different causal agencies articulated in the two different rhetorics.  
In this respect, the broader assemblage of English agricultural rhetoric (including both 
Young’s and Bakewell’s rhetorics) hewes closer to the kind of diffuse and distributed “Cause” 
described by Bakewell. Maurice Charland has argued that audiences are constituted by a single 
unifying rhetorical figure that provides a consistent and shared sense of identity (133-134). That 
might seem to be the case with Bakewell’s rhetoric of a unifying “Cause,” yet Bakewell’s 
rhetoric alone was not enough to constitute the society he wanted to assemble. Bakewell himself 
seems to have known that, because he never just depended on a purely linguistic rhetoric of 
“Cause” to assemble the Dishley Ram Society. For though we have not covered it as much in this 
chapter (largely because we lack the historical records to delve into it deeply) it is clear that 
Bakewell saw the exchange of breeding rams to be as significant to the constitution of his 
Society as was the exchange of written rhetoric. Indeed, the safe and regulated transfer of 
breeding rams was a defining and constitutive feature of the Dishley Ram Society. If breeding 
rams could be securely sent between Society members, vital morphological information could be 
circulated that would tighten both material and semiotic bonds between otherwise disparate 
breeders and establish their shared breed’s power over a larger geographic area. I think one could 
well make the argument that this circulation of rams was itself figurative, both rhetorical and 
material: was not each ram a synecdoche of the breed, a part that represented and articulated the 
whole? The farther and wider these figures could articulate, the more England could be brought 
into the Dishley Ram Society’s fold.  
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And then, of course, there is the simple fact that Bakewell also cultivated the popularity 
which Young’s alternative causality offered him. He may have worried that Young’s rhetoric put 
too much emphasis on his own personal agency, but none of that stopped him from inviting 
Young to witness his improvements or supplying him with crucial scientific data. Bakewell, in a 
number of ways, understood that a society is constituted by multiple different figures. As much 
as Young (or Charland) would like us to focus our attention on the causal efficacy of a single 
constitutive rhetorical figure, the example of improved English agriculture shows that some 
societies require a much wider, distributed, and diverse communicative effort. 
In the popular public sphere alone, however, Young’s style of rhetoric was clearly 
predominant. Kenneth Burke argues well that metonymy affords rhetors a way to reduce the 
effects of complex processes to embodied agencies (424-426). This is how Young’s agricultural 
rhetoric articulated, identifying celebrated farmers who could represent as causes the range of 
agricultural improvements with which they were associated. As we will see in the following 
chapter, a similar style articulated the arrangement of visual rhetorics in the period’s agricultural 
artwork.
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CHAPTER 3: BREEDING’S VISUAL ARTICULATION 
Introduction 
Arthur Young may well have been the most influential English agricultural writer at the 
turn of the 19th century, yet it seems his direct influence on Darwin was minor, if not negligible. 
Partly this is just attributable to chronology; the two writers were not really contemporaries, with 
Young publishing most of his significant agricultural works a good half century before Darwin 
began his scientific career. Also, Young was more frequently engaged with the broader reform of 
English agriculture than he was with the specific animal husbandry practices such reforms 
required. As reference texts for a scientist interested in the fundamental principles of artificial 
selection, Young’s writings were not particularly useful. Perhaps this is why, in his bibliographic 
notebook of “Books Read,” Darwin only records having consulted two of Young’s many 
agricultural travelogues, A Six Months Tour Through the North of England (1770) and Travels 
during the years 1787, 1788, and 1789 (1792). He read these sometime in either late April or 
early May of 1845 which was at least six years after he developed a fairly clear understanding of 
natural selection and its similarities with agricultural breeding. More to the point, next to 
Darwin’s notebook entries for these two works by Young, he summarizes their usefulness for his 
research with the rather curt criticism, “Nothing” (13v). 
So for all Young’s significance to the early articulation of modern agricultural breeding, 
it is clear Darwin found his work to be of little relevance to his own. Yet it is equally clear that 
the two writers shared a deep and abiding appreciation for the incredible advances livestock 
husbandry made in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century. It is also certain that each 
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held the great breeders of this period in the highest of esteem. We have seen Young’s repeated 
plaudits of men like Coke, Rockingham, and Bakewell. Darwin is similarly laudatory in the 
Origin’s first chapter: 
What English breeders have actually effected is proved by the enormous prices given for animals with a 
good pedigree; and these have now been exported to almost every quarter of the world….If selection 
consisted merely in separating some very distinct variety, and breeding from it, the principle would be so 
obvious as hardly to be worth notice; but its importance consists in the great effect produced by the 
accumulation in one direction, during successive generations, of differences absolutely inappreciable by an 
uneducated eye, differences which I for one have vainly attempted to appreciate. Not one man in a 
thousand has accuracy of eye and judgement sufficient to become an eminent breeder. (23-24) 
 
Darwin’s thinking here is likely not just a general opinion about better breeders, but 
specifically about the great luminaries of livestock husbandry that Young did so much to make 
famous. This includes Robert Bakewell, who, as we have seen, embodied Young’s vision of 
modern breeding and also gets repeated mention in the first chapter of Darwin’s Origin (Origin 
25-26). As Darwin puts it there:  
...I cannot doubt that this process, continued during centuries, would improve and modify any breed, in the 
same way as Bakewell, Collin7, etc., by this very same process, only carried on more methodically, did 
greatly modify, even during their own lifetimes, the forms and qualities of their cattle. (35) 
 
Both Young and Darwin believed that what modern animal husbandry had achieved in 
the past half century was an apotheosis of progress, both for the individual men who 
accomplished that success and for the nation that was reaping their achievement’s economic 
benefits. English breeders, as Darwin suggests above, had advanced animal husbandry to the 
point where an international market was demanding their breeds at remarkably high prices. They 
had brought the previously unmethodical practices of rustic shepherds, cowherds, and farmers to 
the level of a principled, deliberate science capable of highly valued innovations. “At the present 
time,” he writes elsewhere in the Origin, “eminent breeders try by methodical selection, with a 
                                                
7 It seems Darwin here misspells the last name of Charles Colling, omitting the “g.” Colling was a close associate of 
Bakewell’s, a member of Bakewell’s Dishley Ram Society, and a frequent subject of Arthur Young’s writings.  
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distinct object in view, to make a new strain or sub-breed, superior to anything existing in the 
country” (25).  
So while Arthur Young may have had no direct influence on Charles Darwin, it is clear 
that the ways Darwin understood English livestock breeders’ achievements were very similar to 
those which Young rhetorically articulated. Indeed, from the perspective of this dissertation, it is 
actually quite helpful that Darwin found Young’s specific works of little use, while still 
embracing the same articulations of progressive husbandry and eminent breeders that so clearly 
animated Young’s thinking. If, as I want to argue, what made a particular rhetorical arrangement 
circulate between earlier English agricultural writing and later biological science was not the 
individual influence of a single great writer, that leaves more room for us to assess the possibility 
that something else advanced the broad and continued success of these ideas. As I made clear in 
the previous chapter, what articulated Young’s specific strain of thinking was a climactic pairing 
of rhetorical figures, incrementum and metonymy, which seem to have exerted a kind of self-
reinforcing logic upon one another, drawing forth Young’s vision in clearer and more fully 
fabricated rhetoric.  
This chapter and the one that follows (Chapter 4) will show that those rhetorics persisted 
after and beyond Young’s career, particularly by looking at different venues in which figures of 
artificial selection further articulated the interrelation of nature and culture in British society. To 
that end, this chapter looks at visual rhetorics of breeding portrayed in artwork about animal 
husbandry from the late 1700’s and early 1800’s. This foray into visual art is important, largely 
because it demonstrates the thorough penetration of the rhetorical figures that previously 
articulated Arthur Young’s arguments into another medium in which Young himself was not 
directly active. If, as I hope to show, incrementum and metonymy are just as critical in the 
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paintings of pioneering breeders as they were in Young’s written accounts, that further suggests 
the cultural power the figures themselves express, beyond a particular rhetor or his chosen 
medium’s influence.  
That is the narrative this chapter hopes to support, particularly because (and as we will 
see in Chapter 4) it appears those texts Darwin himself did define as influential have clear links 
to similar varieties of figurative articulation that we saw advancing Arthur Young’s works and 
which we will see in agricultural artwork. I say varieties because, while incrementum and 
metonymy will once again clearly dominate the style of early-nineteenth century breeding’s 
visual art and written treatises, in neither case will it simply duplicate the particular arrangements 
we saw in Young’s corpus. There incrementum typically described the gradual, progressively 
improving work of an individual farmer, laboring over time to reach a pinnacle of mastery and 
influence over his particular sphere of power, be it a county, a farm, or a breed of animal. In this 
sense, Young’s writing does the initial cultural work of advancing the idea that an individual 
agriculturalist could, by dint of his own effort and merit, achieve a status of metonymic 
excellence, embodying a position of ultimate human mastery over his natural domain. That 
Young’s earlier works establish the reasonableness of that figurative logic may have allowed 
later rhetorics to take greater liberties with the joint articulation of incrementum and metonymy. 
As we will shortly see, in visual art, the temporal narrative of a slowly laboring, striving farmer 
finally achieving greatness is replaced with a spatial rendering in which an eminent breeder’s 
greatness is simply taken as a natural, foregone conclusion. Then, in the later manuals on 
breeding and artificial selection that Darwin does read, a temporal account reoccurs, but it is 
extended to a vastly larger time scale. These manuals often encompass the full history of 
livestock husbandry, with English agriculture as a final climactic resolution of that cultural 
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narrative. In both cases, agricultural figurations after Arthur Young took the metonymic status of 
the breeder for granted, but continued to situate their great achievements at the telos of a 
gradually rising rhetoric. The best place to first encounter this reconfigured pattern is in the 
period’s visual art. 
Figuring the Breeder’s Climactic Space 
Agriculture and rural life has, throughout English history, been a favorite subject of 
visual artists. While different eras tended to emphasize some themes over others, art historian 
Christian Payne notes that pastoral works frequently repeat and re-emphasize three particular 
myths of country life: “that people are happier in the countryside, that country people are more 
virtuous, and that country people were more virtuous and happy in the past than they are now” 
(24). Such myths were supported by traditions of Georgic literature and pastoral poetry that 
referred to classical eras of rural contentment and harmony. These themes persisted in visual art 
well into the late nineteenth century, even after written works were more willing to confront the 
increasing destitution of Victorian farmers (Payne 44-45). Indeed, one of the things that makes 
British agricultural art of this later period so fascinating and a bit distinctive is the way it tried to 
reemphasize narratives of contemporary harmony instead of just nostalgically longing for a 
previous period of classical prosperity. So while earlier agricultural art typically harkened back 
to classical contentment, the end of the Georgian era found agricultural artists trying to draw 
parallels between the order and prosperity of antiquity and their own period of England’s rising 
economic productivity and power. Beyond simply portraying rural life as more preferable to that 
of the city or the town, or more harmonious in the past than what it was in the present, 
agricultural art at the turn of the nineteenth century shifted towards describing its own epoch as 
more productive, harmonious, and orderly, despite powerful evidence to the contrary (Payne 42).   
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Some of this dissonance can be explained by considering the particular audience for 
which this visual art was created. Unlike literary works, paintings circulated in smaller circles 
and amongst wealthier patrons. They were shown either in galleries or the homes of well to do 
connoisseurs, often commissioned by and depicting the upper-class landowners whose interests 
lay with making the current order work better, rather than the more radical reforms for which 
farm workers were increasing calling (Payne 35, 44). While there were some artists who were 
willing to critically examine the economic and social injustices of rural life, for the most part the 
emphasis was on the bounty nature produced and the imagined social harmony such productivity 
allowed (45). 
That is not to say that agricultural art refrained from showing the social hierarchies that 
characterized contemporary farm work, but they offered more beneficent and harmonious 
depictions of that social order. That is particularly true of that smaller class of agricultural art 
which depicts breeders with their livestock. While not a widely popular genre of art, those 
paintings and prints we have of this period’s animal husbandry show a similar emphasis on 
harmony and order alongside social stratification. What makes them particularly interesting, 
however, is that while most other agricultural artwork draws parallels between harmonious 
landscapes and equally harmonious social arrangements, paintings of livestock husbandry 
interject domesticated animals into that parallel composition of society and nature, creating a 
third articulation which harmony and order can compose. The result, as we shall see, is a 
fascinatingly complex interplay between natural setting and figurative arrangement, much of 
which tends towards a similar pairing of incrementum and metonymy that we see in the period’s 
agricultural writing.  
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 Indeed, the potential complexity of livestock husbandry painting becomes most apparent 
when we consider that, on their own, livestock animals were often depicted rather simply. There 
was a strong tradition in English agricultural art of painting highly bred domestic animals in 
isolation, usually with minimal setting and context, the animal standing quietly in profile so as to 
keep the viewer’s focus on the breed’s distinctive physical attributes. Such works, like those by 
Thomas Weaver (fig. 1) and George Garrard (fig. 2), were frequently commissioned by breeders 
to record and popularize their particular breeds and prized examples. Paintings like these were 
typical in the early nineteenth century, and laid the way for the similarly composed but more 
easily reproducible etchings and prints of model animals used in published breeding manuals and 
herd books (Moncrief 24). These straightforwardly illustrated figures gave farmers across 
England an informed familiarity with breeds developed far from their own region, thus helping 
locally productive breeds to circulate more widely. With what seems a similar intention, George 
Garrard went so far as to model many significant breeds in plaster, a way to provide fuller detail 
of their unique features.   
Other works were less focused on exemplifying a distinct breed and more designed to 
highlight the great proportions of a single exceptional animal. In such paintings the emphasis 
was not on the relative proportions of the animal’s different parts (its bodily conformation) but 
rather its overall massive presence. To make the animal’s great scale clear, such works often 
required the inclusion of another figure by which the main subject’s great size could be judged. 
To that end, artists frequently inserted an anonymous shepherd or cowherd standing next to the 
comparatively gigantic animal. John Boultbee’s The Durham Ox (fig. 3) and The Bull ‘Patriot’ 
(fig. 4) and Thomas Weaver’s The Dunearn Ox (fig. 5) all show this technique to good effect. 
Nor were such disproportionate displays reserved for animals like cattle that were naturally 
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larger than humans, as we see in W.H. Davis’s Prize Sheep (fig. 6). Works like these put humans 
and animals side by side, but used an excessive juxtaposition to keep the emphasis firmly on the 
animal, with the included human only a figurative yardstick of the livestock’s greater presence. 
Yet when an animal’s actual breeder is depicted, rather than just an anonymous shepherd 
or cowherd, the comparative scale is often altered so as to emphasize the breeder’s power in the 
arrangement. In these works, not only is the breeder larger than his stock, but also larger than the 
other humans present. So, for example, in Thomas Weaver’s Mr. Stanier and Herdsman with 
Hereford Heifer (fig. 7), Weaver makes the breeder both the scene’s tallest figure and, with 
Stanier’s gestured instructions to the smaller herdsman on his left, its causal presence. A similar 
shift of emphasis from animal to breeder is apparent in another of Weaver’s works, Mr. 
Freestone and his Shepherd with Four Prize Leicester Rams. Here again Weaver makes the 
breeder taller than his attendant and emphasizes his personal control with a hand resting 
benevolently on the sheep’s back. This scene was apparently something of a figurative formula 
for Weaver, for he basically copies it six years later in his A Gentleman Farmer with his Farm 
Manager and Four Prize Leicester Rams. Placing humans alongside their animal charges, 
therefore, did not guarantee a shift of emphasis from the former to the latter, but when a breeder 
enters the picture, their causal role in the breading process seems to confer a special prominence. 
Indeed, as one continues to examine more complicated depictions of livestock husbandry, 
one sees that (unlike the paintings of individual animals) these were designed with specific 
formal and figurative arrangements to highlight the human agents causing the agriculture. Take, 
for example, John West Giles’s lithograph of Mr. Jonas Webb, of Babraham, and His Three 
Rams (fig. 8), in which the breeder (one of this period’s most famous and mentioned specifically 
by Darwin) is given the position of greatest prominence, poised center-right in a portly, imposing 
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profile. His pointing finger suggests a commanding presence, one that correlates with his 
disproportionately large size compared to the small shepherd depicted faintly on the left. 
Significantly, Webb’s relatively formal dress marks him as man of urbane status, suggesting that 
his agricultural success gives him social influence far beyond the painting’s setting. Webb is not 
made a metonym of agricultural progress, but his Rams’ similarly fecund and portly profile 
certainly hint at the great productivity his personal efforts yield. If he is not the single figure 
driving this scene’s action, he is certainly its most important agency. If simpler works tended to 
emphasize the great productivity of bred animals, this one keeps the focus on the breeder’s 
healthy frame and ample success. In sum, Giles’s print articulates the breeder as both the 
instigating force and beneficiary of this scene’s agricultural productivity. 
Works like these benefit from the increased complexity a variety of human and animal 
figures allow, particularly in their ability to position the breeder as figure of control and 
authority. Yet adding a variety of figures also increases the difficulty of organizing the canvas 
coherently. Indeed, as much as Giles’ print displays the affordances of a varied agricultural 
scene, it also suggests its challenges, particularly when we notice how his efforts to give the 
breeder prominence can simultaneously distract viewers from that focal point. For one, Webb’s 
commanding, pointing finger, which obviously adds to his prominence, also leads our eyes away 
from him and towards the unrealistically small shepherd positioned on the left margin of the 
middle-ground. And while that size difference was clearly meant to convey Webb’s power over 
his farm’s operation, the shepherd’s disproportionately small stature makes that technique 
obvious to the point of distraction. So too does the shepherd’s lack of discernible facial features. 
Instead of standing as a real, albeit secondary person (as we saw in Thomas Weaver’s more 
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realistic depictions of breeders with their shepherds and cowherds), Webb’s shepherd hovers at 
the edge mysteriously, an indiscernible cipher. 
Combined with these distracting details are the work’s three different vanishing points (to 
the right of the barn, down the alley on its left, and into the woods behind the shepherd), which 
give the entire setting a similar instability and detract from the effort to make the breeder a 
symbol of calm control. To a degree, the alley down the middle of the picture, with the gradually 
smaller chickens in the middle-ground and the smaller cattle in the background, helps steady this 
work’s narrative account, as we might imagine Webb having strolled down that path to this 
point. Yet his position on the right side of the scene, apparently striding towards the left, tells a 
different story; he seems to have arrived here from somewhere out of the frame, walking into a 
scene that preexisted his arrival.    
In sum, this work suffers from an inability to merge the breeder’s outsized prominence 
with an otherwise natural setting in which his supervening emergence seems more gradual and, 
therefore, reasonable. To put that criticism in the terms of the previous chapter, this print is 
heavy on metonymy and too short on incrementum, to the point where the breeder’s authority 
seems out of balance with the setting over which he stands in charge. 
Other works do a better job balancing those competing demands with their complex 
arrangements. John Ferneley’s 1823 painting Sir John Palmer on His Favourite Mare with His 
Shepherd, John Green, and His Prize Leicester Longwool Sheep (fig. 9) arrives at greater levels 
of harmony between the depicted breeder, his shepherd and the animals around them. Unlike 
Giles’s lithograph of Webb, here all the main characters occupy the same compositional plane, 
but their relative position within the foreground makes their comparative prominence clear. 
Palmer, positioned on horseback above the others, is clearly the most significant figure in this 
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work, and the blue sky breaking through the clouds above his head highlights his privileged 
position in the frame. The shepherd’s posture, glancing upwards towards his employer to gauge 
Palmer’s opinion, makes clear for whom the tableau is arranged, but his clearly inquisitive face 
still allows the subordinate a sense of real personhood that was lacking in Webb’s indiscernible 
shepherd. Additionally, in this work the attendant is the one with his hands on the sheep, holding 
it in position, but the “P” on the animal’s hindquarter makes clear who really owns the animals. 
Equally interesting is the engagement between the three animals (horse, dog, and sheep) at the 
center, with each animal seeming to take a benign interest in the two others in front of it. The 
happy coexistence of these different, highly bred species further contributes to the sense that 
Palmer rises above a stabilized, controlled environment, in which a contented civility amongst 
the animals mirrors the friendly encounter between employer and employee.  
Palmer rises above this scene, but his connection to the shepherd and to the three species, 
makes his prominence less artificially outsized than the lithograph of Webb. The gazing, visual 
connection between the three animals and between the two humans makes this work more 
intimate and less artificially posed. However, Palmer’s rather slight physique and disengaged 
bearing does not grant him the kind of commanding presence we saw Webb demonstrating. 
Additionally, his mien is a bit hard to discern; is he engaging his shepherd’s gaze or just 
contentedly surveying the scene? Likewise, the gloved hand on his hip and the other resting on 
the saddle suggest more a sense of patient contemplation than metonymic action and control. 
Clearly this scene has been arranged for his benefit, but he does not seem to intervene in it 
directly. Instead, he sits with a slightly expressionless face, a passive a viewer of the scene 
before before him. Unlike Giles’s lithograph of Webb, where the eminent breeder has taken his 
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gloves off and is clearly directing the events before him, Palmer has no commanding 
gesticulations to mark him as the primary agent of agriculture. He is more observer than actor.  
Added to that, there is little narrative indicating how Palmer arrived at this particular 
arrangement of people, animals and landscape. Clearly he has ridden to the barn on horseback, 
but where from, and along what path? Whereas Giles’s print (with its multiple vanishing points 
and Webb striding from somewhere else into the frame) gave us too many answers to those 
questions, Ferneley’s work provides none. The setting is balanced and its characters congenial, 
but little indicates Palmer is the cause of that harmonious arrangement.   
 The principal challenge of this genre, then, was to arrange characters and setting so as to 
show a stabilized, natural order alongside a visual narrative that explained that order’s gradual 
emergence, all while still allowing a particular agent to rise above those natural, ordered 
surroundings. Ferneley’s work emphasizes that amicable harmony, but at the expense of denying 
Palmer all the accoutrements of power to which an “eminent breeder” is entitled. His painting 
also lacks any kind of visual history, missing an account of how the breeder arrived at the order 
and harmony which lies before him. Giles’s lithograph of Webb goes too far in the other 
direction, giving the breeder a commanding presence, but an outsized one that further disorders 
an already destabilized setting, without providing the narrative history that would account for the 
power Webb commands. Neither of these works fully answers the question as to how breeding’s 
visual rhetoric can simultaneously position the breeder’s cultural power amidst a naturally 
balanced setting. 
There are, however, two other pieces of visual art from this period that do accomplish 
these combined effects, and they depict some of the same eminent breeders with whom Arthur 
Young’s writing has already made us familiar. These are Thomas Weaver’s painting of Thomas 
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Coke inspecting his sheep on his Holkham estate (fig. 10) and John Boultbee’s portrait of Robert 
Bakewell (fig. 11). Both works demonstrate the way visual incrementums can be brought into 
balance with powerful figures of modern husbandry’s efficacy, offering a harmonious account of 
breeding’s natural foundations alongside the scientific and cultural agency it grants its 
practitioners. Both show the breeder amdist, yet distinct from, the environment in which they are 
situated, while simultaneously offering a visual narrative that naturalizes the breeder’s status 
over and above the other humans and animals arrayed around him.  
Thomas Weaver’s painting of Thomas Coke inspecting his sheep demonstrates that 
balance perfectly (fig. 10). Here there are distinct echoes of the figuration we found in Arthur 
Young’s work. Indeed, what makes this painting work so well is the way it tells a story similar to 
Young’s written accounts but in a fundamentally different medium, combining a variety of 
formal visual techniques (composition, perspective, proportion, color, shading, and gaze) to 
emphasize Coke’s status as a powerful culmination of agricultural progress.  
Firstly, Weaver organizes the composition around two incrementally rising lines. He 
forms the first with the middle-ground’s treeline, which advances gradually higher, beginning at 
the low fence-line on the right and incrementally growing taller as it simultaneously curves 
towards the foreground on the left. Paralleling the treeline’s rising height are the foreground’s 
figures, with their statures increasing similarly from right to left and with Coke, like the final tree 
behind him, rising over the rest. The effect is of two corresponding, advancing lines, but what 
makes this comparison so wonderfully convincing is Weaver’s consolidation of this parallel 
composition with a deft manipulation of perspective. Note how he uses the naturally larger 
appearance of closer objects (via the treeline’s gradual, curving approach from middle-ground on 
the right to foreground on the left) to make a series of actually similarly sized trees reasonably 
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“grow” larger in perspective as the viewer’s eye moves from right to left. There is nothing 
unnatural about nearer trees attaining a larger height and the darker shading in the painting’s 
frame as that middle-ground sweeps forward. He then punctuates that incrementum with the 
final, largest tree on the left, darkened more than the others preceding it, and thus looming 
distinctively into the foreground towards which the treeline has brought us.  
This gradually rising treeline provides a naturalized context in which the otherwise 
conspicuous height allowed the painting’s central figure, Coke, becomes natural. The breeder’s 
power and authority are made as reasonable an outgrowth as the parallel contours of the 
landscape in which that agriculture sits, and the presentation of those contours themselves as 
natural as the physical principles of perspective and perception that Weaver uses to articulate 
them. Color and shading accomplish a similar effect, with darker tones of increasing presence 
distinguishing the human figures on the left more prominently than those on the right and 
mirroring the gradually heavier hues on the treeline’s left. The two smaller shepherds in off-
white cloaks blend congruously with the similarly colored sheep. Coke’s steward, with greater 
social status, is given a bit more color in his dark brown coat, but the viewer’s attention is clearly 
drawn upwards and left by the painting’s most important figure. In particular, the color contrast 
created by Coke’s dark jacket and black hat juxtaposed against his light trousers and bright white 
shirt catches our eye, while simultaneously bridging the chromatic gap between the lighter 
figures in front of and below him with the heavily shaded trees behind. His light trousers allow 
him to stand smoothly amongst the white sheep around his legs, while his tall black hat gives 
him a distinctive sartorial preeminence. He is poised quite naturally amidst the other humans and 
animals, but Weaver’s use of color makes clear that he is the figure by which and for whom this 
scene is organized. 
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Coke’s visual prominence then legitimates his own gazing supervision over the scene 
which, like the largest tree behind him, allows the breeder to both emerge from and loom over 
the incrementum that leads upwards to him. That double presence makes Coke doubly 
significant: he is both the climax of the painting’s fabricated arrangement and the figurative 
bridge through which that arrangement culminates and emerges for us as a work of art. Like 
Coke and because of the particular articulations in which he arises, we can both gaze upon him 
and, through his watching mien, gaze with him. Half character and half viewer, he is both in and 
beyond the environment from which he climactically emerges. 
All of this occurs against a background where the manor house at the center-right and the 
crenulated watchtower barely protruding above the middle-ground’s treeline have faded into the 
distance. The old sources of military power and political authority remain and reinforce the 
current setting, but the emphasis here is on Coke’s individual ability to master, view and control 
the pastoral scene in front of him, the agricultural effects of his contemporary power. Unlike 
Giles print of Webb or Ferneley’s painting of Palmer, Weaver’s work provides a narrative sense 
of history that parallels the gradually rising lines of trees and beings. While there is no specific 
path outlining Coke’s journey to this point, the visual incrementums and the background 
buildings narrativize his current prominence, both visually and historically. Indeed, those 
background structures offer a fairly detailed narrative: they acknowledge Coke’s historical 
connection to the landowning aristocracy, but the pen and notepad in his hands (unlike the 
comparatively disengaged Palmer, Coke has taken his aristocratic gloves off) suggest he has also 
become something more modern. The old watchtower’s militaristic view has been replaced by 
Coke’s even more powerful scientific gaze, able to discern nature’s potentialities, convert them 
into signs and, as the luxurious manor house proves, turn that knowledge into value. Coke’s 
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notebook attests to what all the other visual features in this work also point us to: he is the 
metonymic extrinsic entity able to represent the other extrinsic entities assembled around him. 
He may have metaphorical significance as well, but the crucial aspect of this work is the way his 
presence is able to stand as the representative for all the contiguous agricultural effects in his 
midst.    
Weaver’s painting of Coke deftly accomplishes the difficult double burden that faltered 
Ferneley’s and Giles’s works. It balances the tension of depicting the breeder as an eminent 
metonymic figure while simultaneously constructing a gradual figurative environment in which 
that eminence is reasonable, historical, and natural. To that effect, its visual incrementums are 
critically important, drawing our eyes along climatic, culminating lines from which the final 
figure of the series can rise above the contiguous adjoining figures leading towards him. The 
work articulates Coke as a cultural visionary and naturalizes him as the agent of agricultural 
progress.  
If Weaver’s painting demonstrates how a rather complex array of formal techniques can 
all be brought to bear in the articulation of climactic figuration, John Boultbee’s portrait of 
Robert Bakewell (fig. 11) is perhaps a bit more restrained in its achievement of these same 
effects. Indeed, Bakewell’s posture, solidly balanced in the saddle, with his horse’s bearing 
similarly stolid and poised, makes this painting more quiet and formal. Yet here too a variety of 
visual techniques interact, albeit more subtly, to create a sense of narrative movement similar to 
what saw in Weaver’s painting of Coke.  
Take, for instance, Boultbee’s similar use of a middle-ground treeline that moves from 
left to right and gradually sweeps forward to merge with the largest and tallest tree on right. That 
final tree in the series is hued darker and painted much wider so as punctuate its distinct position 
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in the foreground, beyond the middle-ground series that preceded it. Admittedly, there is no 
immediately apparent parallel incrementum of human and animal figures, largely because this 
work is not as populated as Weaver’s painting of Coke, and what figures there are are equally 
split between middle and foreground. Still, if we examine the animals carefully, we can start to 
discern the repetition of a figurative pattern, with Boultbee duplicating the bodily conformation 
of the background’s middle cow, the dog, and the horse in gradually increasing sizes. Note how 
in all three instances, each animal’s legs are positioned precisely the same, with the hind quarters 
spread farther apart and the forelegs positioned almost alongside one another. Boultbee uses a 
single bodily conformation and simply increases its scale, providing a graduated continuity 
across the compositional planes which then puts the horse’s otherwise grand presence in 
perspective and context. The result is a particular variety of incrementum, a gradatio, in which a 
series of images is repeated in gradually grander terms, but with the same overall proportions and 
syntactic structure.  
That repeated series allows Boultbee to resolve the tension that would otherwise occur 
from having the horse’s outsize presence compete with its rider whose is, as the portrait’s title 
suggests, the work’s focus. Imposing as that horse is, he is only a larger version of the 
unintimidating spaniel at his feet and the docile cow in the distance. The result is that the horse’s 
otherwise impressive height and presence becomes more of a pedestal upon which Bakewell can 
rise into the work’s central culminating position.  
Other techniques allow Bakewell to simultaneously belong to that gradual series of 
animals while also projecting his masterly persona beyond its incremental setting. Firstly, 
Boultbee paints both Bakewell’s and his horse’s profile with similarly sweeping lines. The 
outlines of the horse’s neck, midsection and hindquarters echo the periphery of Bakewell’s own 
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ample torso and smoothly curving back. He then connects the two figures via the gently hanging 
reigns, which sweep back from the bridle to perfectly intersect a triple juncture with the similar 
curves of Bakewell’s waist and the horse’s withers. All these equivalently sweeping lines create 
a sense of geometric balance and harmony, visually mediating the joining of Bakewell’s profile 
with the horse’s, and thereby merging the man’s silhouette with the gradatio of animal figures 
around him. Boultbee likewise paints Bakewell’s trousers in a color matched perfectly to the 
horse’s coat, a remarkable choice since it seems deliberately blended to make it hard to 
distinguish where the man’s legs end and the animal’s body begins. In profile at least, Bakewell 
and the horse are brought contiguously together by line, shape and hue.  
Yet Boultbee grants Bakewell a privilege denied the animals in this scene, allowing his 
neck to turn towards us, and his head and eyes even more so, such that in the small space 
between his shoulders and brow, Bakewell’s body re-articulates his otherwise pure profile into a 
front-facing engagement with the viewer. Unlike the animals, whose artificially perfect 
silhouettes fully commit them to the canvass’s two dimensional plane, Bakewell’s body is flatly 
inside it while his face and eye’s project out beyond it. Here too color makes a difference, with 
Bakewell’s light face made even brighter by the contrast with his dark hair and black hat, and 
thereby distinguishing the part of him that engages with us as separate from that which connects 
his profile to the plane containing the incremental series of figures. In sum, Bakewell’s body 
exists smoothly within this incremental gradatio of repeated forms, at times blending fluently 
into it, yet Boultbee still ensures the eminent breeder can rise from and beyond it, engaging the 
viewer as the culminating figure that supervenes the context from which he emerges. Set against 
the gradually approaching middle-ground’s treeline, that then jumps thoroughly into the 
foreground, Bakewell’s gaze past that foreground and outside the canvass’s plane lets him 
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emerge naturally from within the landscape while simultaneously granting him a privileged 
position over and beyond it. Through his direct gazing connection with us, he becomes the 
climactic metonymic figure able to represent the incremental scene of closely associated 
agricultural entities. 
The visual art of breeders and their animals constantly struggled with those two, oft-times 
competing imperatives: to highlight nature’s great potential for development, while 
simultaneously glorifying those eminent breeders best able to cultivate it. Weaver’s and 
Boultbee’s formula, of depicting breeders as the final, climactic endpoint of visual 
incrementums--as characters that seem to emerge from and beyond the biological settings in 
which they appear--is an intricately fabricated and effective solution. It is also a figurative 
arrangement that seems to mirror the rhetorical combination of incrementum and metonymy that 
articulated Arthur Young’s early works on agricultural improvement. Like his travelogues, 
articles and narratives, here breeders are depicted as rising above and beyond through the very 
work of gradual agricultural development that they themselves advance, their supervenience 
made all the more reasonable and natural by its very incremental origins.  
Yet these visual rhetorics of breeding do not quite give breeders the same metonymic 
glorification that Young was willing to heap upon his favorite subjects. There is, in these 
paintings, none of the monumentalization that we saw in Young’s treatment of Lord Rockingham 
or Robert Bakewell, where real people are converted into utter symbols of agricultural 
improvement and progress. Boultbee’s portrait of Bakewell comes the closest, with the breeder 
elevated upon his horse like a monument on a pedestal, but Bakewell’s gazing look towards the 
viewer might make his presence more interpersonal than broadly cultural or symbolic. The 
breeders in these visual works are certainly glorified figures, and a degree of exaltation 
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surrounds them, but they remain people, as opposed to pure representations of agricultural 
effects. 
There are, however, at least two works that show agricultural breeding as a process 
culminating with the breeder as a metonymic idealization of cultural achievement, a figurative 
treatment equal to what we saw in Young’s corpus. George Garrard’s The Woburn 
Sheepshearing of 1804 (fig. 12) is one of these fascinating works, particularly because it displays 
an entire community of eminent breeders and agriculturalists gathered for what was then the 
foremost sheep fair in England. Originally organized by Francis Russell, 5th Duke of Bedford, 
the Sheepshearing’s goal was to create a vibrant annual market where the best breeders and 
owners could more effectively compare their animals’ values. The Sheepshearing was just one of 
Russell’s many efforts to improve livestock breeding and husbandry. Others included his work to 
found and administer the Smithfield Sheep and Cattle Society, a breeder’s club somewhat similar 
to Bakewell’s Dishley Ram Society, though different in its commitment to advancing a variety of 
breeds. Russell was the Society’s first president, Arthur Young its first secretary, and its first 
show was the 1799 Woburn Sheepshearing (Miller 74-75). The annual fair was also part of the 
5th Duke’s broader initiative to advocate for modern animal husbandry and agriculture, efforts 
that included vast improvements to his own estate and properties around Woburn, as well as 
political reforms he advanced as a member of parliament.  
Francis Russell died two years before the 1804 Sheepshearing depicted here. It was 
continued by Francis’s younger brother and heir, John Russell, 6th Duke of Bedford, whom 
Garrard paints on horseback at the canvass’s center, next to the monumental pillar. Yet even if 
this work gives the 6th Duke more attention than other assembled characters, Garrard’s painting 
is unique in the sheer number of eminent agriculturalists it depicts and celebrates. To that end, 
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Garrard created a legend that detailed the names and locations of each person on the canvas. 
What might appear an anonymous crowd is actually a very discernable group portrait of 
England’s leading agronomists, including some of the reformers, writers and breeders discussed 
in this dissertation (Arthur Young and Thomas Coke are both here) along with other famous 
improvers like Sir Joseph Banks and two important agricultural writers whom Darwin would 
later cite, Lord John Somerville (whom we will encounter again in Chapter 4) and William 
Marshall. The painting portrays numerous other military officers, scientists, parliamentarians and 
aristocrats (88 specific attendees in all), including the future King William IV. Some famous 
animals are also present, like the Durham Ox (center right), a gigantic bull bred by Bakewell’s 
close associate, George Colling. Bakewell’s own breed of sheep, the New Leicestershire, stands 
prominently at the lower left, as do other competing sheep breeds (Southdown, Welsh and 
Spanish) in the enclosure on the lower right.  
Clearly, then, this event was more than just a typical rural fair, and Garrard’s work is 
more than just typical agricultural painting. Indeed, what this piece shows is more the 
culmination of the cultural evolution that Arthur Young had begun figuring almost 50 years prior 
in his travelogues and novels: an agriculture that was increasingly becoming a pursuit for the 
great “gentlemen” of English society. Garrard’s painting emphasizes this importance of 
agriculture to the wealthy and powerful while simultaneously integrating it within a broader 
vision of English society. That second significance is as much an economic story as an 
agricultural one, for the fair shown here is not simply a venue to show prized sheep, but to 
determine which of the animals were the most valuable. The 5th and 6th Dukes offered awards 
for the best animals presented, and separate premiums were given by other participants for 
animals with specific traits (producing fine wool, for example) as well as for improved farm 
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implements and innovative cultivation methods. And, of course, bringing together so many 
improved breeds with wealthy landowners meant the Sheepshearing was a prime opportunity to 
buy and sell (“The Late Woburn Sheepshearing”). 
Yet for all the competition and capital at play here, Garrard goes to great lengths to depict 
a kind of amicable congeniality between participants. Small groups of men gather together in 
friendly conversation, while the group in the lower right corner assemble politely around a judge 
overseeing a shearing competition. Gone is the kind of acrimonious and accusatory competition 
we saw in the last chapter between Bakewell and his Lincolnshire competitor Charles Chaplin. 
Recall that the two men not only disagreed about which breed was best, but about how one might 
fairly make that judgment, with Bakewell refusing to show his animals alongside Chaplin’s for 
fear that the competition would be rigged in his competitors’ favor. In this painting, those 
problems are either surmounted or unacknowledged, but in any case they are not at all present, 
with the emphasis instead on the modern agricultural market’s propensity to integrate a 
harmonious political, economic, and scientific community.   
In that sense, this painting might not monumentalize the accomplishments of an 
individual breeder but, rather, the efforts of a whole class of improving, aristocratic farmers 
working to bring greater prosperity and civility to English society. Put more simply, there are 
elements in this painting that argue the fair is an effect of a Bakewellian “Cause,” a culture-wide 
accomplishment, rather than the work of a single forward thinking agriculturalist. Yet, there are 
different features that would suggest otherwise, principally the giant pillar which occupies the 
central, axial point around which the fair’s action gathers. Though it is a bit hard to make out in 
the reproduction shown here, a number of details (described more clearly in George Scharf’s 
catalogue description of the original) indicate the monument’s particular significance. Firstly, the 
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entire piece is, as Scharf points out, styled after Trajan’s Column, erected in Rome to 
memorialize Emperor Trajan’s military victories in ancient Dacia (present day Moldova and 
Romania), with Garrard’s version emulating the original’s distinctive helical line twisting up the 
pillar’s circumference from bottom to top. Importantly, on Trajan’s Column those twisting lines 
bracket a series of bas relief panels depicting the entire Dacian campaign, with the initial 
invasion at the bottom circling gradually up to the Emperor's final victories at the top. As such, 
the monument operates as powerful synthesis of incrementum and metonymy, referencing a 
contiguous series of repeated, gradually greater accomplishments that rise into a single symbol of 
their cumulative achievement. In Garrard’s more modern setting, the pillar gives the entire scene 
a similar sense of a long, hard-won, historic accomplishment, one deserving monumental 
memorialization.  
Garrard caps this monument with a model of a classic galley and the inscription 
“Commerce” running across the frieze just below the ship. Two more inscriptions mark the 
column’s pedestal: “Science” above the molding, and, at the base “Arts.” Scharf, in his catalog 
description of the original painting, also says that the name “Russell” is inscribed along the side 
of the column’s pedestal, suggesting Garrard intended this monument as a tribute to the 5th 
Duke’s lifelong campaign for agricultural improvement (Scharf 169-170). Apparently, that detail 
has faded with age, for it is no longer apparent in the contemporary reproductions we have 
available to us. Scharf saw the painting over 120 years ago, when its condition was likely better 
than it is now, as a number of other details in the work appear to have also faded. Additionally, if 
(as I think he did), Garrard intended the column to serve as monument to the 5th Duke’s 
agricultural accomplishments, this would explain why the artist positioned Francis’s heir 
alongside the pedestal, standing vigil, as it were, by the monument that attests to his deceased 
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brother’s continued presence in the scene. The monument’s central position, rising high above 
the drawn crowd, allows the departed 5th Duke to continue to function as the otherwise 
decentered market’s causal agency. He remains the central figure whose long efforts for 
agricultural progress have assembled the gathered multitudes into this flourishing fair, one in 
which nature, political power, and capital can all be profitably exchanged.  
Significantly, while the painting’s other details indicate Garrard’s desire to provide a 
historically accurate account of the 1804 gathering, the pillar was entirely the invention of the 
artist; it never existed at Woburn (Gravett). This suggests just how necessary Garrard felt it was 
to depict the fair’s accomplishment with a stylistic element recognizing the man who 
metonymized its achievement. Perhaps too, Garrard felt the painting’s multitude of eminent 
figures still required some sort of singular metonymy around which their variety of efforts could 
be made more synthetically represented. In ways suggested by Weaver’s painting of Coke and, 
more so, Boultbee’s portrait of Bakewell, Garrard’s work uses a metonymic articulation of an 
eminent breeder to provide an otherwise diffuse social phenomenon with a clear causal agency. 
Simultaneously, he integrates that metonym of monumental accomplishment with a sense of 
gradual development, with the classic pillar referencing Trajan’s long military campaign, and 
giving the entire scene a sense of historical proportion that lends more grandeur to Francis 
Russell’s achievement. 
Fortunately for Garrard, a fictive classical monument actually sits quite naturally in the 
scene’s real surroundings. The neo-classical exhibition hall on the left, with its columns and 
pediment, along with the similarly styled stable and chaffmill behind the monument (all these 
structures were at Woburn in 1804 and remain there to this day), lend the scene a similar sense of 
historic accomplishment. Like the monument, the exhibition hall also commemorates Russell’s 
   
124 
personal achievements, with an inscription across the gable reading, “Erected by Francis, Duke 
of Bedford, in 1801.” While these neoclassical touches might suggest a kind of backward 
looking nostalgia for an earlier period, the giant tree rising parallel to the column insures that the 
painting’s account of history runs linearly forward, with the 5th Duke’s efforts a process of long 
temporal realization that, in the present day, come to their great fruition. Like the use of trees we 
saw in the earlier works by Weaver and Boultbee, this one too provides a gradual sense of 
continuity and growth so that the otherwise remarkable accomplishments of the human subjects 
are made more reasonable and incrementally natural.  
Garrard’s painting suggests that, at least in the artist’s imagination, the eminent 
agriculturalists of this era deserved metonymic monumentalization, but that artistic inclination 
would have also taken into account his audience’s receptivity to such figurative emphasis. That 
Garrard could trust his viewers to accept a comparison between an English agricultural breeder 
and a conquering Roman emperor says a great deal. And, indeed, we have one last piece of 
evidence that his sense of figurative decorum was quite reasonable, for there is a real monument 
to Francis Russell and it partakes of many of the same tropes that Garrard articulated in his 
painting. Sir Richard’s Westmacott’s Monument to Francis Russell, Fifth Duke of Bedford was 
erected in 1809 (figs. 13, 14, 15, and 16), overlooking property Russell owned and developed in 
the Bloomsbury neighborhood of London. Despite Bedford’s successful and varied political 
career, Westmacott chose Bedford’s agricultural work as the monument’s central motif. Perhaps 
this was because England’s broad agricultural improvement was an agenda which could unite 
both Russell’s Whig allies and Tory opponents (Busco 88). Indeed, in the parliamentary eulogy 
which Whig leader Charles James Fox delivered in Russell’s memory, he makes a point of 
arguing that even if Bedford’s liberal politics generally placed him at odds with the majority of 
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his political peers, his strident efforts on behalf of agricultural improvement were a clear benefit 
to the entire nation (9-10).  
That unifyingly high opinion of the Duke’s agricultural work likely guided Westmacott’s 
composition of the Bloomsbury statue. The Duke is shown striding confidently forward, with his 
right hand atop a plough and his left hand holding ears of corn. Right below him is a crouching 
sheep, emblematic of the Duke’s efforts as a leading breeder (fig. 15). On the pedestal’s sides, 
two different bas relief panels show scenes of agricultural labor and harvest (fig. 16). Ringing the 
pedestal’s top are four classical putti, each representing one of the four seasons, with Fall 
holding an overflowing cornucopia (fig. 15).  
Like Garrard’s painting of the Woburn Sheepshearing, Westmacott’s statue blends 
contemporary and classical themes to give the Duke a greater sense of historical prominence. 
Indeed, reviewers present at the statue’s installation noted that Russell’s ducal robes and 
distinctive trousers were reminiscent of Roman togas and Phrygian leggings, and lent Russell the 
presence of “One of those illustrious statesmen of ancient Rome, whose time was divided 
between the labours of the Senate and those of their Sabine farms” (qtd in Busco 89). Yet (and 
again like Garrard’s painting), Westmacott integrates these historical tropes without making the 
statue a backwards looking piece of antiquarian fascination. Instead Russell’s striding pose and 
intensely forward gaze mark the piece as decidedly epideictic, articulating a figurative linkage 
that memorializes past achievement so as to indicate the nation’s future course. Surrounded by 
an assortment of agricultural images and motifs, Russell’s confident pose embodies all of 
English agriculture’s promise and the nation’s broader imperial potential. He becomes the 
metonym of England’s natural power, the one extrinsic entity who can stand for all the others 
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contiguously arrayed around him, simultaneously grounded in the native soil while able to look 
out and beyond the present horizon.  
Much like we saw in Arthur Young’s writing, metonymies such as Westmacott’s statue 
of Russell or Garrard’s fictive monument to him do not always require fully delineated 
incrementums to proceed and situate them. Similarly, as we saw in the earlier paintings of Coke 
and Bakewell, visual incrementums do not always resolve with a fully articulated metonym of an 
eminent breeder. Yet in both these cases each figurative articulation suggests and advances at 
least some elements of the other. Coke and Bakewell gaze over and beyond the scenes from 
which they gradually emerge. The incremental figuration around them naturalizes their otherwise 
outsized prominence and power, creating a natural context in which their supervening position 
becomes more rhetorically reasonable. With Garrard’s and Westmacott’s monumental treatments 
of Francis Russell, epitomizing a great figure seems to require a similarly incremental context, 
one in which the outsized prominence given an eminent breeder is shown as the outgrowth of a 
hard-won campaign or a long historical arc. In either case, what we see is a similar interplay 
between incrementum and metonymy, with one figure sometimes predominant, but always 
referencing the other.  
Additionally, these visual rhetorics of breeding and breeders confirm another figurative 
trend we saw articulating Arthur Young’s writing. Agricultural rhetoric could move quite easily 
from a discussion of a single breeder’s or farmer’s incremental development to a claim that that 
individual stood as a symbol for England’s broader national progress. Young does that a number 
of times when discussing eminent farmers like Rockingham, Coke and, most of all, Bakewell. 
Something similar is at work in the visual rhetoric considered in this chapter. Repeatedly we see 
the hard work of an individual breeder allowing them an influence beyond their provincial 
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setting. Men like Coke, Bakewell and Russell are articulated so as to have vision and influence 
beyond the more isolated contexts in which they emerge, and point the viewer towards the wider 
scope of agriculture’s national significance. Incrementum too, can articulate either a limited, 
contemporary change or a longer, epochal shift. In this regard, it seems that these visual 
depictions of breeding continued upon a trend that Arthur Young’s later rhetoric had begun to 
accomplish; taking the limited, contemporary work of individual breeders and expanding their 
accomplishments into narratives of wider scope and importance. The achievements that 
Bakewell, Coke and Russell instigated had immediate effects, but artists and audiences began to 
see them as assembling a grander narrative of cultural accomplishment.  
The Meaning Presence of Visual Difference 
Throughout this chapter I have intentionally avoided noting that, in addition to all the 
figures of incrementum and metonymy which these works compose, one could just as easily see 
them as more fundamentally animated by metaphor. It is clear, for instance, that Gerrard depicts 
the Woburn Sheepshearing like the successful culmination of a military campaign. Similarly, 
Westmacott shows Francis Russell as if he were a Roman emperor. Boultbee’s portrait position’s 
Robert Bakewell’s body to appear like a monument. In each of these instances the images 
painted certainly gain meaning from things that are not in the painting, but which the painting 
intentionally references and points our attention towards, thereby adding meaning to the work 
that it could not naturally otherwise have. 
Undoubtedly, then, these works have strong metaphorical components and elements in 
them which I have labeled metonymic are often only so meaningful because they are also 
simultaneously metaphorical. As an example of how that dual figurative potential works, let us 
look a bit more closely at the clearest metaphorical element in Gerrard’s Woburn Sheepshearing, 
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the monumental column. I argue that the column works as a metonymy because it draws together 
all of the scene’s otherwise contiguous entities (breeders, farmers, shepherds, landowners, 
aristocrats, horses, cows, bulls, sheep, fences, stables and landscapes) and provides that 
multitude with a single figure that can assemble them into a meaningful symbol of agricultural 
agency. The column is both contiguously amidst the scene and the element that most powerfully 
represents it. It allows us to see how a single figure, the departed 5th Duke, still functions as the 
cause for all the effects we see arrayed around the monument. Yet the only reason why the 
column can achieve that metonymic representation is because it simultaneously and 
metaphorically references other meanings beyond the scene. The column’s likeness with an 
ancient Roman monument allows us to see Georgian England as achieving a similar level of 
imperial grandeur and achievement. In this mode the depicted column is simply a metaphoric 
vehicle by which that sense of the Roman power is brought into a modern tenor in which 
imperial Rome has no literal place. Considered otherwise, we might instead interpret the column 
as a metaphor for the deceased 5th Duke, a lone figure standing over and above a scene in which 
he can no longer exist. In this formulation, the column is again a vehicle, offering meaning to the 
depicted tenor that can otherwise not naturally exist within the scene’s timeframe. Quintilian, in 
one of the earliest definitions of rhetorical metaphor, suggested that one of metaphor’s main 
functions was that it allowed language “to borrow what it does not naturally possess” (bk. 8, ch. 
6). As a visual metaphor, the column works similarly, allowing a dead Duke to attend an event 
beyond his natural life and the accomplishments of ancient Rome to animate a scene in the 
modern English countryside. Elements that are naturally beyond the scene are, via metaphor, 
brought to it.  
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Additionally, any psychoanalytic or feminist critic worth his or her salt would be quick 
(and correct) to point out the column operates as a clear metaphorical representation of phallic 
power. Indeed, all of these paintings, and much of the written rhetoric this dissertation considers, 
could very reasonably be read as constructing metaphorical environments in which men are 
shown to master natural fertility and libidinal desire. And, as we saw most clearly in Chapter 2, 
Arthur Young begins this genre of modern agricultural rhetoric as he is simultaneously 
composing fictive works like The Adventures of Emmera, which are precisely about the ability of 
a wandering Englishman to recompose his masculine agency through the fertility of a feminine 
other and the protected, enclosable landscape that she thereby offers. Clearly, one could gain as 
much from considering these works of art metaphorically as one could from a similarly 
wholesale consideration of the way gender and desire animate the entire project of English 
agricultural rhetoric (a point I will revisit at this dissertation’s conclusion). 
So clearly we have to be open to seeing metaphors if we want to fully understand works 
of art like these. Yet if we only look for metaphors--if we only look for the meaning that they 
draw from beyond the frame--I fear that we lose sight of how these works of art themselves 
generate meanings that are not entirely dependent on the exterior significance towards which 
their metaphoric vehicles direct us. That is no small loss, particularly for the rhetoric of science: 
if, as I want to argue in this dissertation, a positive notion of rhetoric’s epistemological and 
scientific value requires it to explain how such figures generate at least some meaning in ways 
not attributable to exterior signification, or to the authors who manifest their meaning, I do not 
see how an entirely metaphorical theory of language, art or rhetoric can provide that. We have to 
cultivate ways that attend to figurative articulations more internal to the works they animate, 
otherwise critics who see rhetoric (and scientific rhetoric specifically) as simply a meaning 
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vehicle for a metaphysically primary material tenor or an ontologically primary rhetor will win 
the argument. And they would be justified (albeit wrong) in doing so.  
What makes visual rhetoric such a useful medium for helping us see the meaningful 
structures of non-metaphorical figures is that it allows us to more easily perceive how contiguous 
relationships internal to compositions exist within the same space and time as the work of 
rhetoric through which they articulate. Let me explain that admittedly convoluted assertion by 
way of making a relative comparison between visual and linguistic rhetorics. I say “relative 
comparison” because I actually do not think there is ultimately an absolute difference between 
the expressive means of pictorial and linguistic media, but simply that our cultural bias towards 
perceiving language as more fundamentally referential and metaphorical (or, to use Jakobson’s 
term, paradigmatic) make it harder to see how other figurative devices (like incrementum and 
metonymy) articulate meanings internal to linguistic rhetoric.     
How can we, then, delineate this relative difference between linguistic and visual 
rhetoric? Firstly, linguistic rhetoric, barring some important exceptions, is assertively referential. 
A State of the Union speech, for example, does not avowedly attempt to embody a newly 
reformed nation, but instead to reference real reforms which, put in place beyond the space and 
time of the speech’s delivery, might create a reformed nation. The speech either references the 
union or attempts to represent the president's desire for changes to it, but in either case it seems 
beholden to things or acts beyond its performance. Even fictional texts, which attempt to signify 
worlds which do not actually exist, do not attempt to suggest that those worlds are instead 
located in the media in which the rhetoric is written. One does not often isolate the spatial 
arrangement of words on the page of a novel to therein find some pattern, shape, or structure that 
depicts the world as also composed by the referential meaning of that page’s language. Instead, 
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one imagines a real world which the fictional text references. Of course, the exceptions to this 
“rule” (again, I do not actually believe it is actually a rule) are affirmatively performative texts. 
As I noted earlier, E. E. Cummings’s poetry does precisely what most linguistic texts do not 
assertively do, using spatial arrangements of words and letters to generate meaning in ways other 
than language’s generally referential structure. Herman Melville’s Pierre does something 
similar, as does the typography of James Joyce’s Ulysses. Again, my point here is not to make an 
absolute distinction between linguistic, performative, oral, poetic, novelistic and pictorial 
rhetorics. I actually think that a good State of the Union speech might really embody and 
perform the world it attempts to create. One could make the argument that Lincoln’s Gettysburg 
Address (not a State of the Union speech, I know, but still within that same genre of epideictic 
American political rhetoric) performs the very linkage (through techniques of amplification or 
auxesis) between death and rebirth that its text also references. But that is not generally how we 
think of linguistic texts, how we perceive them (particularly the uninspiring ones), or how we 
imagine their invention. With linguistic media, and especially with forensic and deliberative 
rhetoric, we generally have a perceptual bias towards seeing them as primarily referential. That 
predominantly referential structure, in which the text is about events that exist beyond it, 
frequently predispose our analysis of them to metaphorical theories in which the text can 
articulate a meaning vehicle for an ontologically separate tenor. Metaphorical rhetoric is “about” 
the topic it describes (in the sense of “around” it and external to it) but not “amidst” those things.  
With pictorial and visual rhetorics, however, their more assertively mimetic presentations 
ask us a bit more forthrightly (a “bit” that may just be enough to jar our bias towards 
experiencing them referentially) to consider not just how they refer to real worlds beyond their 
performance, but also to consider them as partially constituting real physical arrangements in and 
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of themselves. In these cases, I think it is easier to perceive how the structural relations internal 
to a visual rhetorical performance generate at least some meaning that is irreducible to the 
referential dimension of metaphor. So, for instance, when we consider the arrangement of 
individuals and animals in Thomas Weaver’s painting of Thomas Coke inspecting his sheep (fig. 
10), the gradually increasing height of the figures from right to left, and the prominence of Coke 
above them all, gives the breeder a sense of power that is, in part, not reducible to a referential 
relationship beyond the canvas. Of course, we do often metaphorically associate height with 
power, so to a degree even this visual climax metaphorically references a cultural meaning 
beyond the canvas. But what the painting foregrounds is that we are only able to make that 
referential move because we experience an increasing extension of height as a real differential 
power in the exact same sense as it occurs in the painting’s figural articulation. The figure moves 
from our right to our left and the figure really differentiates, extends and articulates--becoming 
taller than it once was. It really is different. Then it finds its resolution in the metonymic climax, 
the lone man standing at the end who can control and therefore represent the internally 
differential series which has led towards him. But as a metonymy, as a figure of contiguity, Coke 
is not beyond the series with which he associates. Instead of the climactic figure being 
metaphorically like, but different to some other more really meaningful thing (say the cultural 
power which we associate with height), he himself stands for the climax’s real internal 
differentiation, beginning small and meek with the sheep, becoming taller and more empowered 
with the shepherds, and then, as a metonym, representing that visual difference as meaning. We 
go from the brute nature of the sheep, to the rudimentary agriculture of shepherds, to the more 
thoroughly mechanical management of the steward, to the informed, linguistic and scientific 
knowledge-power of Coke, with his supervising gaze and his pad and pen. All these different 
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stages are, by the figurative climax, made a single differential movement, legitimizing Coke’s 
knowledge-power as a natural outgrowth which he can then legitimately (by virtue of that 
intimate integration with the natural world) represent on his pad. It is by virtue of that single 
differential movement that Coke’s scientific power can, at the climax’s culmination, represent 
what he sees in terms that would otherwise appear to be only referential and metaphorical (the 
notes on the pad) but which have a referential-metaphorical legitimacy that partially depends 
upon their metonymic contiguity with what they actually represent. The notes on the pad are 
signs, but not signs of something separate from their own figuration. They are metonymic signs 
contiguous with the differentiating figure that they come to signify.  
Lessons for the Study of Visual Rhetoric 
Scholars of visual rhetoric have, for a long time, worked to articulate a very similar 
understanding of the way visual rhetoric draws our attention to the material meaning and 
presence that inheres within a rhetorical performance. Such efforts often also invoke the fact that 
visuality takes place within the real dimension of space, and that it slows down time by making 
particular visual configurations more durable, bringing a level of reality and evocativeness to 
their performances that we may not perceive in textual or oral performance (Propen 179; Blair 
51, 53; Hill 27-30). Charles Hill attributes this to the increased presence of visual arguments, 
arguing that they have a less representational and more direct connection to the subjects they 
depict (29). J. Anthony Blair argues something similar when he writes that “The advantage of 
visual arguments over print or spoken arguments lies in their evocative power” and attributes that 
evocativeness to visual rhetoric’s greater “sense of realism” (51). Yet these types of arguments 
for the material power of visual rhetoric suffer from many of the same epistemological problems 
that I described in my earlier critiques of completely metaphorical theories of scientific rhetoric. 
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If we identify visual rhetoric’s directness and realism as that which makes it so effectively 
persuasive, then we immediately concede that an even more direct and real mode of experience 
would be even more rhetorically effective. At least theoretically, the most rhetorically effective 
experience would be an utterly unmediated one--a totally direct encounter with the world’s real 
and unadulterated presence--and this then puts any kind of mediated rhetorical communication 
(be it oral, textual, visual or figurative) back in its subsidiary position relative to those utterly real 
types of direct experience.  
A more affirmatively rhetorical way to understanding visual rhetoric’s effectiveness is 
offered by Maureen Daly Goggin, who begins by critiquing the notion that the study of visual 
rhetoric must confine itself to non-textual elements. Rather, as Goggin points out, text also 
always takes on a particular visual arrangement, and rhetoricians can manipulate that 
arrangement beyond the standard left-to-right, top-to-bottom arrangement of words and 
sentences to produce more noticeable rhetorical effects (87-90). Furthermore, Goggin’s analysis 
may help us better clarify the specific visual affordance underlying what Hill and Blair more 
ambiguously described as “presence,” “evocativeness,” and “realism.” Goggin’s draws particular 
attention to the way early-modern embroidery used both textual and pictorial elements alongside 
one another to produce complex visual patterns that derived just as much meaning from those 
combined textual-pictorial arrangements as they did from the individual symbolic meanings of 
any one image or word (99-100). Following Goggin, we can say that what visual rhetoric does 
well is to highlight syntagmatic arrangement as a source of meaning that is produced through the 
relations of different components within the rhetorical performance. In Goggin’s analysis, for 
example, both pictures and text interact within the rhetorical performance of a single work of 
embroidery. Of course, arrangement also produces meaning in less visual mediums. Oral 
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performances also accrue great significance from their arrangement, but because visual 
performances allow a greater range of component parts, their arrangements can be more 
noticeable, both for audiences and for critics.   
Indeed, it is this internal arrangement of components that J. Anthony Blair repeatedly 
notes in his more general description of visual rhetoric’s evocativeness and presence. For 
example, Blair points to the famous “Daisy” presidential campaign advertisement8 as a typical 
example of how visual argument can rely upon the same types of enthymemic logics that 
characterize linguistic rhetoric. Yet he also notes that the ad relies heavily on a particular kind of 
figurative arrangement, the proximate juxtaposition of an innocent child alongside the violence 
of an atomic explosion (50). Indeed, watching the advertisement, one has to wonder if the 
majority of its rhetorical effect was produced by its implied logic (to cite Blair’s rendering of it: 
“Goldwater might, on something as arbitrary as a whim, launch a nuclear holocaust. Such a 
holocaust would cause unspeakable horror for everyone, including innocent children. Hence, it 
would endanger the national interest to elect Goldwater”(50)) or by the much more “evocative” 
(to use Blair’s term) effect of the advertisement’s internal figurative arrangement (“Peace Little 
Girl”).  
Other examples Blair analyzes can be similarly reconceived. For instance, he cites a 
classic Pepsi television commercial as a paradigmatic example of the type of evocativeness 
communicable through visual rhetoric. The commercial shows a pair of adorable, toddler-aged 
boys joyfully playing with a litter of equally adorable and playful puppies. As Blair describes it, 
such rhetoric is almost irresistible, evoking “involuntary reactions that must be consciously 
                                                
8 The “Daisy” advertisement was used by President Lyndon B. Johnson in his 1964 presidential campaign against 
Barry Goldwater. It featured a little girl counting while picking daisy petals, followed an ominous voice over 
counting down to an atomic explosion. The intent was to suggest Johnson’s opponent was reckless and would risk 
nuclear war.  
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countered by the recipient if their power is to be at all defused” (54). Whether or not that is true, 
Blair’s analysis misses the fact that this commercial is also articulated by a much more complex 
figural arrangement. For one thing, the commercial contains more scenes than the one Blair 
describes with the boys and puppies. It begins with a shot of an older man (perhaps a 
grandfather) challenging a young girl to a friendly foot race across a beach. Then, as they start 
running, the video overlays an image of a rotating, bubbling and glistening Pepsi bottle. For a 
few seconds, we see both the runners and the Pepsi bottle simultaneously. This pattern repeats 
throughout the commercial as we move from the beach scene to a sailboat, and then on to a 
grandmother’s backyard. Each scene has a different cast of characters but the repetition of the 
overlaid Pepsi bottle creates a sense of contiguity across those otherwise disconnected places and 
characters (Hummel). At least two figurative devices are at work here: repetition, obviously, but 
also metonymy, as the repeated invocation of the overlayed Pepsi bottle makes clear that it is the 
extrinsic entity that can stand the for all the other entities with which it is, via the overlay, 
contiguously associated. The effect may well be evocative, but it is, more rhetorically speaking, 
the evocative product of a particular figural arrangement within the dimension of the 
performance itself.  
Again, I think all forms of rhetorical expression have the potential for this kind of internal 
figural arrangement and articulation, it just seems to be that we have become so inured to 
considering the referential dimension of written texts and oral speeches that we frequently lose 
the ability to notice the performative way in which figural arrangements internal to their 
performances also articulate meaning.  
All of which is just to say that a work of art like Weaver’s agricultural paintings is as 
constituted by metonymic meaning as it is by metaphoric significance. Saying as much should 
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not really be such a radical assertion, since structuralist theories of communication have long 
argued that it precisely by these two axes of signification that meaning is constituted. Yet it is 
also interesting that, at least in the rhetoric of science, a general trend has been to focus on the 
metaphoric dimension of meaning. Why that happened is too complicated a subject to detail 
here, but I think it likely has something to do with a widespread belief that human language is 
the climax of creativity, over and above other forms of communication that simply can not create 
with the vitality of human discourse. From this perspective, it was the great asset of human 
communication that it need only refer metaphorically to this less vital real world, allowing it to 
produce meaning without that meaning being tied directly to the static referential sources which 
it represented.  
Here is where actor-network theory offers us a well-timed corrective. Bruno Latour has 
repeatedly argued against the notion of the mute objectivity of objects (as well as a purely 
referential subjective language), suggesting instead that those things we imagine as objects can 
instead demonstrate articulating practices which simultaneously co-produce both material bodies 
and symbolic meanings. A good example of this comes in Latour’s 1999 book Pandora’s Hope, 
in which Latour joins a group of soil scientists in the Brazilian outback. A critical tool in that 
expedition is the pedocomparator, an open box whose grid of small compartments 
simultaneously separates soil into objective samples and signals their sedimentary meaning (49-
53). As Joshua Prenosil has recently noted, Latour emphasizes that the pedocomparator is not a 
passive tool in that process (100-101, 105). For just as the scientist “loads his pedocomparator 
with the meaning of the piece of earth—he educes it [the earth], he articulates it,” Latour is also 
quick to grant the material equipment an articulating agency of its own. As the very scientist who 
loads it points out to Latour, “It is the pedocomparator that tells us when we have finished a 
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transect” (emphasis original; 51). Science, in Latour’s understanding, is this distinctly articulate 
network of material-semiotic hybrids, practices that leverage a co-production of bodies and 
meanings. If the pedocomparator only articulated one or the other (either bodies or meanings), it 
would not be scientifically articulate.  
I think we can profitably think of the visual rhetorics this chapter considers as articulating 
similarly. An image like Weaver’s painting of Coke or Boultbee’s painting of Bakewell both 
assembles objective bodies and, through that very incremental assemblage, affords the 
representation of their meaning. In Weaver’s painting of Coke, the incremental series of bodies 
shows Coke as their masterly organizing principle, an objective arrangement that legitimates 
Coke’s ability to author those same bodies’ meanings through the notes he takes on his note pad. 
Like Latour’s pedocomparator, Weaver’s Coke is a material-semiotic hybrid, simultaneously the 
breeder/producer of the animal bodies in front of him and the linguistic agency who represents 
those bodies in his notes. Boultbee’s painting of Bakewell does something similar. His position 
as the culmination of the incremental series of animals around him allows him to sit naturally 
amidst those bodies while also supervening them. That, combined with the fact that the center 
cow, the dog, and the horse all display the same body conformation attest to a single creative 
agency behind their breeding. Bakewell, though contiguous with those bodies, is also clearly 
their cause. At the same time, as Bakewell’s head turns out towards the audience, he becomes the 
one body able to also represent that very power to us. He both creates those objective bodies and 
represents their act of creation. 
If the question this dissertation asks is how modern breeding articulates, then the answer 
which these works of art provide is pretty clear: climactically. As we are about to see in Chapter 
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4, a very similar climactic combination of incrementum and metonymy likewise articulates the 
manuals on breeding which Darwin read during his research for the Origin.  
Figures 
 
Fig. 1. Thomas Weaver, A Brindled Shorthorn Cow, Bred at Calke, 1831.  
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Fig. 2. George Garrard, A Durham Ox, 1804. 
 
 
Fig. 3. John Boultbee, The Durham Ox, 1802. 
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Fig. 4. John Boultbee, The Bull Patriot, 1809. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Thomas Weaver, The Dunearn Ox, 1812-1818. 
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Fig. 6. William Henry Davis, Prize Sheep, 1838. 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Thomas Weaver, Mr. Stanier and Herdsman with Hereford Heifer, 1820. 
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Fig. 8, John West Giles, Mr. Jonas Webb, of Babraham, and His Three Rams, 1842. 
 
 
 
Fig. 9. John E. Fernely, Sir John Palmer on His Favourite Mare with His Shepherd, John Green, 
and His Prize Leicester Longwool Sheep, 1823.  
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Fig. 10. C. Weaver, Thomas William Coke, 1st Earl of Leicester, and His Southdown Sheep, c. 
1815. Study after an original painting by Thomas Weaver. 
 
 
Fig. 11. John Boultbee, Robert Bakewell, c. 1788-1791. 
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Fig. 12. George Garrard, The Woburn Sheepshearing in 1804, c. 1805. 
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Figs. 13 and 14. Sir Richard Westmacott, Monument to Francis Russell, Fifth Duke of Bedford, 
erected 1809. 
 
Figs. 15 and 16. Sir Richard Westmacott, Monument to Francis Russell, Fifth Duke of Bedford 
(details), erected 1809. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE AGRICULTURAL FIGURES OF DARWIN’S EVOLUTIONARY 
RHETORIC9 
 
Introduction 
 
Few works of science have been more thoroughly studied by rhetoricians than Charles 
Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, to the point where we have a fairly full accounting of the 
persuasive resources with which Darwin composed his “one long argument” (Autobiography 
140). John Angus Campbell did comprehensive work in this regard, demonstrating that part of 
Darwin’s genius was an ability to integrate a variety of rhetorical traditions into a coherent 
argument for a radically new science (“Why Was Darwin Believed?” 236). Among these 
rhetorical influences were the gradualism of Charles Lyell’s uniformitarian geology and the 
teleological language of William Paley’s natural theology. Also critical was a Newtonian logos 
of causality and a Lamarckian emphasis on environmental pressures in evolutionary processes 
(“Why Was Darwin Believed?” 207, 233; “Darwin and the Origin” 5-8). Then, of course, there 
were the rhetorical debts that Darwin openly acknowledged in the Origin, such as his adoption of 
Thomas Malthus’s theory about the inherent pressures within expanding populations (Origin 5, 
63). 
There is another rhetorical resource upon which Darwin depended, a resource that has yet 
to be fully appreciated and is critical to understanding the invention of his science. Darwin was 
intensely interested in agricultural writings, particularly those that described the improvement of 
                                                
9 An earlier version of this chapter previously appeared as an article in the Quarterly Journal of Speech. The original 
citation is as follows: Abeles, Oren. “The Agricultural Figures of Darwin’s Evolutionary Rhetoric.” Quarterly 
Journal of Speech, vol. 2, no. 1, 2016, pp. 41-61. 
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agricultural livestock and domesticated animals by selective breeding. As a biologist 
investigating the ways animal morphology could develop and evolve, Darwin believed that 
studying how breeders practiced the “artificial selection” of domesticated animals might allow 
him (and later his audience) to understand the similar effects of natural selection upon wild 
species. This early interest in breeding and breeders persisted well beyond Darwin’s initial 
research and became essential to the rhetorical case he made in The Origin of Species. Indeed, as 
John Angus Campbell and David Depew have each argued, the causal logic of Darwin’s 
argument in the Origin rests not so much on experimental data, but on the metaphorical parallel 
Darwin draws between the way breeders selectively reproduce desirable stock animals and the 
similar way harsh natural environments selectively reproduce the fitter members of a species (On 
the Way 3-4; “Rhetoric of the Origin” 252). This comparison takes up the better part of the 
Origin’s first and fourth chapters and is central to Darwin’s theoretical framework. 
That so important a scientific theory rests on this metaphorical logic would seem 
significant enough to generate considerable interest amongst scholars of scientific rhetoric and 
communication. That this has not happened (beyond the treatments Campbell and Depew have 
given it) may well be a symptom of the fact that the centrality of metaphor in scientific invention 
and popularization has so dominated contemporary conversations that critics may imagine little 
to be gained from renewed attention to its role at the heart of still another scientific theory 
(Fahnestock 4-6). More generally speaking, metaphorical analysis has been so prevalent in the 
broader field of rhetoric (and allied disciplines like linguistics) that the notion of Darwin’s theory 
as articulated by that master of the “master tropes” may simply have been taken for granted after 
the early attention it received (Fahnestock 4; Genette 103-26). I think, however, that the 
evaluation of Darwin’s figurative language should not conclude so quickly, particularly because, 
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as I will make clear in this chapter’s first half, there is more to it than previous metaphorical 
analyses have identified, to the point where thinking about it as either a conceptual or an 
illustrative metaphor misses the vital logical work it accomplishes in Darwin’s rhetoric. Nor do I 
think (as philosophers of science, as opposed to rhetoricians, have tended to argue) that calling it 
an analogy entirely grasps its rhetorical function either. Instead, I will argue that breeding 
operates as a rhetorical metonymy, allowing Darwin to substitute the breeder’s condensed and 
simplified causal agency as an explanation for nature’s more diffuse and complex selective 
effects. With that reevaluation of Darwin’s figurative language completed, we will be in a better 
position (in this chapter’s second half) to identify the way Darwin owes debts to agricultural 
rhetorics similar to those discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. As we will see, the specific agricultural 
works Darwin consulted evidence climactic articulations similar to those we saw in english 
agricultural art and Arthur Young’s genre originating rhetoric. Darwin uses that climactic 
articulation in his own way, but this chapter aims to show that agricultural rhetoric’s particular 
combination of incrementum and metonymy provided him with a critical way to articulate nature 
and culture together. Metaphor has proven a particularly adept rubric for the analysis of scientific 
explanations but, as I discuss below, it is has been less effective in capturing the linguistic 
resources that help scientists articulate causal mechanisms. This chapter (indeed this whole 
dissertation) offers one way to think about a wider range of figurative devices that scientists, like 
Darwin, use to compose causal arguments.  
The Metonymy of the Breeder 
On the face of it, there are good reasons to think that Darwin’s use of breeding is simply 
either conceptual or an illustrative metaphor. After all, this was how Darwin himself described it, 
largely after he was criticized by a number of scientific contemporaries who thought his 
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language of “selection” was too metaphorical for a work of science. Darwin’s metaphor smacked 
of a purposive and personified Nature, critics argued, and this language might suggest he was 
thinking along the teleological lines of earlier natural theologies, which used biological 
adaptations as evidence of God’s omnipotent design (Sloan 266). In later editions of the Origin, 
Darwin himself acknowledged the validity of such criticism, but he insisted that there was 
nothing wrong with scientists using such descriptive metaphors for the purposes of illustration. 
The metaphor, he argued, just simplified for the sake of “brevity” the “aggregate action and 
product of many natural laws” which, the greater intricacies of natural selection notwithstanding, 
produced the same outcome by the same means as the far simpler process of breeding (Origin, 
5th ed. 93). Natural selection, in Darwin’s account, might operate at a much higher level of 
complexity and frequency than agricultural breeding, but the metaphorical logic equating them 
was not invalidated by the simple expansion or contraction of scale it took to move from one side 
of the comparison (agricultural breeding) to the other (natural selection). 
So agricultural tropes clearly played a role in Darwin’s argument, yet that is not the same 
thing as saying agricultural rhetoric helped Darwin invent his theory. Indeed, Darwin’s use of an 
agricultural metaphor would seem to say less about the influential role of agricultural rhetoric 
and more about the conceptual utility of metaphorical comparison. And, as Depew has rightly 
pointed out, Darwin’s view of the metaphor as a merely illustrative device, and not a logical 
component of scientific argument, is the least substantive depiction of that figure’s rhetorical 
utility (“Evolutionary” 383). If we take Darwin’s analysis of his metaphorical language as the 
final word on the topic, there really would not seem to be reason to look further into it.   
This may also explain why the majority of scholarly interest in Darwin’s agricultural 
language has come from historians as opposed to rhetoricians. That is not to say such studies by 
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Robert Young, Harriet Ritvo, James Secord, Bert Theunissin, Mark Largent and L.T. Evans are 
of no use to rhetoricians, for they show how deeply enmeshed Darwin was in the world of 
breeders and how thoroughly he depended on their knowledge during the Origin’s composition 
(Young 95-98; Ritvo 40-42; Secord 162-186; Theunissin 179-212; Largent 14-29; Evans 113-
140). Most critically for my purposes, Michael Ruse’s insightful study of Darwin’s personal 
copies of agricultural texts demonstrates that early in his research for the Origin, Darwin found 
agricultural writers making comparisons between breeding and evolution similar to those he 
would go on to make some years later in the Origin (339-350). Ruse’s work is significant 
because it counters the previously established narrative on the crystallizing moments in Darwin’s 
inventional process. Scholars studying that process had generally followed the timeline Darwin 
himself suggested some years later in his autobiography; he wrote that it was reading Thomas 
Malthus’s Essay on the Principle of Population in the fall of 1838 that gave him the critical 
“theory by which to work” (Autobiography 120; Herbert 212-213; Limoges 74). Yet Ruse shows 
that Darwin encountered agricultural writers making overt comparisons between livestock 
breeding and a hypothetical theory of natural selection some months before he read Malthus, and 
that he heavily annotated these comparisons with comments suggesting they had conceptual 
promise (344-347). Other scholars, like Jonathan Hodge and Janet Browne, have disputed the 
precise date at which Darwin assimilated these influences, but as Mark Largent has summarized, 
there is good reason for a consensus account in which the comparison between breeding and 
evolution plays a significant role in Darwin’s longer term effort to conceptualize natural 
selection (Hodge 242-244; Browne 389; Largent 27-28). 
Yet even this consensus account says less about the role of agricultural rhetoric in 
particular and more about the inventional power of comparison, offering little reason to look 
   
152 
deeper into any potential rhetorical or figurative debts Darwin might owe to English agricultural 
rhetoric. I think, however, leaving Darwin’s agricultural metaphor unstudied is problematic –
although not because, as metaphor, it has something more to tell us. The problem is not that the 
metaphor has been too studied but that it is not, strictly speaking, a metaphor. Instead, Darwin’s 
figurative use of artificial selection is better understood as a metonymy; for while Darwin 
himself describes it as a metaphor, if we look carefully at the way he uses it—and particularly at 
the way it helps him invent and articulate his argument—it becomes clear that its rhetorical 
power derives not from its comparative function as a metaphor but, rather, from its simplifying 
and condensing function as a metonymy. 
To understand how breeding operates as a metonymy of evolution, we have to revisit the 
way Darwin thinks about the relationship between artificial and natural selection. In Darwin’s 
argument the connection between the two is one of quantitative difference:  breeding takes all the 
numerous selective pressures that come to bear on an organism in a natural environment and 
condenses these multiple points of selection down to a single selective agency, the human 
breeder, whose choices alone determine which variety of a species will reproduce and which will 
not. This is a difference in scale and number, which is to say, a difference of quantity and not one 
of quality, kind or nature. A metaphor, however, describes one thing by comparing it with a 
qualitatively or naturally different other thing, and uses that fundamental difference to throw a 
singular similarity between the two components into a more striking relief. Quintilian, in one of 
the earliest definitions of rhetorical metaphor, drew attention to precisely this propensity to 
compare fundamentally distinct entities. A metaphor’s great artfulness, he asserted, derives from 
this tendency to “increase the copiousness of a language by allowing it to borrow what it does 
not naturally possess” (my emphasis; bk. 8 chpt. 6). Contemporary scholars continue to 
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emphasize that this qualitative difference between the two components of a metaphor is critical 
to the figure’s structure (Chandler 126-129). Indeed, as semiotician Daniel Chandler argues, it is 
the pairing of two elements that we generally conceive as fundamentally unrelated that gives the 
better metaphors their particular cognitive power (127, 129). 
Thus the question to be asked is whether Darwin imagined breeding and evolution to be 
naturally and qualitatively different processes or quantitatively different iterations of a naturally 
identical mechanism. Darwin, it is true, compared the vastly more numerous and longer-acting 
agencies of natural selection with the refined, simplified and condensed processes of artificial 
selection, but that is a comparison of scale and number, which is to say of quantity, not quality or 
nature. As he made clear repeatedly in the Origin, Darwin did not consider breeding and 
evolution to be naturally different either in their effects or in their mechanisms. Indeed, much of 
his argument’s logic is based upon the premise that the “varieties” produced by artificial 
selection are only incrementally different from what he called “incipient species,” and these also 
only incrementally distinct from “true species” (Variation, vol. 1, 4-5; Origin 51-52). This was 
why, both in the Origin and in his later work devoted to breeding, The Variation of Animals and 
Plants Under Domestication, he had to explain away the supposed natural, qualitative distinction 
that other naturalists typically used to distinguish between domesticated breeds of the same 
animal (two breeds of horse, for example), which can successfully interbreed to produce fertile 
offspring, and closely allied but distinct species (a horse and a zebra, by contrast), which do not 
always interbreed and generally produce sterile offspring when they do (Variation, vol. 2, 410-
411; Origin 276-278). Darwin argued (mistakenly, it turns out) that the sterility of offspring bred 
between closely allied species was due primarily to each species’s longer adjustment to different 
habitats–a kind of biological acclimatization that he believed exerted a disproportionate impact 
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on a species’s reproductive capacity (Origin, 248, 254; Variation, vol. 2 411). What seems like a 
fundamental, natural distinction, according to Darwin, is really just a conditional one, with the 
reproduction of allied species more beholden to environmental conditions than the interbreeding 
of domesticated varieties. There is, Darwin argued, “no fundamental distinction between species 
and varieties” (Origin 278). 
So we find, in both Origin and Variation Under Domestication, Darwin writing long, 
sweeping passages in which he bridges what would otherwise be a conceptual gap between the 
agricultural accomplishments of breeding and the evolutionary productions of natural selection. 
Here is a typical example from Variation Under Domestication, volume 2, which Darwin begins 
by referring to the Origin: 
In accordance with the views maintained by me in this work and elsewhere, not only the various domestic 
races, but the most distinct genera and orders within the same great class,—for instance, whales, mice, 
birds, and fishes—are all the descendants of one common progenitor, and we must admit that the whole 
vast amount of difference between these forms of life has primarily arisen from simple variability. To 
consider the subject under this point of view is enough to strike one dumb with amazement. But our 
amazement ought to be lessened when we reflect that beings, almost infinite in number, during an almost 
infinite lapse of time, have often had their whole organisation rendered in some degree plastic, and that 
each slight modification of structure which was in any way beneficial under excessively complex 
conditions of life, will have been preserved, whilst each which was in any way injurious will have been 
rigorously destroyed. And the long-continued accumulation of beneficial variations will infallibly lead to 
structures as diversified, as beautifully adapted for various purposes, and as excellently co-ordinated, as we 
see in the animals and plants all around us. Hence I have spoken of selection as the paramount power, 
whether applied by man to the formation of domestic breeds, or by nature to the production of species. 
(429-430) 
 
In essence, Darwin posits the selective breeding of domestic varieties and the natural 
selection of wild species as processes of qualitative identity, positioned at opposite ends of 
an incremental continuum of more or less numerous and durative selective agencies. 
That Darwin makes this incremental distinction between nature and culture has not 
completely escaped scholarly notice. Indeed, it is precisely this incremental articulation of his 
argument that Jeanne Fahnestock writes about in her study of Darwin’s style. Fahnestock finds 
the classical figure incrementum at the heart of the Origin’s argument, allowing Darwin to bring 
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his audience, by gradual steps, from the eminently clear and immediate selective pressures that a 
breeder exerts on his stock, to the more complex and protracted selective pressures to which 
environments subject species (113-115). And though Fahnestock tends to believe Darwin used 
selective breeding as more of a metaphorical or analogical comparison (she mentions both), her 
description of breeding as the endpoint of that incremental argument suggests that its stylistic 
and theoretical potential might be something more. In that same vein, I see Darwin’s use of 
artificial section as a simplified, condensed metonymic epitome, one he uses much as most 
modern biological sciences traditionally use controlled and condensed experimental examples to 
identify the underlying causal mechanisms driving natural systems. This is, in fact, how Darwin 
himself explicitly portrays his pairing of artificial and natural selection. As he describes in 
Variation Under Domestication, volume 1, human breeders are simply taking control and 
advantage of the very same inherent variability that allows natural selection to make a longer-
term difference in species evolution. Agricultural breeding, he argues, can be seen as a large 
scale “experiment” on the evolutionary potential of natural processes: 
No doubt man selects varying individuals, sows their seeds, and again selects their varying offspring. But 
the initial variation on which man works, and without which he can do nothing, is caused by slight changes 
in the conditions of life, which must often have occurred under nature. Man, therefore, may be said to have 
been trying an experiment on a gigantic scale; and it is an experiment which nature during the long lapse of 
time has incessantly tried. Hence it follows that the principles of domestication are important for us. (3) 
 
That Darwin’s rhetoric uses breeders in precisely this way—as the metonymic cause for 
nature’s more numerous and complex effects—is, actually, quite a traditional use of metonymy. 
Again our source is Quintilian, who in his Institutes of Oratory demonstrates metonymy with the 
example of using individual Greek gods as the poetic representatives for the complex natural 
phenomena they command. One might identify a terrible ocean gale as “Poseidon's wrath,” and 
thereby depict the whole storm -- the rain, the waves, the wind -- by the deity that is its causal 
agent (bk. 8 chpt. 6.). Of course, the breeders Darwin cites in the Origin are neither deities nor 
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otherwise supernaturally powerful agents (that would make them metaphors). Yet Quintilian's 
point in exemplifying metonymy via the deities of nature was less to suggest the divine control 
of nature and more to indicate the way a metonymic figure substitutes a single commanding 
entity for the more complex phenomena that it controls. Metonymy, he writes, “indicates an 
invention, by the inventor, or a thing possessed, by the possessor” (bk. 8 chpt. 6). Contemporary 
linguistics continues to emphasize this substitutional function of metonymy, in which the figure 
draws a broader assemblage down to the single element of the wider complex that most 
thoroughly accounts for its instantiation (Chandler 130). George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, for 
example, draw specific attention to the way metonymies allow writers to identify a more 
complicated set of actions by their primary instigating agency (e.g. “Nixon bombed Hanoi”) 
(Lakoff and Johnson 39).  
It is this operation of causal reduction, peculiar to metonymy, which, I think, also 
explains why alternative accounts of Darwin’s argument as analogical, as opposed to 
metaphorical, also do not entirely grasp the specific rhetorical construction of his logos 
(“Analogical Inference” 509; Sterrett 165; Gildenhuys 609). That is not to say that calling 
Darwin’s comparative depiction of breeding and natural selection an analogy is entirely 
unreasonable, for, like metonymy, it is also the function of an analogical argument that it 
correlates two naturally associable phenomena and attributes what is known about the one to 
what is as yet unknown about the other. But in Darwin’s case this is simply not all his figurative 
rhetoric accomplishes: his metonymic figure of selection substitutes the breeder’s far simpler and 
clearer causal agency to delineate an identical but far more complex natural process. 
This is clearly visible in the way Darwin repeatedly attributes great efficacy and power to 
modern English breeders, highlighting the level of control they achieve over nature and their 
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distinct capacity to evolve a species’s morphology toward more profitable traits. As we saw 
earlier (in Chapters 2 and 3), Darwin argues that the best breeders are “gifted” with a remarkable 
talent for selective discernment, allowing them to develop a species’s characteristics in any way 
they please. Like an unremittingly harsh natural environment, the best breeders perceive even the 
smallest imperfections in an animal’s structure and act with constant attention, across many 
generations, to improve the overall morphology of their animals (Origin 30-31). That Darwin so 
valorized these best “eminent” breeders and begins his argument by adopting their principles as 
his own may seem surprising for those more used to thinking of the Origin’s cultural 
engagements along theological, philosophical, or economic axes. Certainly these play a role, yet 
the degree to which Darwin’s argument grounds itself in the metonymic agency of the animal 
breeder has remained a significantly overlooked component of his argument. 
It is also a particularly crucial component of his argument. Indeed, for Darwin, the 
breeder’s status as the unilateral agent of biological change was essential to his logos, 
particularly since the Newtonian philosophy of science with which he worked (and the standard 
to which his scientific peers would hold him accountable) compelled theorists to identify a “vera 
causa” or a true cause of the phenomena they were attempting to discern (“Why Was Darwin 
Believed?” 207). He encountered this Newtonian causal epistemology largely through the work 
of John Herschel, one of Victorian England’s most prominent natural philosophers and whom 
Darwin described as among the greatest influences on his development as a scientist (His Life 
Told 23). In Herschel’s definition of causal scientific accounts, the identified cause could never 
just metaphorically explain a natural process; it had to actually show itself “adequate” to produce 
the effects perceived (“Arguments in the Origin” 124). So for Darwin to make his theory live up 
to the status of a Herschelian vera causa, selection had to actually be shown to operate as a 
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causal force “adequate” in and of itself to produce the evolutionary effects for which he wanted 
to account (“Arguments in the Origin” 124; Hull 180-181).  
We need to be careful here because the term “adequate” has a very specific purpose and 
meaning in Western philosophy, dating back at least to St. Thomas Aquinas's epistemological 
concept of “adequatio,” and embracing a meaning somewhat broader than our contemporary 
notion of it as a synonym for “sufficient.” (Wolenski 13). Aquinas, for example, uses the term 
“adaequatio” to describe truth as a relation of “correspondence” between two ontologically 
independent and external entities: mind and object (David). Marian David makes this point by 
showing that Aquinas described truth as “the equation [adaequatio] of thing and intellect,” which 
he then further clarified as the condition of an intellectual judgement (or mind) which “conforms 
to the external reality,” or object (my emphasis). Adequacy performs a very similar function in 
the Herschelian vera causa epistemology to which Darwin subscribed, requiring causes to be 
external to and independent of their effects. As David Hull puts it, “the vera causa ideal 
traditionally specified that both the existence and the adequacy of a cause should be evidenced 
independently of the facts explained (my emphasis; 180-181). Not only did a “true cause” need 
to be adequate in the sense of providing a sufficient explanation, it also needed to be 
ontologically distinct from its effects.   
In Darwin’s theory, the breeder functions as that true cause, a singular, identifiable and 
external agency, a cause independent of the animals he effects, taking advantage of natural 
variations and thereby instigating a process of actual evolution. This metonymic figuration of the 
argument allowed Darwin to argue that all of nature’s selective complexity could be theoretically 
and practically reduced into a single observable cause. Indeed, he himself states that this is how 
his metonym functions, writing in the Origin’s fourth chapter: 
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Slow though the process of selection may be, if feeble man can do much by his powers of artificial 
selection, I can see no limit to the amount of change, to the beauty and infinite complexity of the 
coadaptations between all organic beings, one with another and with their physical conditions of life, which 
may be effected in the long course of time by nature's power of selection. (109) 
 
This passage, in particular, offers a revealing look at the logical problems that the breeder 
metonym helped Darwin solve, for while natural selection is certainly a more all-encompassing 
causal force than man’s “feeble” “powers,” its utter ubiquity throughout nature also makes 
discerning its varied efficacies an interpretive challenge. As Darwin alludes here, the adaptation 
of one organism to the others around it can simultaneously become a new selective pressure for 
those organisms to which the first one was adapting. This is why he connects this description of 
“coadaptation” with the more uniformly selective “physical conditions of life.” That Darwin’s 
theory draws our attention to this hermeneutic-like circularity of cause and effect has rightfully 
been one of its greatest attributes. But for him to satisfy the more mechanistic “adequacy” of the 
Herschelian vera causa he also needed to be able to connect this seemingly complex 
phenomenon with an identical process in which the actants were reduced to empirically 
discernable and independent causes and effects (“Origin of the Origin” 7). This is what the 
metonymy of breeding offers. By using a human agency as metonymic for such a diffuse and 
apparently entangled natural relationship, Darwin’s argument does more than argue from an 
analogical identity or metaphorical similarity; it substitutes a clear and independent causal agent 
as the metonymic embodiment of an otherwise complex natural process. That Darwin positions 
the breeder as this metonym of natural selection was much more than what Richard Richards 
describes as an illustrative device to help less-expert readers understand evolution’s complexity 
(96). It may certainly do that, but it is first and foremost a crucial logical element, one that 
condenses evolution’s process to a clear selective force independent of its effects, thus 
comporting with the reigning Newtonian causal epistemology. 
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Once we see Darwin’s metonymic deployment of the breeder as the powerful rhetorical 
figure that it is, his style becomes a bit more complicated and, I want to argue, more revealing. 
This is particularly true if we look at his use of metonymy alongside that other critical figurative 
device animating his work, incrementum. Again, as Fahnestock shows so well, this figure is 
perfectly suited for taking readers from one side of a continuum to the other via a series of 
gradual steps, which is precisely why Darwin uses it to bridge the traditional distinction between 
agricultural and natural selection (Fahnestock 115). This happens in the Origin’s first chapter 
where Darwin posits a series of historical stages in which human breeders gradually assume 
more of the selective agency originally affected by harsh environments (36-39). Primitive 
agriculture occupies the earliest of these steps, with pastoral communities not fully supporting 
the sustenance and survival of the proximate, semi-domesticated animals useful to them; yet still, 
in times of famine or other extreme circumstances, going to some effort to ensure that the best 
animals were not allowed to die off. In such instances, human selective agencies overlapped with 
the varied agencies of natural selection, with semi-wild, semi-domesticated animals developing 
traits that would profit both their own independent chances for survival and those of the humans 
aiding their reproduction. This would be the least active form of a broader intermediary step that 
Darwin calls “unconscious selection” (36). The next step would be a more advanced form of 
selection with breeders beginning to understand that they could direct the morphology of breeds 
by differential reproduction, though only possessing a partial mastery of the breeding skills 
required for full control of the evolutionary process. Darwin calls this step “partly unconscious 
and partly methodical selection” (39). Finally, there is the fully conscious, fully methodical 
selection practiced by modern agriculturalists. This was, as Darwin noted, a fairly recent 
historical accomplishment, “reduced to methodical practice for scarcely more than three-quarters 
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of a century,” but its principles had gradually emerged and developed out of a longue durée of 
cultural development (33). It is true that Darwin generally runs this series in reverse 
chronological order, starting with modern breeding and tracing artificial selection back to its 
primitive origins, yet a great utility of such an incremental narrative is that a rhetor can move 
from one side of the figure to the other in whichever cognitive direction his or her argument 
requires (Fahnestock 92). For Darwin, who was cultivating a causal mechanism that could 
explain an otherwise complex natural phenomena, it made sense to begin with the certainty of 
the breeder’s metonymic agency and to work backwards in time towards its as yet unexplained 
natural effects. As we will see shortly, the agricultural writers Darwin cited were describing the 
exact same timeline (producing a kind of figurative arrangement similar to what we saw, in 
Chapter 3, with the more historic works of agricultural art), but in their arguments the goal was 
the reverse: to naturalize the great agency of English breeders by showing it as the telos of a long 
process of cultural development. Consequently, they started with nature and from there adduced 
culture. 
In both cases, however, it is the “eminent breeder” who remains as the representative 
metonymy of its historical precedents, standing at the end of a long process of cultural 
development. That these historical steps would culminate with this single, powerful agent 
embodying the otherwise complex forces that lead up to it is, actually, not surprising. As 
Fahnestock also noted, incrementum frequently leads rhetors to introduce such a culminating 
final step, a kind of crescendo for the series from which it emerges. In such instances, style 
manuals often refer to it as a climax, which is, as I want to argue, the particular way it operates in 
the agricultural rhetoric from which Darwin draws (92-93). On the Origin of Species is logically 
grounded in that narrative of agricultural climax, with Darwin’s combination of tropes 
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articulating an incremental alignment of nature and culture, in which the modern breeder’s 
metonymic power stands as a summation of the selective efficacies that culturally precede it. 
Reconceptualizing how this combination of incrementum and metonymy helps Darwin 
articulate his arguments can also help us think more clearly about how he figuratively articulates 
his argument. For while metaphor is certainly not a figurative device ascribable to one particular 
rhetorical tradition, this distinctive combination of incrementum and metonymy is much more 
peculiar and, therefore, more particularly attributable. As I have suggested throughout this 
dissertation, it has roots in a rhetorical tradition of English agricultural writing that had, for the 
half century or so leading up to the period of Darwin’s evolutionary research, worked to figure 
English animal husbandry specifically, and English agriculture more generally, as having 
reached a climax of cultural progress and scientific improvement. In the remainder of this 
chapter, we will confine our analysis to some of the agricultural texts Darwin consulted during 
his early research on evolution. As we will see, these show evidence of a very similar figural 
arrangement. 
Agricultural Climax in Darwin’s Breeding Manuals 
One of the great benefits of studying Darwin’s compositional process for the Origin is 
that he left behind fairly good records of what he read, when he read it, and how much it 
informed his thinking. A number of primary sources are useful in this regard, including his 
“Transmutation Notebooks,” where he worked through his initial ideas on evolution, and a 
bibliographic notebook containing two lists, of “Books to Read” and “Books Read.” Also helpful 
are the books from Darwin’s personal library, which contain his notes and marginalia and 
indicate the way specific authors spurred his thinking. 
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These sources all suggest that Darwin’s engagement with theories of agricultural 
breeding, and the texts, manuals, and treatises that described its practices, date back to the 
earliest stages of his evolution research. Moreover, these works make explicit links between 
agricultural breeding and speculative theories of natural evolution (“Darwin and Artificial 
Selection” 344-349). Again, Ruse’s essay has shown this comprehensively, pointing particularly 
to Darwin’s reading of two breeding texts sometime between February and July of 1838, quite 
early in his research on evolution and before he read Malthus (350). These texts, as Ruse points 
out, make overt comparisons between theories of breeding and hypothetical explanations for 
evolutionary change. I would add, however, that Ruse, like many other scholars before and after, 
makes the understandable mistake of imagining that Darwin’s early research in agricultural texts 
led him to develop a merely analogical comparison between natural selection and agricultural 
breeding. Since Ruse misses the metonymic role breeders play in Darwin’s logic, he also does 
not draw attention to the way the earlier agricultural writers Darwin read were also thinking 
about nature and agriculture as naturally identical processes positioned along an incremental 
continuum of cultural progress. 
If, instead of looking for analogical or metaphorical comparisons between nature and 
agriculture, we look for texts in which incrementum and metonymy gradually reduce seemingly 
complex natural processes to the clear and controlled actions of human agencies, we find that not 
only were there earlier agricultural writers thinking along just such lines, but that Darwin found 
these lines of argument particularly compelling. In this regard, five of Darwin’s sources on 
artificial selection are important. The first two are a pair of short pamphlets on breeding, one by 
John Wilkinson titled Remarks on the Improvement of Cattle (1820) and another by Sir John 
Saunders Sebright titled The Art of Improving the Breeds of Domestic Animals (1809). I treat 
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these two texts together, partially because Wilkinson wrote his work in direct response to and 
agreement with Sebright’s manual, and also because Darwin (as we will see shortly) saw clear 
similarities between the two. 
The other texts I will consider are two books on livestock husbandry by the veterinarian 
William Youatt, the similarly titled Cattle: Their Breeds, Management and Diseases (1834) and 
Sheep: Their Breeds Management and Diseases (1837), as well as a more general agricultural 
manual by John Southey Somerville titled Facts and Observations Relative to Sheep, Wool, 
Ploughs and Oxen (1809). The books by Youatt were in Darwin’s library during his evolution 
research, although it is not entirely clear when Darwin first read them. His list of “Books Read” 
suggests he consulted Cattle in 1840 and Sheep in 1841, but he also mentions wanting to read 
them as early as the summer of 1838 and he makes explicit reference to Youatt’s writing (though 
not on agriculture) as early as September of that year (Books Read 7v, 11v; Transmutation 
Notebook D 179; Orang Utans 1). It is also likely Darwin picked up these books on multiple 
occasions throughout his compositional process, as the pages in his personal copies of Youatt’s 
books bear a variety of markings, in lead pencil, colored pencil, and ink, suggesting a number of 
readings with different implements in hand10. In any case, we know for certain that Darwin held 
Youatt’s work in the highest opinion, for he wrote in an 1859 letter to his friend and colleague 
Thomas Huxley that Youatt’s books on animal husbandry were, taken together, “far better” and 
had “more practical authority” than those by any other individual author (emphasis original; Life 
                                                
10 Throughout this chapter I refer to marginalia in Darwin’s personal copies of breeding manuals, which are mostly 
held by Cambridge University’s library. Many, along with Darwin’s marginalia in them, are viewable online 
through the Biodiversity Heritage Library (http://www.biodiversitylibrary.org/collection/darwinlibrary). I cite 
Darwin’s marginalia by referring to the pages of the books on which specific notes appear in his personal copies. 
The pamphlets by Sebright and Wilkinson are not part of the online collection, though Darwin’s copies of them are 
preserved at Cambridge. Ruse’s essay “Charles Darwin and Artificial Selection” has good descriptions of their 
marginalia, and I cite them by referencing Ruse’s discussion of the notes Darwin makes. 
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and Letters 75). Somerville’s text came to Darwin’s attention somewhat later in his composition 
process, in May of 1844, but his prominent citation of Somerville’s work in both the Origin and 
Variation Under Domestication suggests this work was particularly helpful to his conception of 
the breeder’s power and control (Books Read 14v). 
It makes sense, however, to begin with Wilkinson’s comparatively small pamphlet, as 
Darwin certainly read this text during the earliest period of his evolution research. It is a rather 
humble work, only 71 small pages in length, and generally just catalogs some best practices, but 
in the first few passages Wilkinson allows himself to speculate more broadly on whether the 
different breeds of cattle originally descended from a single bovine ancestor. He argues that they 
likely did, and he goes on to offer an incremental account in which, first, different varieties of 
cattle naturally evolved and, second, these different varieties were then slowly developed further 
by early cattle breeders. Next, he argues, later breeders made selection a more methodical 
practice until the original process, which was originally an entirely natural phenomenon, became 
a completely agricultural mechanism. Because the entire passage exhibits an incremental 
arrangement that connects its varied parts, it is worth citing at length: 
Whether the different breeds with which we are now acquainted, descended originally from one 
common stock, the Wild Bison, is a question, I think, hard to be determined. Of this, however, we may be 
assured, from the very nature of the case, that the distinct breeds at first, if more than one, could have been 
by no means numerous; so that the great variety which we behold at present, is owing to food, to climate, or 
to other collateral and accidental circumstances. And perhaps of all the causes contributing to this 
multiplicity, none would be more effectual, than the hidden springs of nature itself. For though we perceive 
that there is a strong tendency, for like to produce like, as it is usually termed; yet he that is at all 
conversant with nature, must perceive also, that there is a certain tendency to change. And this law of 
nature would soon be assisted by man, who is ever fond of novelty; and delights in diversity, even for its 
own sake. 
Thus then, we have seen, that distinct breeds might readily be formed by the joint efforts of nature 
and of art; nor will it be more difficult to perceive how they might afterwards be improved. 
That all would be capable of improvement is too obvious to need discussion. For no one can behold any 
breed whatever in its more natural and less improved state, without perceiving a great variety in the shapes 
of individuals, their different degrees of tendency to feeding, or certain other remarkable properties, which 
might give to some a decided superiority over the rest. These, therefore, must be selected from the whole 
herd; and as you yourself, Sir, have remarked, the male and female be properly matched. When we come to 
their progeny, some will probably be worse, some equal to, and some even better, than the parents 
themselves. The worst must unquestionably be rejected, while the rest, and especially the best of these, are 
carefully to be preserved for future stock. And thus by a judicious selection of male and female, and 
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discarding everything that is refuse, we must continue to proceed. And by such procedure, animals have at 
length been produced, so different from the generality of the stock from whence they were originally taken, 
that none but such as are well acquainted with these matters, could have any idea, that there existed 
between them the least afiinity. The distinction indeed between some, and their own particular variety, has 
scarcely been less, than the distinction between that variety and the whole species. The longer also these 
perfections have been continued, the more stability will they have acquired, and the more will they partake 
of nature itself (my emphasis; 2-5). 
 
In his personal copy of the pamphlet, Darwin put quotation marks around the last 
sentence and scored two vertical lines next to it in the margins (cited in “Charles Darwin and 
Artificial Selection” 347). His quotation marks suggest that he might have considered excerpting 
that portion of Wilkinson’s text in his own work later on, for we will see he did just that with 
another passage that crystallized his thinking. Ultimately he did not use that final sentence in the 
Origin, but that Darwin found it distinctly impressive is not surprising because Wilkinson, 
writing that breeds begin to “partake of nature itself,” is arguing the very qualitative identity 
between species and breeds that Darwin’s own metonymic argument would eventually depend 
upon. 
Additionally, here Darwin encounters an early form of his own later line of reasoning that 
moves readers incrementally from the obscure, “hidden springs of nature” that drive evolutionary 
processes in the wild to the clearly perceptible changes made by human agents in agricultural 
breeding. Between these two extremes lies a series of developmental steps in which breeds 
gradually acquire the same type of morphological distinctiveness that marks natural species. 
Wilkinson’s text arrives at the science of breeding by showing it as a qualitatively similar 
outgrowth of fundamentally natural tendencies, which modern agriculture slowly raises to a level 
of refined systematicity. Contemporary agriculture, in Wilkinson’s schema, occupies the final 
step of an incremental process in which nature is gradually brought under the clear and 
discernable control of human breeders, acting (just like natural selection) with careful, constant 
attention to the development of their herd across many generations. 
   
167 
It might well be objected, however, that Wilkinson’s rather mysterious description of the 
“hidden springs of nature” would simply have been too obscure for Darwin to connect that 
“certain tendency to change” with the selective efficacy that the breeder assumes at the 
culmination of Wilkinson’s description. Yet in encountering Wilkinson’s account Darwin’s 
reading would likely have been informed by the earlier text to which Wilkinson’s is a direct 
response, Sir John Saunders Sebright’s The Art of Improving the Breeds of Domestic Animals. As 
Ruse noted in his discussion of Darwin’s copy of this pamphlet, in Sebright’s work there is an 
explicit connection drawn between selection in nature and selection in breeding, and it comes in 
a passage that Darwin noted with a long line down the margin: 
Many causes combine to prevent animals, in a state of nature, from degenerating…. 
The greatest number of females will, of course, fall to the share of the most vigorous males; and 
the strongest individuals of both sexes, by driving away the weakest, will enjoy the best food, and the most 
favourable situation, for themselves and for their offspring. 
A severe winter, or a scarcity of food, by destroying the weak and the unhealthy, has all the good 
effects of the most skillful selection. In cold and barren countries, no animals can live to the age of maturity 
but those who have strong constitutions; the weak and unhealthy do not live to propagate their 
infirmities…. (my emphasis; 15) 
  
Beneath that passage, Darwin added the following marginalia: 
In plants man presents mixtures, varies conditions and destroys, the unfavorable kind—could he do this last 
effectively and keep on the same exact conditions for many generations he would make species, which 
would be infertile with other species.— (cited in “Darwin and Artificial Selection” 347)  
 
As Ruse noted in his treatment of these texts, it is not entirely clear that Sebright is 
thinking about the development of new species (Sebright is more so describing the healthy 
maintenance of an existing species), but Darwin’s reaction shows that he at least was starting to 
see how a theory of selection might allow one to conceptualize a theory of natural speciation 
(“Darwin and Artificial Selection” 348). 
That Darwin also thought about Sebright’s account as being of a similar mind with 
Wilkinson’s seems likely, for he wrote explicitly about the authors’ parallel findings on the same 
page of his Transmutation Notebook C. That passage also contains a particularly telling pair of 
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notes (which I have emphasized in italics) in which Darwin draws the connection between the 
“art of making varieties” and a nascent articulation of natural selection’s mechanisms: 
Sir J. Sebright pamphlet most important showing effects of peculiarities being long in blood.** 
thinks difficulty in crossing race—bad effects of incestuous intercourse. — excellent observations of sickly 
offspring being cut off so that not propagated by nature. — Whole art of making varieties may be inferred 
from facts stated. 
** Fully supported by Mr. Wilkinson,—milking hereditary, developement of important organ (see 
mark on pages),—crosses of diff: breeds succeed, yet seems to grant that difficult & other go back to either 
parent. (133)  
 
Even if Wilkinson’s rather obscure depiction of the similarities between the breeds 
formed by domestication and the species formed by “hidden springs of nature” left a lot to 
Darwin’s imagination, he also had Sebright’s more explicit account to fill in the gaps. That, at 
least to some degree, appears to be what he does in this notebook entry, equating Sebright’s 
“excellent observations” about nature’s constant selective efficacy with the “Whole art of 
making varieties.” He also appears to have seen both writers supporting the important corollary 
idea that divergent breeds might at some point become infertile with one another, noting that 
Sebright “thinks difficulty in crossing race” and Wilkinson thinks “crosses of diff; breeds 
succeed, yet seem to grant that difficult & other go back to either parent.” This could well have 
encouraged Darwin’s later incremental distinction between breeding and speciation. In a number 
of ways, these two texts were helping Darwin to envision the figural logic he could use to equate 
selection in agricultural with selection in nature. 
This qualitative identity that both Wilkinson and Sebright find between natural 
evolutionary tendencies and the controlled development of agricultural breeds is critical, even if 
neither author goes on to speculate very deeply as to how evolution actually produces new 
species in the wild. Nor does either explicitly posit the breeder as a metonym of natural selection, 
even if their rhetoric suggests the reasonableness of such a figurative rendering. It is likely, then, 
that the combined figurations of Wilkinson’s and Sebright’s works offered Darwin an early 
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articulation for the more developed agricultural incrementum he would articulate in the Origin, 
one that demonstrates its figurative, conceptual and logical potential without fully fleshing out all 
the details Darwin would require to make a metonymic condensation linking evolution and 
breeding. 
Other agricultural writers likely aided Darwin’s development of that more fully realized 
configuration, including, as I indicated above, the veterinarian William Youatt. Youatt’s two 
books are especially significant because he devotes repeated and extended attention to the 
historical development of different domesticated breeds, tracing, in much the same way Darwin 
did in the Origin and Variation Under Domestication, their incremental development from wild 
species to agricultural commodities. In one telling example from his book on sheep, Youatt 
paints a picture very similar to that given by Wilkinson, in which the varied effects of a 
fluctuating natural environment are gradually superseded by human agents and controlled 
agriculture. Of particular interest to Youatt is the way early shepherds might incrementally take 
advantage of the natural changes that cause sheep to develop more woolly coats, with farmers 
gradually adjusting their agriculture so as to best accentuate the sheep’s natural tendencies. He 
speculates about this development in a section titled “The Gradual Change from Hair to Wool.” 
Again, I quote it at length because the passage demonstrates an incremental arrangement which 
is best appreciated in its entirety: 
The observation of the occasional admixture of wool and hair, and the experience of the superior 
utility and value of the wool, would probably induce the early shepherds to take serious note of the 
circumstances that seemed to influence the proportionate quantity of these substances. It would soon be 
evident that climate and temperature had much to do with this. The Argali has been known in Russia from 
time immemorial, and regarded by many persons as the origin of the various breeds of domesticated sheep. 
In summer its coat consists of short hair, sleek, and resembling that of a deer; but in winter it is made up of 
wool mixed with hair, and concealing at its roots a fine woolly down. 
It is probable, that a change, bearing much resemblance to this, would take place in the primitive 
flocks, corresponding with the change of seasons. 
This would naturally suggest the conclusion, that the nature of the coat of the sheep was in some 
measure dependent on the external temperature; and, that if Providence did not temper the wind to the 
shorn lamb, it at least suited the defence to the hardship which was to be endured in winter, and the 
oppressive heat that was to be avoided in summer. Hence probably would follow the experiment, whether, 
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by sheltering from the inclemency of the one season, and the sultriness of the other, a more uniform, and 
useful, and valuable fleece might not be procured; or, if no direct experiments were instituted, the continual 
change of pasture which was rendered necessary by the nature of the country and the numerousness of the 
flocks, and the direction in which the wanderings of the shepherds were performed, from the south to the 
north until the midst of summer, and from the north to the south until mid-winter, would tend, in some 
measure, to produce this desired change and improvement in the fleece. 
The working of another agent might not escape attention. Both the quantity and the kind of 
nutriment—the condition in which the sheep are kept—have, as will be seen in a thousand instances, much 
influence in determining the character of the fleece, and in this respect among others. 
Wherever these hairy sheep are now found, the management of that animal is in a most disgraceful 
state; and among the cultivated sheep, and those who are the especial subjects of this work—the British 
sheep—the remains of this ancient hairy covering exist, to any very great extent, among those alone that are 
comparatively neglected or abandoned. (my emphasis; 59-60)  
 
Here Youatt suggests that early breeders gradually brought a natural tendency into 
systematic cultivation, producing modern breeds of sheep that took the best advantage of the 
natural predispositions that were present in the species before domestication. However, the 
process Youatt describes here is not actually equivalent to natural selection. The breeders in this 
example are not gradually taking the place of the selective pressures produced by harsh 
environments but, rather, incrementally augmenting and aiding the natural morphological 
changes that fluctuating environments produce within each single generation of living animals. 
Youatt’s rendering of evolutionary change is, at least in this example, closer to Jean Baptiste 
Lamarck’s theory of evolution by acquired characteristics than it is the eventual theory of natural 
selection Darwin articulates in the Origin. His example lends itself to the kind of incremental 
linkage between nature and culture that Darwin would later use to such great effect, but it does 
so without making selection the defining characteristic of that continuum of gradual 
acculturation. 
Yet Youatt does not confine his incremental account of the development of wool to that 
single mechanism alone. Instead he follows it up in the next paragraph with an account that 
Darwin underscored and noted heavily, this time introducing the breeder as a selective agency 
whose efficacy rises above and beyond the power that mere environmental changes might 
produce. Youatt writes: 
   
171 
These causes, however, would operate only to a limited extent; a more powerful principle would, at a very 
early period of sheep-husbandry, be called into action—that which enables the agriculturist not only to 
modify the character of his flock, but to change it altogether—the magician's wand, by means of which he 
may summon into life whatever form and mould he pleases—the principle of selection—the fact, that “like 
will produce like.” The early shepherd would therefore select for breeding those animals in which the 
quantity of hair was smaller than usual, and that of wool correspondingly increased—in which the wool not 
only afforded warmth in winter, but was becoming a permanent covering; and by steady adherence to this, 
the character of the fleece would be gradually yet essentially changed. There was a selection, from time to 
time, of those animals to breed from which bore most wool, until ultimately a breed has been obtained, 
bearing wool only, or nearly so. (my emphasis; 60)  
 
While Youatt distinguishes this practice of selective breeding from the earlier 
environmental and agricultural causes he describes, he also positions it as the final step on that 
same continuum of increasingly powerful agencies affecting the development of wool. 
Additionally, Youatt’s account of selection’s earliest instances echoes Wilkinson’s, with early 
breeders beginning to capitalize on morphological changes that nature was already affecting. 
These early breeders, Youatt speculates, would have chosen to breed those animals that were 
already naturally developing wool as a more permanent covering, and not simply as a seasonal 
change. His account also gives selection its own incremental history of development, beginning 
with early efforts that progress with time and lead up to the present day “until ultimately a breed 
has been obtained, bearing wool only, or nearly so.” 
But the most significant component of this description is not the way Youatt links 
breeding to an incremental history of gradually more controlled cultivation, but the way he 
epitomizes the capable breeder as the all-powerful agent of the evolutionary process. Equating 
that selective efficacy with a kind of magic, he offer his readers, and Darwin among them, an 
account of livestock husbandry that elevates breeders to a level of supreme control over 
biological change. By condensing all of breeding’s efficacy down to the single agency of a 
breeder who may “summon into life whatever form or mold he pleases,” Youatt provides the 
exact metonymy of selection’s mechanism that Darwin would later use to elucidate his theory. 
Indeed, Darwin clearly liked Youatt’s figure of a human agent commanding all of nature’s 
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evolutionary powers, for he bracketed that sentence with quotation marks and, this time, went on 
to excerpt it in the Origin. Here is how it appears there, coming as part of Darwin’s explication 
of artificial selection in the first chapter: 
We cannot suppose that all the breeds were suddenly produced as perfect and as useful as we now 
see them; indeed, in several cases, we know that this has not been their history. The key is man's power of 
accumulative selection: nature gives successive variations; man adds them up in certain directions useful to 
him. In this sense he may be said to make for himself useful breeds. 
The great power of this principle of selection is not hypothetical. It is certain that several of our 
eminent breeders have, even within a single lifetime, modified to a large extent some breeds of cattle and 
sheep. In order fully to realise what they have done, it is almost necessary to read several of the many 
treatises devoted to this subject, and to inspect the animals. Breeders habitually speak of an animal's 
organisation as something quite plastic, which they can model almost as they please. If I had space I could 
quote numerous passages to this effect from highly competent authorities. Youatt, who was probably better 
acquainted with the works of agriculturalists than almost any other individual, and who was himself a very 
good judge of an animal, speaks of the principle of selection as “that which enables the agriculturist, not 
only to modify the character of his flock, but to change it altogether. It is the magician's wand, by means of 
which he may summon into life whatever form and mould he pleases.” (my emphasis; 30-32)  
 
Here we see many of the essential elements of Youatt’s earlier account of breeding’s 
historical development combined: the idea that agriculture would gradually improve upon a 
process nature had already set into motion; that the initial work of such husbandry would be slow 
and imperfect; that gradually such efforts would rise to the perfection achieved by the breeders in 
modern England, with their expertise allowing them to evolve breeds in any way they saw fit. 
Additionally, since Darwin would have already been familiar with Wilkinson’s more 
qualitatively consistent account, he would have been able to overlay that more consistent 
narrative on top of Youatt’s version. He could then complete this more systematic incremental 
history with Youatt’s more climactic logic, emphasizing the modern breeder’s singular power 
and control over an otherwise complex evolutionary process. Between Youatt’s and Wilkinson’s 
similar lines of incremental argument, Darwin had the figurative account he would need to make 
the breeder’s selection a metonymic cause of the natural dynamic he was trying to delineate. 
From the moment he read Youatt’s Sheep, Darwin appears to have been struck by the specific 
language with which Youatt describes the breeder’s evolutionary power, for, in addition to 
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putting the “magician’s wand” sentence in quotation marks, he also noted on a separate sheet of 
endnotes that that same page contained a “Splendid sentence on selection” (“Supplementary”). 
While it is possible this note refers to any one of the sentences on that page (60) Youatt’s manual 
on sheep, there is only one sentence around which Darwin scribbled in quotation marks. It is the 
sentence where Youatt says the breeder can “summon into life whatever form and mould he 
pleases.” 
We can begin to perceive how Darwin saw agricultural breeding as having found, in 
practice, the very principles of biological selection that he wanted to elucidate in theory. That 
becomes distinctly clear when we consider his response to another of Youatt’s manuals, the 1834 
book on Cattle. Again, the most significant marginalia Darwin makes in his copy comes in a 
section devoted to theories of breeding. This note actually responds to Youatt’s quotation of 
another agricultural writer, cited only as “the Rev. H. Berry,” who outlines in concise prose the 
fundamental techniques of selective breeding. Berry describes how England's pioneering 
breeders gradually systematized their selective practices, producing the vastly improved animals 
that came to dominate modern livestock husbandry. He makes particular mention of Georgian 
England’s most famous cattle and sheep breeder, Robert Bakewell, who, as we have seen, was 
frequently credited for developing the selective methods Darwin thought operated as a corollary 
to natural selection. And as we will see shortly, Bakewell was also a paradigmatic breeder in 
Darwin’s imagination. Darwin scored two lines and an “X” alongside Berry’s description of 
Bakewell’s innovations, and writes a telling note in the margin: “As this simple principle only 
lately discovered even in most valuable practice, no wonder not discovered, as theory of 
Species” (522). It seems, then, that at this point in his research, Darwin has come to the 
conclusion that he can develop a full-fledged science using, in part, breeding’s practical 
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accomplishments. Indeed, there is the suggestion in his comments that, since selection’s basic 
principles had only recently been systematically clarified, he could be among the first to use that 
agricultural accomplishment as the foundation for a broader science. 
Darwin encountered a similar picture of modern breeders in Lord John Southey 
Somerville’s 1809 manual Facts and Observations Relative to Sheep, Wool, Ploughs and Oxen. 
It was the first chapter of this book on sheep rearing which seems to have interested Darwin the 
most, and one sentence in particular that he thought important enough to quote multiple times. It 
comes early in the text, as Somerville begins by outlining how England’s basic climate and soil 
have made it, historically speaking, more naturally suited to fine, short-woolled sheep. He goes 
on to point out, however, that the last thirty years have shown breeders powerful enough to 
supplant those natural constraints and develop successful long-woolled varieties. It culminates 
with breeders as the singular agents of their breed’s development beyond nature’s selective 
pressures: 
Every practical man, looking over the map of England, who has given himself time to study the 
properties of its soil and climate, will admit, that one half of the kingdom at least, is by nature appropriated 
to the short-woolled, fine-grained breed. He might with safety admit much more than half; for it at length 
appears that our climate, from the most northern parts to the most southern, can grow wool of the finest 
possible quality. Taking into consideration the upland pastures, the light convertible tillage, the loamy soils, 
and mountainous districts of the kingdom, such a proportion should be admitted to be moderate and just. 
But notwithstanding the great importance of short-woolled sheep to the nation; the whole attention, both of 
farmers and breeders, has for these thirty years past, been absorbed in carrying to a degree of perfection 
hardly credible, the heavy, long-woolled sheep; such as the Lincoln, Cotswould, Romney Marsh, and New 
Leicester, but more particularly the last. 
To such extreme perfection has the frame of this animal been carried, that one is lost in 
admiration at the skill and good fortune of those who worked out such an alteration. It should seem, as if 
they chalked out, on a wall, a form, perfect in itself, and then given it existence. (my emphasis; 2-3) 
 
If this last sentence sounds similar to Youatt’s line about breeders seemingly waving 
magic wands, that, apparently, is also how Darwin heard it, for he includes it in the Origin right 
after his quotation of Youatt’s line, writing, 
Youatt, who was probably better acquainted with the works of agriculturalists than almost any other 
individual, and who was himself a very good judge of an animal, speaks of the principle of selection as 
"that which enables the agriculturist, not only to modify the character of his flock, but to change it 
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altogether. It is the magician's wand, by means of which he may summon into life whatever form and 
mould he pleases." Lord Somerville, speaking of what breeders have done for sheep, says:—“It would seem 
as if they had chalked out upon a wall a form perfect in itself, and then had given it existence.” (my 
emphasis; 31) 
 
Similar to the accounts offered by both Youatt and Willkinson, in Somerville’s we also begin 
with a less sophisticated agriculture, in which the natural conditions largely determine the type of 
animals kept. As breeding becomes more effective, those natural efficacies are replaced by 
human agencies, to the point at which breeders emerge as the sole cause of their animal’s 
morphology. 
We should note, however, that Somerville’s use of the plural “breeders” as opposed to a 
single “breeder” might suggest that this passage would not quite have offered Darwin precisely 
the kind of causal reduction and condensation his metonymic argument required. Again, the 
value of that figurative logic is that it draws multiple points of selection down to a single agent, 
not a plural class of similar agencies. To some degree this may well be the case, yet if we look at 
how Darwin himself interpolates this passage into his own writing, we find him making precisely 
that last cognitive step towards the singular agency of a single breeder. We can see this best in 
the way he quotes this same line in Variation Under Domestication, with slightly different 
phrasing, perhaps from a different edition of the Somerville’s book. There he writes, “Lord 
Somerville, in speaking of the marvellous improvement of the New Leicester sheep, effected by 
Bakewell and his successors, says, ‘It would seem as if they had first drawn a perfect form, and 
then given it life’” (195). It is interesting that Darwin inserts Bakewell’s name here, for though 
public depictions credited him with innovating the New Leicester breed, Somerville never 
mentions him specifically in this passage. Apparently, then, Darwin had specific individuals in 
mind when he read Somerville’s description of “breeders.” And while Darwin does go on to 
mention Bakewell’s plural “successors,” he had, one page previous, named some of these men as 
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well, with great specificity, integrating a list some of England’s modern agricultural luminaries 
alongside an excerpt of the same Youatt passage he had cited previously in the Origin: 
What man has effected within recent times in England by methodical selection is clearly shown by our 
exhibitions of improved quadrupeds and fancy birds. With respect to cattle, sheep, and pigs, we owe their 
great improvement to a long series of well-known names—Bakewell, Colling, Ellman, Bates, Jonas Webb, 
Lords Leicester and Western, Fisher Hobbs, and others. Agricultural writers are unanimous on the power 
of selection: any number of statements to this effect could be quoted; a few will suffice. Youatt, a sagacious 
and experienced observer, writes, the principle of selection is “that which enables the agriculturist, not only 
to modify the character of his flock, but to change it altogether.” (194)  
 
Even when Darwin speaks of “breeders,” it is clear he has particular individual agents in 
mind—the “eminent breeders” and agricultural innovators of late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century England, who had taken control of nature’s seemingly opaque and complex processes 
and arrived at the point where they could change their animals “altogether.” 
It is important to point out that in all of these passages and in Darwin’s responses to 
them, nowhere do we see the mechanisms of selective breeding depicted as distinct from or 
metaphorical for the principles that would later delineate Darwin’s theory of natural selection. 
Rather, the sense one gets is that Darwin encountered an agricultural narrative in which breeding 
had only recently reached the point where this “experiment on a gigantic scale” could fully refine 
the causal principles of what he believed was a naturally identical evolutionary mechanism. That 
incremental connection between nature and culture likely has some of it roots in his reading of 
Wilkinson’s text, where he found an account that showed the gradual development of 
increasingly systematized agricultural breeding, and grounded its fundamental mechanisms in 
the qualitatively similar process of natural evolution. Then, in Youatt’s and Somerville’s works, 
he found a clear model of the modern breeder as the metonymic representation of nature’s 
selective efficacy, the climax of that long process of agricultural improvement. 
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The Broader Articulation of Figural Logics 
Darwin saw England’s eminent breeders as having found, in practice, the principle he 
wanted to identify in theory: that the selective reproduction of breeds and species could take the 
beneficial variations within a particular animal and disseminate those traits more widely within a 
population. As I hope I have shown, he was not alone in thinking along these lines. There were a 
number of prominent agricultural writers making similar arguments, though in their case the goal 
was not to articulate a new concept of nature. These experts in animal husbandry were more 
interested in describing the great accomplishments of English farming as marking a historical 
zenith of cultural development. While animal husbandry may seem a peculiar vehicle for that 
kind of triumphalist narrative, we should bear in mind that this period witnessed a great surge in 
England’s agricultural productivity, and the modernization of animal breeding was a significant 
part of that important development (Overton 12-14). In Darwin’s era, the “eminent breeders” like 
Robert Bakewell were public figures, representative of England’s broader progress as an 
emerging modern economy (On the Husbandry 3-17). 
For Darwin, however, these texts were less significant for their historical relevance than 
they were for the logical leverage that the breeder metonym offered his argument. Nature’s 
evolutionary productions, as he famously put it in the Origin’s conclusion, appear inherently 
“entangled” (489). As a scientist steeped in the Newtonian vera causa, he needed to offer his 
colleagues a clearer causal account, one in which the cause could “adequately” account for its 
effect. The breeder metonym accomplishes that in the Origin, substituting nature’s apparently 
complex operations for an agency that is naturally identical, if quantitatively reduced and 
causally clear. 
   
178 
As I acknowledged earlier, Darwin was mistaken in equating these two agencies and it 
may well be the case that current evolutionary theory is still struggling under the burden of that 
false equivalency. That could be particularly true for biologists trying to extend evolutionary 
theory beyond the more linear paradigm constructed by contemporary adaptationists’ 
appropriation of Darwinian natural selection. Biologists like Richard Lewontin, John Odling-
Smee, Kevin Laland and Marcus Feldman have argued for years that there is a more 
fundamentally complex relationship between environments and genotypes (one in which 
selection’s causal efficacy simply can not be unilaterally delineated) and that the current iteration 
of adaptationist neo-Darwinism makes it difficult to theorize evolution as a multi-lateral, 
complex interplay of selection and variation (Lewontin 100-105; Odling-Smee et al. 16-19). I 
suspect that the adaptationists’ more unilateral model of selective efficacy, which Lewontin and 
his allies criticize, has some rhetorical roots in the causal reduction which Darwin’s metonymy 
afforded, offering a way to reduce a seemingly complex and entangled process to suit a more 
linear paradigm of cause and effect. In this sense, the rhetorical analysis I have offered above 
may be of help to scientists trying to retrieve and advocate for a complexity of evolutionary 
relationships that, in many other ways, Darwin’s work still calls to our attention. As we will see 
in the next chapter, this complexity may require a different and less climactic articulation. 
In tracing these figurative debts that Darwin owes to agricultural writers, I have also 
repeatedly positioned my analysis against a long trend in the study of Darwin’s rhetoric, and the 
rhetoric of science more generally, that sees scientific explanations as a more thoroughly 
metaphorical endeavor. Yet if metaphor has been a preponderant trope in the rhetoric of science 
that prevalence is not without some valid reasons. One has only to look at the studies by Celeste 
Condit, Adam Bostanci, and Elizabeth Parthenia Shea to be convinced that metaphor plays an 
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instrumental role in the public illustration of scientific concepts or, as Leah Ceccarelli has 
shown, in the construction of alliances between different scientific disciplines (Condit 10-23, 
218-219; Bostanci 468-469; Shea 105-120; Ceccarelli 5, 34-37, 93-97, 163). Additionally, there 
is also interesting evidence, in studies by Ken Baake and Michael Bradie, that metaphors are 
essential to the communication amongst scientists within disciplines, particularly as aids to 
invention in nascent research agendas. Yet it is also telling that in both of Baake’s and Bradie’s 
accounts, some of the scientists they studied (particularly those engaged in mechanical physics 
and the construction of evolutionary models) rejected the researchers’ claims that their work was 
ultimately structured by that metaphorical logic (Baake 53-55, 72-73,76; Bradie 162-163). The 
scientists’ objections were for the very reasons we might imagine: that metaphor’s inherent 
polysemy detracts from the very accuracy and precision their research purports to offer. That, as 
we have seen, is quite similar to Darwin’s objection that a strong conception of scientific 
metaphor would misconstrue his theory. His goal, after all, was to identify a true cause, not a 
metaphorical one. 
Metaphors are certainly important to scientific invention and dissemination, but if we 
want to take seriously the idea that the context of discovery is always already a part of the 
context of justification, then we need to think more broadly about what other types of linguistic 
resources offer scientists both conceptual inventiveness and the ability to identify the causes of 
natural processes in a non-metaphorical way. That does not mean, however, that we have to 
concede that scientific discourse lies in some fanciful world of unmediated literality. The literal, 
as Gerard Genette argued, is not the only alternative to the metaphorical (114-121). We just need 
to consider what other types of figural arrangements scientists rely upon, what types of tropes 
they count as proof, and study how those figural logics articulate the arrangement of their 
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arguments. That is what I have tried to do here. In Darwin’s case, metonymy and incrementum 
appear to have been effective articulations, allowing him to reduce a multiplicity of interacting 
causes and effects down to a single independent causal agent, adequate to account for the types 
of changes he saw in the natural world. Such figurative language both helped him invent his 
argument and helped him prove it, providing him with a novel and persuasive way of articulating 
evolution. That his theory has been so successful suggests how enduringly articulate those tropes 
were.
   
181 
 
CHAPTER 5: ARTICULATING BIOLOGY ANEW 
The figurative arrangement of modern agricultural rhetoric was not merely metaphorical. 
Robert Bakewell had a forthrightly low estimation of his own agency, but Arthur Young saw that 
articulating Bakewell as a metonymic cause for all of agricultural improvement could help 
accomplish the very advances that Bakewell worried were beyond his reach. So while Bakewell 
was busy distributing any agency he might have out to the broader metonymy of the “Cause,” 
Young’s rhetoric worked to establish Bakewell and farmers like him as the metonymic figures 
that could substitute as the cause of all progressive husbandry, if not England’s greater 
civilizational advance. To do that, Young positioned Bakewell and a host of farmers like him as 
the climactic telos of incremental passages, narratives and histories. 
This created a cultural environment in which it actually became reasonable to imagine 
agriculturalists in imperial terms. If 100 years before farmers were generally thought of bucolic 
commoners, by the early 1800’s they were being represented by monumental columns and 
statues that dressed them as Roman Senators. These metonymic depictions, in which a single 
agricultural figure stood for a whole range of contiguous associations, were likewise undergirded 
by incremental spatial arrangements of environments, animals and laborers, as well as more 
temporal and historical incrementums like the upward spiraling pillar that memorialized Francis 
Russell’s gradual accomplishments in the same terms as Emperor Trajan’s long military 
campaign. 
So it should not surprise us that when Darwin consulted the technical manuals on 
breeding and domesticated livestock, he found similar accounts that historicized livestock 
   
182 
agriculture as a long incrementum of civilization progress culminating with the contemporary 
Engish breeder. That rhetoric made men like Bakewell, Coke, and Webb the single figure who 
could represent the contiguous causes and effects which that civilizational incrementum 
gradually cultivated, organized, and controlled. This climactic rhetoric was there waiting for 
Darwin, epitomized in William Youatt’s depictions of the breeder “[summoning] into life 
whatever form or mould he pleases,” and John Southey Somerville’s description of breeders 
chalking out a form on a wall and then “giving it existence” (Sheep 60; Somerville 2-3). These 
metonyms of a single cause evolving new varieties of animals allowed Darwin to imagine a 
selective cause completely free of any confounding variables, a unilateral mechanism that 
allowed cause to stand for extrinsic but still contiguous effects. The breeder, in the accounts 
Darwin found, adequately, unilaterally and directly accounted for the evolutionary change he 
produced.  
This historical analysis is, I think, what this dissertation has established fairly well. Yet in 
doing so it may have seemed to hew too closely to the kind of “logic of influence” analysis 
which, in the first chapter, I expressly stated I wanted to avoid. To some degree, that should not 
be considered an error, as it is clear to me that breeding principles did influence Darwin’s 
thinking. Yet granting a certain degree of influence between agricultural authors and Darwin’s 
work should not prevent us from also considering whether another, more rhetorical relationship 
also helped Darwin invent his science. This concluding chapter will attempt to summarize and 
clarify that rhetorical relationship, principally by arguing that if agricultural rhetoric became 
influential, it was largely because it articulated a relatively stable figurative arrangement that 
incrementally joined natural bodies with the metonymic agricultural figures that could represent 
them. Instead of agriculture just becoming an influential metaphorical way of thinking about a 
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separate nature, the agricultural climax allowed breeders to stand as metonymic representatives 
of the natural effects with which they remained contiguous. The agricultural rhetoric of this 
period articulated an incremental linkage between nature and culture while simultaneously 
affording a way for the human subjects of culture to represent that nature.   
If, as Bruno Latour has repeatedly argued, science never attempts to separate nature and 
culture but rather finds increasingly articulate ways of joining them, we can say that Young’s 
agricultural rhetoric begins this thoroughly hybrid process through the incremental articulation of 
his rhetoric. Part of that figurative arrangement’s challenge was accounting for how so much 
agency could naturally come to reside within a single farmer or breeder while still allowing the 
breeder to exist amidst the animals and environments he commanded. Arthur Young solved that 
rhetorical problem using climaxes that allowed agriculturalists to begin as mere farmers but rise 
in prestige through the course of the incremental series that articulated them. We saw this, for 
example, in the account Young gave of the barley farmer John Yeldham, which begins with 
Yeldham described as a humble “Esq.” practicing “common good husbandry.” Very quickly, 
however, Young’s tone rises, so that Yeldham can emerge from his common beginnings and 
demonstrate an “excellent husbandry” worthy of “veneration.” Young’s tone rises further, 
moving Yeldham from a somewhat agentic farmer into an entirely inventive “worthy author” 
who should be ranked amongst “the first cultivators of his age” (Six Weeks Tour 81). Series like 
this allowed farmers to still be continuously amidst “common good husbandry,” while also rising 
above and beyond it, to the point where they not only possessed the commanding creative 
powers of “authors,” but also stood as metonymic representatives for all of modern agriculture.  
Young’s rhetoric performed a similar function with Bakewell, allowing him to both be a 
“private” body and a significant “public” cultural figure. That, as we saw, is how Young 
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articulates Bakewell in his final discussion of this prototypical eminent breeder. Here, for 
reference, is the same passage we considered earlier in Chapter 2: 
In his private character, Bakewell was extremely respectable; his morals unimpeached; his conversation 
never disgraced by those detestable expletives so current in many a farming mouth;--his humanity to the 
brute creation eminent and exemplary; of the economy he practiced in his house-keeping, as well as his 
numerous journeys, Mr. Culley speaks in terms of warm approbation: in his observance of religious duties, 
he was steady and consistent, nor would he deviate from his rule of not shewing stock on a Sunday; though 
urged by persons of the highest rank: in word, he was a man who thought for himself, and whatever might 
be his failings, he was so decided a benefactor to the public, that his memory ought to be dear to the whole 
Agricultural world. And some statues are to be found in Westminster Abbey, erected to the memory of 
men, who merited far less of the public, than did this humble Cultivator of the earth. (On Husbandry 16-17) 
 
In the course of this passage, Young incrementally expands the scope of Bakewell’s 
influence. We begin with Bakewell granted an important but limited ability to control his own 
personal “private” body. Significantly, we next move to his treatment of animals, which is 
similarly humble and demonstrates his “humanity.” At this point in the passage, Bakewell is 
more a creature of nature than a force of it. His scope has increased beyond the control over his 
private body, but it has yet to take on the kind of great agentic power that could make him a 
causal metonym for all of agriculture. The passage, however, continues to expand the scope of 
Bakewell’s influence incrementally outward, with Young next considering Bakewell’s broader 
“economy” and then his even wider engagement with spiritual matters. The rising tone of this 
incremental movement underwrites the otherwise surprising suggestion that Bakewell deserved 
monumental commemoration in Westminster Abbey. If the passage begins with Bakewell a 
meek “private” body, demonstrating a basic “humanity” towards other animals, it concludes with 
him as an all-powerful, capital “C,” “Cultivator of the earth.” Passages like this one allowed 
Bakewell to both humanely interact with his livestock while also granting him privileges that 
surpassed common human powers. He could be both a private person and a contiguous entity 
amidst his animals, while also a climactic metonym for all of agriculture writ large. Young’s 
incremental articulation joins the natural bodies which agriculture cultivates with the causal 
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figures like Bakewell who, because of their great causal efficacy, are able to metonymically 
represent the power of cultivation.  
The idea that farmers deserved the kind of monumental recognition granted to England’s 
historical luminaries might still seem hyperbolic to contemporary readers, even set amidst the 
effectiveness of Young’s figurative rhetoric. Yet clearly Young was not alone in depicting 
breeders as civilization-defining figures, metonyms that could stand for all the other contiguous 
entities of improving agriculture. We saw in Chapter 4, for example, that Sir Richard 
Westmacott’s Monument to Francis Russell comes pretty close to actually doing what Young’s 
climactic rhetoric suggests, memorializing Russell as a monumental figure who could stand for 
all the improved animals, efficient laborers, and modern agricultural implements that are arrayed 
contiguously around his bronzed form. Indeed, throughout the genre of early 19th century 
English agricultural art, we see similarly incremental arrangements that simultaneously allow 
farmers, and particularly breeders, to stand bodily amidst nature while simultaneously 
representing its enlightened cultivation. Nature and culture are not separated in these depictions. 
Instead, metonymic figures of cultural power are climatically articulated amidst and out of 
nature. We see this best, I think in Thomas Weaver’s painting of Thomas Coke, in which sheep, 
laborers, steward, and breeder are organized incrementally so that Coke can metonymical 
represent the cultural power he has over the natural bodies around him, all while still existing 
harmoniously with them. More to the point, it is the very incremental articulation of his 
connection to those natural bodies that makes his metonymic status so plausible. If, instead, 
Weaver depicted Coke in his distant manor house in the painting’s background, reading letters or 
writing instructions to his laborers, he might well have appeared as a figure of culture, but one 
with no contiguous connection to the nature he is supposed to cause. As Weaver paints him, he 
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can both stand contiguously amidst the sheep’s natural bodies and also, through the notes he pens 
on his pad, author cultural meaning. Arranging the painting’s bodies incrementally allows 
Coke’s cultured presence to rise above his animals (and laborers) while still standing 
contiguously amidst them, making Coke’s metonymic status as reasonable a summation as the 
incremental series that leads upwards towards him. Coke’s metonymic status is, in this fashion, 
figuratively articulated, but not metaphorically so. He is both contiguous with the sheep’s natural 
bodies and the agricultural figure who can metonymically represent the cause of their 
improvement.  
The breeder’s metonymic status was not only undergirded by these spatial incrementums. 
Works like Garrard’s The Woburn Sheepshearing of 1804 and Westmacott’s Monument to 
Francis Russell gave the breeder a similar sense of metonymic power, but supported it with more 
temporal incrementums that positioned breeders as the historical culmination of gradual 
civilizational progress. This sense, that modern English breeders represented the contemporary 
climax of a long term cultural development was equally current in the breeding manuals Darwin 
read during his research for the Origin. And, as we have seen, the authors of those technical 
rhetorics used similarly incremental arrangements of cultural history to show that modern 
agriculture was the contiguous if refined telos of the civilizational stages that preceded it. In 
many cases these historical incrementums reached back to a time before agricultural breeding 
was deliberately pursued, thus creating a continuous historical narrative connecting the entirely 
natural evolution of wild animals with the purposefully caused breeding of domesticated ones.  
This allowed the modern breeder to metonymically represent the more primitive and natural 
forces that shaped animal evolution, while still remaining contiguous with those natural 
processes.  
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Darwin clearly uses this same incremental arrangement of contiguous historical stages in 
the Origin, arguing in the first chapter that modern breeder’s purposeful techniques of “artificial 
selection” were only incrementally different from less intentional human practices of 
“unconscious selection,” and these too only incremental different for “natural selection.” As 
Darwin moves from one stage to the next, he contiguously connects culture and nature, so that 
the breeder’s clear and linear causal efficacy can truly stand for the recursive causes and effects 
that are ubiquitously present between individual organisms. Jeanne Fahnestock and David 
Depew have each well argued that it was precisely the incremental figurative arrangement of this 
contiguous historical series that connects the two otherwise opposed spheres of nature and 
culture, thereby allowing the breeder to clearly identify the evolution’s causality (Fahnestock 
113-115; “Evolutionary Theory” 338). Yet as important as both Fahnestock’s and Depew’s 
insights are to a figurative analysis of Darwin’s argument, both of them still have yet to fully 
theorize the way the breeder metonymically represents nature’s causal efficacy. Fahnestock 
generally avoids the topic of how breeders figuratively function in the Origin, without exactly 
specifying a reason for that avoidance. However, her surrounding analysis suggests that, since 
other critics have frequently described the breeder as metaphorical, a deeper discussion of that 
figure would take her study down an overly-worn path of metaphorical analysis. Depew, on the 
other hand, forthrightly embraces the notion that the breeder is a metaphor for nature, yet, as he 
himself suggests, this would seem to undercut the instrumental rhetorical value that the breeder 
plays in clarifying evolution’s true cause. What I hope the analysis of Chapter 4 has shown is 
that the incremental arrangement of Darwin’s argument produces two simultaneous and 
ultimately inextricable rhetorical effects (neither of which is metaphorical). First, and as I just 
described above, it joins nature and culture as two merely terminal endpoints of a longer 
   
188 
historical series, contiguously aligned via intermediary historical stages in which both nature and 
culture operate side by side. This allows the breeder to non-metaphorically represent nature. 
Second, it leverages that very incremental narrative to show that the breeder’s singular and clear 
causal efficacy is a reasonable culmination of those prior historical stages in which cause and 
effect seem entangled. The incrementum not only links nature and culture, it also legitimates 
culture’s increasing ability to separate natural evolution into distinct cause and effect. The result 
is not just a gradual series, but a gradual refinement from natural opacity to clear, linear, 
mechanistic, and metonymic causality, in which the breeder not only non-metaphorically 
represents nature, but represents it as a singular and separate cause. In a critical way, then, 
incrementum and metonymy depend on one another in Darwin’s argument. Individually, neither 
is nearly as useful as they are in tandem, which is why I think their conjoined rhetorical 
performance is better understood as a single figure: climax.  
As I described in Chapter 4, a climax is an incrementum in which the final step in the 
series is made to rise over and above the contiguous stages that precede it. Metonymy is an 
effective trope for this final climactic stage, for reasons which I outlined in Chapter 1 and shall 
now reiterate here. As I argued in that earlier chapter, metonymy bases itself in a relation of 
simple contiguity. Before the metonymic substitution takes place, metonymy does not presume 
one term to be more representative than the other; it just requires they be contiguous. However, 
as soon as the substitution is made, that then grants the representative metonymic substitute an 
independent status over and above the term for which it substitutes. For example, the two 
metonymic extrinsic entities inventor and invention can be considered as equally real, but as 
soon as we represent the reading of Macbeth by saying we are “reading Shakespeare,” we have 
reduced the former to a subsidiary effect caused (and therefore representable) by the latter.  
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Thus, allowing the breeder to stand as a cause that can substitute for the natural 
contiguity of causes and effects does produce a kind of hierarchy in Darwin’s work, with the 
breeder the only entity that can entirely substitute for effects as their independent, “adequate,” 
representative cause. That hierarchy can be somewhat obscured in Darwin’s argument, as he 
repeatedly downplays the results of the breeder’s causal efficacy when compared with nature’s 
(Origin 109). Yet the breeder still retains a kind of hierarchical status not afforded to nature: 
nature cannot represent effects by substituting causes for them because, in nature, every cause is 
always already also an effect, just as every effect is always already also a cause. For one to 
substitute for the other, they would first have to be disentangled and that, as Darwin tells us at 
the Origin’s conclusion, is not how we contemplate nature in its manifold existence, even as it 
remains a function of a lawful set of Newtonian causes (489-490). In Darwin’s argument, only 
the breeder can be immediately seen as a singular, unilateral, and independent cause of 
evolution, and thus substitute for and represent its ontologically separate effects. For while the 
breeder can “summon into life whatever form or mould he pleases,” he is not in turn so 
biologically evolved by the animals he develops (qtd. in Origin 31). If he was, he would never be 
the true cause that adequately and independently accounted for his breed; his effects would 
account for and metonymically represent the cause of him. This would be more than just an 
interpretive tangle; it would suggest a more thoroughgoing ontological involvement of the two 
animals (human breeder and domesticated animal) and would have leant itself less to a theory of 
evolution than to a theory of involution (Deleuze and Guattari 238). Fortunately for Darwin, that 
was not how breeding was publically articulated. Breeding was depicted as the controlled 
“experiment” that showed nature’s mechanism operating through ontologically separate causes 
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and effects, a human breeder independently causing the evolution of animals through a linear 
mechanism that clarified the apparent tangles (Variation, vol. 1, 3).  
Bruno Latour has argued against this very type of linear causal explanation which the 
breeder metonymically offers. In his account, an action is not so much independently taken by a 
separate individual as it is “overtaken” by the other actants with whom the first forms a relatively 
stable if surprising society (Reassembling 43-46, 58-59). We do not, however, need to resort to 
Latour’s philosophical problematization of linear causality to critique Darwin’s metonymic 
deployment of it through the breeder. We have an ethnographic informant much closer to the 
breeder’s actual work than Latour, and Latour himself would tell us that it is precisely this kind 
of local actor’s avowed associations we should do our best to trace (48, 50-52). As we saw in 
Chapter 2, Robert Bakewell did not see himself as the independent cause of his breed. Rather, he 
identified the Dishley Ram Society as “the Cause,” a distributed assemblage that cooperatively 
evolved a sheep breed, the rules governing its circulation, the Society’s breeders’ standards, and 
the economic and political conditions that best ensured the Society’s survival. The Dishley Ram 
Society was not so much a single independent cause producing ontologically separate effects; it 
was an ontologically social “Cause” that articulated its actants felicitously and afforded them 
emergent effects inextricable (which is to say, not independent) from their mutual participation 
in that sociality. Put another way, the “Cause” that compelled Bakewell, his allies, their animals, 
and their politics was a successfully reproductive ecosystem.  
Now here a skeptic would insist that I am making an egregious and “merely rhetorical” 
category error: by calling the Dishley Ram Society a reproductive ecosystem and offering 
Bakewell’s more distributed and ecologically social “Causality” as a way of critiquing Darwin’s 
more linear mechanism of ontologically separate causes and effects, I am conflating the 
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obviously non-biological, social agencies that produced the Dishley Ram Society’s collaborative 
effects with the distinctly different biological agencies that only occur when individual 
organisms act on other ontologically independent organisms. Yet this very distinction, between 
individualistic biological action and collaboratively social involvement, in no small part exists 
because (as I argued in Chapter 4) Darwin’s metonymic agricultural argument allows him to 
articulate biology in that distinctly individualistic way. As Darwin tells us repeatedly in Origin, 
biological change is an interaction either between different individual organisms or between 
individual organisms and ontologically separate environmental conditions (what Darwin refers to 
in the quotation directly below as the “physical conditions of life.”). It is an apparently entangled 
interaction, to be sure, but one in which “...there must, in every case be a struggle for existence, 
either one individual with another of the same species, or with the individuals of distinct species, 
or with the physical conditions of life” (my emphasis; 64). It was Darwin’s very metonymic 
conception of the breeder--a singular, independent vera causa, selecting which animal to 
reproduce and which to slaughter--that helped him represent biology in this individualistic, 
nonsocial way. Of course, Darwin’s interest in Malthusian demography (the theory that constant 
human population expansion evinces divinely ordained competition favoring the industrious and 
virtuous) may have also predisposed him to think along these lines (Bowler 102). Yet as we saw 
in Chapter 4, Darwin had to fulfill the vera causa requirement by showing selection was a causal 
force that actually caused biological evolution, and it was the breeder metonym that provided 
him with that independent causal clarity. We do not have to take my word for that conclusion; 
we have Darwin himself saying that it is the identical process of agricultural breeding that allows 
us to perceive how selection acts on specifically “individual” organisms. He writes just that in 
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his 1844 “Essay,” which served as a second draft (after the 1842 sketch quoted in Chapter 2) for 
the arguments he later made in the Origin: 
Can it be doubted, from the struggle each individual has to obtain subsistence, that any minute variation in 
structure, habits, or instincts, adapting that individual better to the new conditions, would tell upon its 
vigour and health? In the struggle it would have a better chance of surviving; and those of its offspring 
which inherited the variation, be it ever so slight, would also have a better chance. Yearly more are bred 
than can survive; the smallest grain in the balance, in the long run, must tell on which death shall fall, and 
which shall survive. Let this work of selection on the one hand, and death on the other, go on for a 
thousand generations, who will pretend to affirm that it would produce no effect, when we remember what, 
in a few years, Bakewell effected in cattle and Western in Sheep by this identical principle of selection. (my 
emphasis; Foundations 91) 
 
The middle of this passage is particularly interesting because Darwin’s discussion of the internal 
pressures created by a constantly expanding population is precisely the kind of thinking that 
might lead him to an analogy with Malthusianism. In that very same moment, however, Darwin 
is already turning back to the language of breeders, so that instead of writing “Yearly more are 
born than can survive” we find him stating “Yearly more are bred than can survive” (my 
emphasis). Then, by the end of the passage, it is Bakewell (and another eminent breeder, Lord 
Western), not Malthus, who identifies the causal principle underlying evolution. These eminent 
breeders allowed Darwin to figure breeding as a process of fundamentally separate causes and 
effects, and thus articulate biology as an ontology of equally individualistic organisms acting 
upon one another according to identical selective causalities.  
We should pause to acknowledge that though I am convinced classical Darwinism (and 
its neo-Darwinian offshoots) is ultimately a theory of individualistic change (and am in good 
company in thinking so (Gayon 27, 68)) there are scholars who argue that other elements of 
Darwin’s work also support theories of group selection and social collaboration (Borello 3). We 
do not have the time to settle those disputes here. What we can assert, however, is that to the 
degree that Darwin does make the independent individual organism a primary unit of biological 
analysis, it was the metonymic individual breeder selecting individual animals that, helped him 
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conceive of it in that way. Darwin articulates breeding as a process in which an external cause 
(the selective breeder) effects a change in an ontologically separate individual (the animal). It 
was this very ontological separation of causes from their effects that made his argument conform 
to the Herschelian and Netownian vera causa, just as it was that conformation with the vera 
causa that made his theory comport with the logical standards of his contemporary scientific 
audience. It was not just a logical argument, however; it was an articulation of climactic 
figuration.   
That Robert Bakewell, the avowed “servant” of his Society’s ontologically social 
“Cause,” functioned as a prototypical causal agency of that contrastingly individualistic 
Darwinian argument is not so much ironic as it is the predictable result of Bakewell limiting his 
articulations to the more limited social “Cause” he wanted to serve. The Bakewell Darwin 
encountered was not the one we saw in Bakewell’s personal letters to George Culley about the 
Dishley Ram Society. It was the Bakewell first publically portrayed by Arthur Young and, later, 
the other agricultural rhetors this dissertation considered in Chapters 3 and 4. It was Bakewell the 
“eminent breeder”--Bakewell the “Cultivator of the earth.” That figurative arrangement did more 
than articulate the improvement of breeding. It began a figurative style that would eventually 
articulate a new biological nature, just as Bakewell’s private correspondences were articulating a 
different kind of sociality.  
Whether those two figurative arrangements--the “Cause” of  sociality and the cause of 
biology--need necessarily be so different is a question that has hummed in the background of this 
entire dissertation. It is one which the analysis of the preceding four chapters can not so much 
answer as prepare a way for me to productively explore in my future work. As I mentioned at the 
conclusion of Chapter 4, there are a number of scientists within biology who are asking very 
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similar questions. Researchers like Richard Lewontin, F. John Odling-Smee, Kevin Laland and 
Marcus Feldman have made convincing arguments that biology is too constrained by the 
individualistic neo-Darwinian approaches advanced by theorists like Richard Dawkins (Wells 
548-549). Jeanne Fahnestock has written with great acuity on Richard Lewontin’s alternative 
(non-Darwinian) way of figuratively arranging evolutionary relationships. Lewontin, Fahnestock 
points out, uses a kind of linguistic palindrome called an antemetabole to argue that the 
environment produces the organism just as the organism produces the environment (154-155). 
Lewontin’s figurative science also seems well suited to solving the kind of philosophical 
problems which interest me, as his notion of non-human biological life cultivating selective 
environmental conditions suggests a mode of cultivation permeating nature, making cultural 
production as natural as selection adaptation. Additionally (and as Fahnestock argues), the fact 
that it is the very antimetabolic figuration of his argument that helps Lewontin start to question 
the Darwinian separation between environments and organism suggests that something about the 
figure’s own internal syntagmatic structural symmetry resists the reader’s attempts to break the 
two entities (environment and organism) apart (155). Lewontin, it seems to me, has found a 
relatively stable articulation to resolve the natural and cultural problems with which he and much 
of contemporary biology is faced. 
For now, I think Lewontin has arrived at a generally tenable solution to the problems 
posed by Darwin’s evolutionary rhetoric, yet I would caution us from imagining that it is a final 
answer--a kind of climactic solution in its own right. As we saw in Arthur Young’s utopianist 
novel Emmera, a climactic search for a stable figure of natural-cultural consummation can have 
overtones of both imperial appropriation and patriarchal libidinal desire. Young’s novelistic 
work does not seem to have been an outlier, for even though I have not made an extensive point 
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of calling it to the reader’s attention, it has not escaped my notice that the agricultural rhetoric I 
study is shot through with phallic figures (masculine statues, columns, bulls, rams, and stallions) 
that try to offer audiences a stable identification of England’s cultural power over nature. We 
saw that most prominently, I think, in Chapter 3’s analysis of agricultural art, particularly with 
the monumental column in George Garrard’s painting of the The Woburn Sheepshearing in 1804. 
That that column was likely intended to reconstitute the presence of an absent patriarch lends 
even more credence to a psychoanalytic reading of its performativity. We saw similarly climactic 
attempts by Young to monumentalize Bakewell as a statuesque figure that could stand for all the 
earth’s masculine cultivation. That same climactic arrangement persists in the breeding manuals 
Darwin read, particularly in Youatt’s invocation that the modern breeder stands as the telos of 
agricultural history, finally achieving the ability to “summon into life whatever form or mould he 
pleases” (qtd. in Origin 31). These very gendered climaxes were incredibly desirable to Darwin, 
but I think they have outlived their usefulness to us.  
One of Darwin’s more enduring insights is that both nature and culture really do change. 
That being the case, it may be that the constantly articulating movement of evolution and 
involution, biology and sociality, require us to never settle on some imagined final figure that 
will forever solve our rhetorical problems, be they natural, cultural, or some hybrid of the two. 
Yet if we have the burden of continuously needing to rearticulate our world, we are fortunate that 
both our linguistic and biological affordances seem remarkably capable of that incessant 
movement. Christian Lundberg has argued that attempts to imagine a consummate rhetorical 
relationship never achieve the final climax that they seek, and I am inclined to agree with him 
(122-123). Yet he also quickly enjoins against the conclusion that this radical indeterminacy of 
autonomous rhetorical registers necessarily means that rhetoric itself does not exist (123). 
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Nature, I believe, may have this ever-articulating propensity as well, a radical indeterminacy 
incessantly turning us to new lives and new worlds, evolving and involving us in new 
arrangements with the beings around and without us. If this is true, then rhetoric’s own incessant 
movement may be the very complication we require to remain amidst the changing world with 
which we, even in our failures, continue to live. 
The rhetoric of science has a crucial role to play in this future, helping scientists and 
philosophers, not to mention rhetoricians and their students, understand that the ways we 
figuratively arrange nature and culture are much more than “merely metaphorical” or “merely 
rhetorical.” They articulate the kinds of lives we interact with and open us to the possibility of 
how our own lives might involve them anew. The space between us and these others is a 
commons we will continue to cultivate, one way or the other, either with indifference or with 
sense. I believe we all have means to be more articulate.
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